Designing and generating prototype for E-Governance based election strategy using biometric authentication and smart card device

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Military Voting and the Law: Procedural and Technological Solutions to the Ballot Transit Problem

During the 2000 presidential election controversy in Florida, the ballots submitted by individuals living overseas—especially military voters—were seen as crucial to the election outcome as the margin of potential victory was so small that these ballots could turn the election from one candidate to the other. Headlines at the time noted that “Odds Against Gore Absentee Gains: Republican-Leaning Counties Appear to Have More Uncounted Overseas Ballots,” “Bush Lead Swells with Overseas Votes,” “Military Ballot Review is Urged,” and “How Bush Took Florida: Mining the Overseas Absentee Vote.” For many Americans, however, the controversy surrounding the votes of military personnel and overseas voters, despite its importance, may have seemed both bewildering and esoteric. The debate centered on minute details; whether or not certain overseas absentee ballots were valid and could therefore be counted if they lacked postmarks, were received within given time periods, had missing signature or were deficient in other statutorily required characteristics, that are beyond the interest of the typical individual. However, several key legal skirmishes were fought within the broader context of the recount battle concerning whether certain absentee ballots could be counted, the resolution of which could have swayed the outcome of the 2000 presidential election. Issues of equal protection, federalism and statutory interpretation played large roles in this litigation. The tension between allowing overseas votes to be counted and ensuring a fair election that complied with state law was at the heart of the debate and related litigation

Military voting and the law: procedural and technological solutions to the ballot transit problem

Journal ArticleDuring the 2000 presidential election controversy in Florida, the ballots submitted by individuals living overseas-especially military voters-were seen as crucial to the election outcome as the margin of potential victory was so small that these ballots could turn the election from one candidate to the other. Headlines at the time noted that "Odds Against Gore Absentee Gains: Republican-Leaning Counties Appear to Have More Uncounted Overseas Ballots,"1 "Bush Lead Swells with Overseas Votes,"2 "Military Ballot Review is Urged,"3 And "How Bush Took Florida: Mining the Overseas Absentee Vote."4 For many Americans, however, the controversy surrounding the votes of military personnel and overseas voters, despite its importance, may have seemed both bewildering and esoteric. The debate centered on minute details; whether or not certain overseas absentee ballots were valid and could therefore be counted if they lacked postmarks, were received within given time periods, had missing

Potential and challenges of e-voting in the European Union

European Union Democracy Observatory (EUDO)This study was commissioned and supervised by the European Parliament’s Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the AFCO Committee. It addresses the potentials and challenges of the implementation of Internet voting in European Parliament elections. It considers the social, political, legal, and technological implications of its introduction as an alternative to on-paper ballot and builds on the recent experience of previous trials and successful e-enabled elections to issue technical recommendations regarding Internet voting in the European Union

A novel smart contract based blockchain with sidechain for electronic voting

Several countries have been researching digital voting methods in order to overcome the challenges of paper balloting and physical voting. The recent coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) epidemic has compelled the remote implementation of existing systems and procedures. Online voting will ultimately become the norm just like unified payments interface (UPI) payments and online banking. With digital voting or electronic voting (e-voting) a small bug can cause massive vote rigging. E-voting must be honest, exact, safe, and simple. E-voting is vulnerable to malware, which can disrupt servers. Blockchain’s end-to-end validation solves these problems. Three smart contracts-voter, candidate, and voting-are employed. The problem of fraudulent actions is addressed using vote coins. Vote coins indicate voter status. Sidechain technology complements blockchain. Sidechains improve blockchain functionality by performing operations outside of blockchains and delivering the results to the mainchain. Thus, storing the encrypted vote on the sidechain and using the decrypted result on the mainchain reduces cost. Building access control policies to grant only authorized users’ access to the votes for counting is made simpler by this authorization paradigm. Results of the approach depict the proposed e-voting system improves system security against replay attacks and reduces the processing cost as well as processing time

On the Integration of Blockchain and SDN: Overview, Applications, and Future Perspectives

Blockchain (BC) and software-defined networking (SDN) are leading technologies which have recently found applications in several network-related scenarios and have consequently experienced a growing interest in the research community. Indeed, current networks connect a massive number of objects over the Internet and in this complex scenario, to ensure security, privacy, confidentiality, and programmability, the utilization of BC and SDN have been successfully proposed. In this work, we provide a comprehensive survey regarding these two recent research trends and review the related state-of-the-art literature. We first describe the main features of each technology and discuss their most common and used variants. Furthermore, we envision the integration of such technologies to jointly take advantage of these latter efficiently. Indeed, we consider their group-wise utilization—named BC–SDN—based on the need for stronger security and privacy. Additionally, we cover the application fields of these technologies both individually and combined. Finally, we discuss the open issues of reviewed research and describe potential directions for future avenues regarding the integration of BC and SDN. To summarize, the contribution of the present survey spans from an overview of the literature background on BC and SDN to the discussion of the benefits and limitations of BC–SDN integration in different fields, which also raises open challenges and possible future avenues examined herein. To the best of our knowledge, compared to existing surveys, this is the first work that analyzes the aforementioned aspects in light of a broad BC–SDN integration, with a specific focus on security and privacy issues in actual utilization scenarios

On the Integration of Blockchain and SDN: Overview, Applications, and Future Perspectives

