Modelling the Developing Mind: From Structure to Change

This paper presents a theory of cognitive change. The theory assumes that the fundamental causes of cognitive change reside in the architecture of mind. Thus, the architecture of mind as specified by the theory is described first. It is assumed that the mind is a three-level universe involving (1) a processing system that constrains processing potentials, (2) a set of specialized capacity systems that guide understanding of different reality and knowledge domains, and (3) a hypecognitive system that monitors and controls the functioning of all other systems. The paper then specifies the types of change that may occur in cognitive development (changes within the levels of mind, changes in the relations between structures across levels, changes in the efficiency of a structure) and a series of general (e.g., metarepresentation) and more specific mechanisms (e.g., bridging, interweaving, and fusion) that bring the changes about. It is argued that different types of change require different mechanisms. Finally, a general model of the nature of cognitive development is offered. The relations between the theory proposed in the paper and other theories and research in cognitive development and cognitive neuroscience is discussed throughout the paper

Rationality in discovery : a study of logic, cognition, computation and neuropharmacology

Part I Introduction The specific problem adressed in this thesis is: what is the rational use of theory and experiment in the process of scientific discovery, in theory and in the practice of drug research for Parkinson’s disease? The thesis aims to answer the following specific questions: what is: 1) the structure of a theory?; 2) the process of scientific reasoning?; 3) the route between theory and experiment? In the first part I further discuss issues about rationality in science as introduction to part II, and I present an overview of my case-study of neuropharmacology, for which I interviewed researchers from the Groningen Pharmacy Department, as an introduction to part III. Part II Discovery In this part I discuss three theoretical models of scientific discovery according to studies in the fields of Logic, Cognition, and Computation. In those fields the structure of a theory is respectively explicated as: a set of sentences; a set of associated memory chunks; and as a computer program that can generate the observed data. Rationality in discovery is characterized by: finding axioms that imply observation sentences; heuristic search for a hypothesis, as part of problem solving, by applying memory chunks and production rules that represent skill; and finding the shortest program that generates the data, respectively. I further argue that reasoning in discovery includes logical fallacies, which are neccesary to introduce new hypotheses. I also argue that, while human subjects often make errors in hypothesis evaluation tasks from a logical perspective, these evaluations are rational given a probabilistic interpretation. Part III Neuropharmacology In this last part I discusses my case-study and a model of discovery in a practice of drug research for Parkinson’s disease. I discuss the dopamine theory of Parkinson’s disease and model its structure as a qualitative differential equation. Then I discuss the use and reasons for particular experiments to both test a drug and explore the function of the brain. I describe different kinds of problems in drug research leading to a discovery. Based on that description I distinguish three kinds of reasoning tasks in discovery, inference to: the best explanation, the best prediction and the best intervention. I further demonstrate how a part of reasoning in neuropharmacology can be computationally modeled as qualitative reasoning, and aided by a computer supported discovery system

Human reasoning and cognitive science

In the late summer of 1998, the authors, a cognitive scientist and a logician, started talking about the relevance of modern mathematical logic to the study of human reasoning, and we have been talking ever since. This book is an interim report of that conversation. It argues that results such as those on the Wason selection task, purportedly showing the irrelevance of formal logic to actual human reasoning, have been widely misinterpreted, mainly because the picture of logic current in psychology and cognitive science is completely mistaken. We aim to give the reader a more accurate picture of mathematical logic and, in doing so, hope to show that logic, properly conceived, is still a very helpful tool in cognitive science. The main thrust of the book is therefore constructive. We give a number of examples in which logical theorizing helps in understanding and modeling observed behavior in reasoning tasks, deviations of that behavior in a psychiatric disorder (autism), and even the roots of that behavior in the evolution of the brain

