Are developmental disorders like cases of adult brain damage? Implications from connectionist modelling

It is often assumed that similar domain-specific behavioural impairments found in cases of adult brain damage and developmental disorders correspond to similar underlying causes, and can serve as convergent evidence for the modular structure of the normal adult cognitive system. We argue that this correspondence is contingent on an unsupported assumption that atypical development can produce selective deficits while the rest of the system develops normally (Residual Normality), and that this assumption tends to bias data collection in the field. Based on a review of connectionist models of acquired and developmental disorders in the domains of reading and past tense, as well as on new simulations, we explore the computational viability of Residual Normality and the potential role of development in producing behavioural deficits. Simulations demonstrate that damage to a developmental model can produce very different effects depending on whether it occurs prior to or following the training process. Because developmental disorders typically involve damage prior to learning, we conclude that the developmental process is a key component of the explanation of endstate impairments in such disorders. Further simulations demonstrate that in simple connectionist learning systems, the assumption of Residual Normality is undermined by processes of compensation or alteration elsewhere in the system. We outline the precise computational conditions required for Residual Normality to hold in development, and suggest that in many cases it is an unlikely hypothesis. We conclude that in developmental disorders, inferences from behavioural deficits to underlying structure crucially depend on developmental conditions, and that the process of ontogenetic development cannot be ignored in constructing models of developmental disorders

Models of atypical development must also be models of normal development

Functional magnetic resonance imaging studies of developmental disorders and normal cognition that include children are becoming increasingly common and represent part of a newly expanding field of developmental cognitive neuroscience. These studies have illustrated the importance of the process of development in understanding brain mechanisms underlying cognition and including children ill the study of the etiology of developmental disorders

A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience

When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches vehicle and process theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may be space for vehicle theories of consciousness in cognitive science, they are relatively rare. This is because of the influence exerted, on the one hand, by a large body of research which purports to show that the explicit representation of information in the brain and conscious experience are dissociable, and on the other, by the classical computational theory of mind – the theory that takes human cognition to be a species of symbol manipulation. But two recent developments in cognitive science combine to suggest that a reappraisal of this situation is in order. First, a number of theorists have recently been highly critical of the experimental methodologies employed in the dissociation studies – so critical, in fact, it’s no longer reasonable to assume that the dissociability of conscious experience and explicit representation has been adequately demonstrated. Second, classicism, as a theory of human cognition, is no longer as dominant in cognitive science as it once was. It now has a lively competitor in the form of connectionism; and connectionism, unlike classicism, does have the computational resources to support a robust vehicle theory of consciousness. In this paper we develop and defend this connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. It takes the form of the following simple empirical hypothesis: phenomenal experience consists in the explicit representation of information in neurally realized PDP networks. This hypothesis leads us to re-assess some common wisdom about consciousness, but, we will argue, in fruitful and ultimately plausible ways

Learning Hard Alignments with Variational Inference

There has recently been significant interest in hard attention models for tasks such as object recognition, visual captioning and speech recognition. Hard attention can offer benefits over soft attention such as decreased computational cost, but training hard attention models can be difficult because of the discrete latent variables they introduce. Previous work used REINFORCE and Q-learning to approach these issues, but those methods can provide high-variance gradient estimates and be slow to train. In this paper, we tackle the problem of learning hard attention for a sequential task using variational inference methods, specifically the recently introduced VIMCO and NVIL. Furthermore, we propose a novel baseline that adapts VIMCO to this setting. We demonstrate our method on a phoneme recognition task in clean and noisy environments and show that our method outperforms REINFORCE, with the difference being greater for a more complicated task

Lifelong Neural Predictive Coding: Learning Cumulatively Online without Forgetting

In lifelong learning systems, especially those based on artificial neural networks, one of the biggest obstacles is the severe inability to retain old knowledge as new information is encountered. This phenomenon is known as catastrophic forgetting. In this article, we propose a new kind of connectionist architecture, the Sequential Neural Coding Network, that is robust to forgetting when learning from streams of data points and, unlike networks of today, does not learn via the immensely popular back-propagation of errors. Grounded in the neurocognitive theory of predictive processing, our model adapts its synapses in a biologically-plausible fashion, while another, complementary neural system rapidly learns to direct and control this cortex-like structure by mimicking the task-executive control functionality of the basal ganglia. In our experiments, we demonstrate that our self-organizing system experiences significantly less forgetting as compared to standard neural models and outperforms a wide swath of previously proposed methods even though it is trained across task datasets in a stream-like fashion. The promising performance of our complementary system on benchmarks, e.g., SplitMNIST, Split Fashion MNIST, and Split NotMNIST, offers evidence that by incorporating mechanisms prominent in real neuronal systems, such as competition, sparse activation patterns, and iterative input processing, a new possibility for tackling the grand challenge of lifelong machine learning opens up.Comment: Key updates including results on standard benchmarks, e.g., split mnist/fmnist/not-mnist. Task selection/basal ganglia model has been integrate

Training neural networks to encode symbols enables combinatorial generalization

Combinatorial generalization - the ability to understand and produce novel combinations of already familiar elements - is considered to be a core capacity of the human mind and a major challenge to neural network models. A significant body of research suggests that conventional neural networks can't solve this problem unless they are endowed with mechanisms specifically engineered for the purpose of representing symbols. In this paper we introduce a novel way of representing symbolic structures in connectionist terms - the vectors approach to representing symbols (VARS), which allows training standard neural architectures to encode symbolic knowledge explicitly at their output layers. In two simulations, we show that neural networks not only can learn to produce VARS representations, but in doing so they achieve combinatorial generalization in their symbolic and non-symbolic output. This adds to other recent work that has shown improved combinatorial generalization under specific training conditions, and raises the question of whether specific mechanisms or training routines are needed to support symbolic processing

A distributed framework for semi-automatically developing architectures of brain and mind

Developing comprehensive theories of low-level neuronal brain processes and high-level cognitive behaviours, as well as integrating them, is an ambitious challenge that requires new conceptual, computational, and empirical tools. Given the complexities of these theories, they will almost certainly be expressed as computational systems. Here, we propose to use recent developments in grid technology to develop a system of evolutionary scientific discovery, which will (a) enable empirical researchers to make their data widely available for use in developing and testing theories, and (b) enable theorists to semi-automatically develop computational theories. We illustrate these ideas with a case study taken from the domain of categorisation

Precis of neuroconstructivism: how the brain constructs cognition

Neuroconstructivism: How the Brain Constructs Cognition proposes a unifying framework for the study of cognitive development that brings together (1) constructivism (which views development as the progressive elaboration of increasingly complex structures), (2) cognitive neuroscience (which aims to understand the neural mechanisms underlying behavior), and (3) computational modeling (which proposes formal and explicit specifications of information processing). The guiding principle of our approach is context dependence, within and (in contrast to Marr [1982]) between levels of organization. We propose that three mechanisms guide the emergence of representations: competition, cooperation, and chronotopy; which themselves allow for two central processes: proactivity and progressive specialization. We suggest that the main outcome of development is partial representations, distributed across distinct functional circuits. This framework is derived by examining development at the level of single neurons, brain systems, and whole organisms. We use the terms encellment, embrainment, and embodiment to describe the higher-level contextual influences that act at each of these levels of organization. To illustrate these mechanisms in operation we provide case studies in early visual perception, infant habituation, phonological development, and object representations in infancy. Three further case studies are concerned with interactions between levels of explanation: social development, atypical development and within that, developmental dyslexia. We conclude that cognitive development arises from a dynamic, contextual change in embodied neural structures leading to partial representations across multiple brain regions and timescales, in response to proactively specified physical and social environment