Blockchain (BC) and Software-Defined Networking (SDN) are leading technologies which have recently found applications in several network-related scenarios and have consequently experienced a growing interest in the research community. Indeed, current networks connect a massive number of objects over the Internet and in this complex scenario, to ensure security, privacy, confidentiality, and programmability, the utilization of BC and SDN have been successfully proposed. In this work, we provide a comprehensive survey regarding these two recent research trends and review the related state-of-the-art literature. We first describe the main features of each technology and discuss their most common and used variants. Furthermore, we envision the integration of such technologies to jointly take advantage of these latter efficiently. Indeed, we consider their group-wise utilization -- named BC-SDN -- based on the need for stronger security and privacy. Additionally, we cover the application fields of these technologies both individually and combined. Finally, we discuss the open issues of reviewed research and describe potential directions for future avenues regarding the integration of BC and SDN. To summarize, the contribution of the present survey spans from an overview of the literature background on BC and SDN to the discussion of the benefits and limitations of BC-SDN integration in different fields, which also raises open challenges and possible future avenues examined herein. To the best of our knowledge, compared to existing surveys, this is the first work that analyzes the aforementioned aspects in light of a broad BC-SDN integration, with a specific focus on security and privacy issues in actual utilization scenarios.Comment: 42 pages, 14 figures, to be published in Journal of Network and Systems Management - Special Issue on Blockchains and Distributed Ledgers in Network and Service Managemen

Is Internet Voting Trustworthy? The Science and the Policy Battles

According to clear scientific consensus, no known technology can make internet voting secure. In some applications—such as e-pollbooks (voter sign-in), voter registration, and absentee ballot request—it is appropriate to use the internet, as the inherent insecurity can be mitigated by other means. But the insecurity of paperless transmission of a voted ballot through the internet cannot be mitigated. The law recognizes this in several ways. Courts have enjoined the use of certain paperless or internet-connected voting systems. Federal law requires states to allow voters to use the internet to request absentee ballots but carefully stops short of internet ballot return (i.e., voting). But many U.S. states and a few countries go beyond what is safe: they have adopted internet voting for citizens living abroad and (in some cases) for voters with disabilities. Most internet voting systems have an essentially common architecture, and they are insecure at least at the same key point: after the voter has reviewed the ballot but before it is transmitted. I review six internet voting systems deployed between 2006 and 2021 that were insecure in practice, just as predicted by theory—of which some were also insecure in surprising new ways, “unforced errors”. We cannot get along without the assistance of computers. U.S. ballots are too long to count entirely by hand unless the special circumstances of a recount require it. So computer-counted paper ballots play a critical role in the security and auditability of our elections. But audits cannot be used to secure internet voting systems, which have no paper ballots that form an auditable paper trail. There are policy controversies: trustworthiness versus convenience, and security versus accessibility. From 2019 to 2022 there were lawsuits in Virginia, New Jersey, New York, New Hampshire, and North Carolina; legislation enacted in Rhode Island and withdrawn in California. There is a common pattern to these disputes, which have mostly resolved in a way that provides remote accessible vote by mail (RAVBM) but stops short of permitting electronic ballot return (internet voting). What would it take to thoroughly review a proposed internet voting system to be assured whether it delivers the security it promises? Switzerland provides a case study. In Switzerland, after a few years of internet voting pilot projects, the Federal Chancellery commissioned several extremely thorough expert studies of their deployed system. These reports teach us not only about their internet voting system itself but about how to study those systems before making policy decisions. Accessibility of election systems to voters with disabilities is a genuine problem. Disability-rights groups have been among those lobbying for internet voting (which is not securable) and other forms of remote accessible vote by mail (which can be adequately securable). I review statistics showing that internet voting is probably not the most effective way to serve voters with disabilities

Mitigating Electoral Discontents in Nigeria: A Case for SMS Enabled Vote-Casting System

Two decades into the 4th Republic has witnessed 6 elections fraught with varying kinds of anomalies that all 3 electoral reforms within the period have been unable to subdue. Electoral violence has summarily led to countless loss of lives and continued low voter turnout. Borrowing however from the resounding success of e-banking the country can rewardingly procure an e-resuscitation of the electoral sector that is not only guilty of consistent fraud but also liable for continued loss of lives. Nigeria ranked atop as the most improved country in Sub-Saharan Africa in the Mobile Connectivity Index as at 2019 and the seventh most improved globally. This progress was driven by a range of improvements like enabling regulatory framework espoused by the country in this direction and as a result the country now has one of the most affordable handset costs in the world besides a mobile penetration of 187 million active cell phone users of the country’s 212 million population as of 2021. In addition, up from 31% in 2014 to 52% in 2019, Nigeria’s Online Service Index score for e-government shows glaringly that the country is robustly ready for an SMS enabled vote casting system and would do well to rapidly implement same. SMS voting is premised on familiar technology and the use of a single ballot box (single computer Server) is not only fraud-proof but also guarantees eradication of violence and frequent loss of lives associated conventional vote-casting system while also improving political participation and voter turnout

Creating Friction: Infrastructuring Civic Engagement in Everyday Life

This paper introduces the theoretical lens of the everyday to intersect and extend the emerging bodies of research on contestational design and infrastructures of civic engagement. Our analysis of social theories of everyday life suggests a design space that distinguishes ‘privileged moments’ of civic engagement from a more holistic understanding of the everyday as ‘product-residue.’ We analyze various efforts that researchers have undertaken to design infrastructures of civic engagement along two axes: the everyday-ness of the engagement fostered (from ‘privileged moments’ to ‘product-residue’) and the underlying paradigm of political participation (from consensus to contestation). Our analysis reveals the dearth and promise of infrastructures that create friction— provoking contestation through use that is embedded in the everyday life of citizens. Ultimately, this paper is a call to action for designers to create friction.