An Electroencephalogram Investigation of Two Modes of Reasoning

The use of electroencephalography (EEG) to exam the electrical brain activity associated with reasoning provides an opportunity to quantify the functional and temporal aspects of this uniquely human capability, and at the same time expand our knowledge about what a given event-related potential (ERP) might measure. The question of what form of mental representation and transformational processes underlie human reasoning has been a central theme in cognitive psychology since its inception (Chomsky, 1957; McCarthy, 1955; Miller, 1956; Newell, Shaw, Simon, 1958). Two prominent, but competing views remain at the forefront of the discussion, one positing that human inference making is principally syntactic (Braine & O'Brien, 1998; Fodor, 1975; Pylyshyn, 1984; Rips, 1994), and the other that it is, fundamentally, semantic in nature (Gentner & Stevens, 1983; Johnson-Laird, 1983). The purpose of the proposed study is to investigate the neurophysiology of mental model (MM) and mental rule (MR) reasoning using high-density electroencephalography (EEG), with the goal of providing a characterization of the time course and a general estimate of the spatial dimensions of the brain activations correlated with these specific instances of two classic views of reasoning. The research is motivated by two questions: 1) Will violations of expectancy established by the devised MM and MR reasoning strategies evoke the N400 and P600 ERPs, respectively, and 2) Will topographical scalp distributions associated with each reasoning strategy suggest distinct psychological representations and processes? A finding of a N400 response in the MM condition suggests that reasoning about the relations between entities in the type of problems presented engages a network of cortical areas previously shown to be involved in processing violations of semantic expectancies in studies of language comprehension. By comparison, incongruent events in the MR condition are expected to evoke a bilateral anterior P600, a component previously associated with recognizing and restructuring syntactic anomalies or incongruities in sentence comprehension. If the hypothesized results are obtained they would provide potentially insightful information about the chronometry of mental processes associated with the different representations and inference making mechanisms postulated to support each mode of reasoning, and as well, broaden our understanding of the neural functionality associated with the N400 and P600 ERP

Enhanced Bees Algorithm with fuzzy logic and Kalman filtering

The Bees Algorithm is a new population-based optimisation procedure which employs a combination of global exploratory and local exploitatory search. This thesis introduces an enhanced version of the Bees Algorithm which implements a fuzzy logic system for greedy selection of local search sites. The proposed fuzzy greedy selection system reduces the number of parameters needed to run the Bees Algorithm. The proposed algorithm has been applied to a number of benchmark function optimisation problems to demonstrate its robustness and self-organising ability. The Bees Algorithm in both its basic and enhanced forms has been used to optimise the parameters of a fuzzy logic controller. The purpose of the controller is to stabilise and balance an under-actuated two-link acrobatic robot (ACROBOT) in the upright position. Kalman filtering, as a fast convergence gradient-based optimisation method, is introduced as an alternative to random neighbourhood search to guide worker bees speedily towards the optima of local search sites. The proposed method has been used to tune membership functions for a fuzzy logic system. Finally, the fuzzy greedy selection system is enhanced by using multiple independent criteria to select local search sites. The enhanced fuzzy selection system has again been used with Kalman filtering to speed up the Bees Algorithm. The resulting algorithm has been applied to train a Radial Basis Function (RBF) neural network for wood defect identification. The results obtained show that the changes made to the Bees Algorithm in this research have significantly improved its performance. This is because these enhancements maintain the robust global search attribute of the Bees Algorithm and improve its local search procedure.EThOS - Electronic Theses Online ServiceGBUnited Kingdo

Predictive processing and mental representation

According to some (e.g. Friston, 2010) predictive processing (PP) models of cognition have the potential to offer a grand unifying theory of cognition. The framework defines a flexible architecture governed by one simple principle – minimise error. The process of Bayesian inference used to achieve this goal results in an ongoing flow of prediction that both makes sense of perception and unifies it with action. Such a provocative and appealing theory naturally has caused ripples in philosophical circles, prompting several commentaries (e.g. Hohwy, 2012; Clark, 2016). This thesis tackles one outstanding philosophical problem in relation to PP – the question of mental representation. In attempting to understand the nature of mental representations in PP systems I touch on several contentious points in philosophy of cognitive science, including the explanatory power of mechanisms vs. dynamics, the internalism vs. externalism debate, and the knotty problem of proper biological function. Exploring these issues enables me to offer a speculative solution to the question of mental representation in PP systems, with further implications for understanding mental representation in a broader context. The result is a conception of mind that is deeply continuous with life. With an explanation of how normativity emerges in certain classes of self-maintaining systems of which cognitive systems are a subset. We discover the possibility of a harmonious union between mechanics and dynamics necessary for making sense of PP systems, each playing an indispensable role in our understanding of their internal representations

Using Novel Semantic and Informational Manipulations of Rules to Extend an Interpretive Approach to Conditional Reasoning

Institute for Communicating and Collaborative SystemsThis thesis extends a view of human reasoning which emphasises a theory of interpretation in conditional reasoning. It extends work on Wason’s (1968) ‘selection task’, using novel rules and contexts to explore the factors that control subject interpretations, which in turn is reflected in their performance. After reviewing the work on conditional reasoning and particularly the interpretative framework of Stenning & van Lambalgen (2004), the thesis explores subjects’ reasoning with rules that describe processes extended in time in two experiments. The most striking finding is that many subjects exhibit an unusual constant anaphor reading, even though the anaphors involved are tenses rather than pronouns. Results are explained in terms of the temporal constraints involved in the situation described. The thesis then uses novel ‘information packaging’ manipulations which use colour to emphasise different distinctions in Wason’s original task. This manipulation provides evidence of where subjects’ attention already rests. This is combined with a task that gathers data of subjects’ interpretation of negation. Results are consistent with the idea that although subjects in the standard task are focussed on the distinction between cases that fit the rule and ones that do not, there is evidence that emphasising the mapping of the antecedent/consequent onto back/front of the cards is sensitive to these manipulations. The negation interpretation task reveals striking divergences between subjects’ interpretations and the classical model assumed in the literature, and these differences are interpretable in terms of default logic. A few conditions were originally designed as controls only to end up generating striking results of their own. Colour is used in the truth conditional semantics of the rules (black/white replaces number/letter or vowel/consonant) instead of being used as mere information packaging. Sizable increases in ‘classical competence’ responses are observed and this is interpreted in terms of the non-hierarchical structure of the properties used. Studies using LSA and a novel tensor network operating on a database of rules gathered from selection task literature show conclusively that higher frequencies of function words appear in descriptive rules than they do in deontic rules. This thesis concludes that it is possible to direct subjects towards various interpretations on the task through the use of semantic manipulations that include but are not restricted to the ones observed in this work. Issues that include resolving the anaphora in the problem, the hierarchy of the structure of properties and the negation of clauses clearly influence the interpretation subjects arrive at which in turn affects their reasoning and responses. Results indicate that subject assumptions concerning negatives are different from those made by experimenters which inform all major theories including Mental Models, Information Gain and those based on mental logic. In particular, subjects’ most frequent selections indicate that they are selecting an implicit negative which is the opposite of what is expected by the principle of truth of Mental Models

Scientific Explanation and the Philosophy of Persuasion: Understanding Rhetoric through Scientific Principles and Mechanisms

This thesis explores the issue of whether Aristotle\u27s Rhetoric is consistent with the principles and tools of contemporary science. The approach is to review Aristotle\u27s Rhetoric (along with several modernizing ideas) in light of explanatory mechanisms from psychology, biology, cognitive science and neuroscience. The thesis begins by reviewing Aristotle\u27s Rhetoric and modern rhetorical contributions from Chaim Perelman and Christopher Tindale. A discussion of several psychological principles of reasoning and their relevance to philosophical rhetoric follows. Next, a computational cognitive science framework on emotions and cognition and its applicability to rhetoric is provided, followed by a discussion from principles of evolutionary biology on language evolution and morality and their relevance to rhetoric. The thesis concludes with a brief discussion of rhetorical ideas relative to the neuroanatomy of deductive and inductive reasoning and relative to a view of morality founded on brain neurochemistry

The Psychology of Human Thought

The “Psychology of Human Thought” is an “open access” collection of peer-reviewed chapters from all areas of higher cognitive processes. The book is intended to be used as a textbook in courses on higher process, complex cognition, human thought, and related courses. Chapters include concept acquisition, knowledge representation, inductive and deductive reasoning, problem solving, metacognition, language, expertise, intelligence, creativity, wisdom, development of thought, affect and thought, and sections about history and about methods. The chapters are written by distinguished scholarly experts in their respective fields, coming from such diverse regions as North America, Great Britain, France, Germany, Norway, Israel, and Australia. The level of the chapters is addressed to advanced undergraduates and beginning graduate students.„Psychology of Human Thought“ ist eine Sammlung frei zugänglicher, qualitätsgeprüfter Kapitel aus allen Gebieten höherer Kognition. Sie ist gedacht als Lesebuch zum Studium komplexer Kognition und des menschlichen Denkens. Die Kapitel umfassen die Themen Begriffserwerb, Wissensrepräsentation, induktives und deduktives Schließen, Problemlösen, Metakognition, Sprache, Kultur, Expertise, Intelligenz, Kreativität, Weisheit, Denkentwicklung, Denken und Gefühle. Auch Kapitel zur Geschichte und zu Methoden sind dabei. Die Kapitel sind von weltweit führenden Experten aus den USA, Großbritannien, Frankreich, Norwegen, Israel, Australien und Deutschland verfasst. Das Niveau ist ausgerichtet auf fortgeschrittene Studierende