197 research outputs found
07351 Abstracts Collection -- Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents
From 26.08. to 30.08.2007, the Dagstuhl Seminar 07351 ``Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents\u27\u27 was held in the International Conference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl.
During the seminar, several participants presented their current
research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of
the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of
seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section
describes the seminar topics and goals in general.
Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available
AGM 25 years: twenty-five years of research in belief change
The 1985 paper by Carlos Alchourrón (1931–1996), Peter Gärdenfors,
and David Makinson (AGM), “On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet
Contraction and Revision Functions” was the starting-point of a large and
rapidly growing literature that employs formal models in the investigation
of changes in belief states and databases. In this review, the first twenty five years of this development are summarized. The topics covered include
equivalent characterizations of AGM operations, extended representations of
the belief states, change operators not included in the original framework,
iterated change, applications of the model, its connections with other formal
frameworks, computatibility of AGM operations, and criticism of the model.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio
Ranking Theory
Ranking theory is one of the salient formal representations of doxastic states. It differs from others in being able to represent belief in a proposition (= taking it to be true), to also represent degrees
of belief (i.e. beliefs as more or less firm), and thus to generally account for the dynamics of these beliefs. It does so on the basis of fundamental and compelling rationality postulates and is hence one
way of explicating the rational structure of doxastic states. Thereby it provides foundations for accounts of defeasible or nonmonotonic reasoning. It has widespread applications in philosophy, it proves to
be most useful in Artificial Intelligence, and it has started to find applications as a model of reasoning in psychology
State-of-the-art on evolution and reactivity
This report starts by, in Chapter 1, outlining aspects of querying and updating resources on
the Web and on the Semantic Web, including the development of query and update languages
to be carried out within the Rewerse project.
From this outline, it becomes clear that several existing research areas and topics are of
interest for this work in Rewerse. In the remainder of this report we further present state of
the art surveys in a selection of such areas and topics. More precisely: in Chapter 2 we give
an overview of logics for reasoning about state change and updates; Chapter 3 is devoted to briefly describing existing update languages for the Web, and also for updating logic programs;
in Chapter 4 event-condition-action rules, both in the context of active database systems and
in the context of semistructured data, are surveyed; in Chapter 5 we give an overview of some relevant rule-based agents frameworks
Reason Maintenance - State of the Art
This paper describes state of the art in reason maintenance with a focus on its future usage in the KiWi project. To give a bigger picture of the field, it also mentions closely related issues such as non-monotonic logic and paraconsistency. The paper is organized as follows: first, two motivating scenarios referring to semantic wikis are presented which are then used to introduce the different reason maintenance techniques
Belief revision and computational argumentation: a critical comparison
This paper aims at comparing and relating belief revision and argumentation as
approaches to model reasoning processes. Referring to some prominent literature
references in both fields, we will discuss their (implicit or explicit) assumptions on the
modeled processes and hence commonalities and differences in the forms of reason ing they are suitable to deal with. The intended contribution is on one hand assessing
the (not fully explored yet) relationships between two lively research fields in the
broad area of defeasible reasoning and on the other hand pointing out open issues and
potential directions for future research.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio
Expressing Belief Flow in Assertion Networks
Abstract. In the line of some earlier work done on belief dynamics, we propose an abstract model of belief propagation on a graph based on the methodology of the revision theory of truth. A modal language is developed for portraying the behavior of this model, and its expressiveness is discussed. We compare the proposal of this model as well as the language developed with some of the existing frameworks for modelling communication situations.
Current and Future Challenges in Knowledge Representation and Reasoning
Knowledge Representation and Reasoning is a central, longstanding, and active
area of Artificial Intelligence. Over the years it has evolved significantly;
more recently it has been challenged and complemented by research in areas such
as machine learning and reasoning under uncertainty. In July 2022 a Dagstuhl
Perspectives workshop was held on Knowledge Representation and Reasoning. The
goal of the workshop was to describe the state of the art in the field,
including its relation with other areas, its shortcomings and strengths,
together with recommendations for future progress. We developed this manifesto
based on the presentations, panels, working groups, and discussions that took
place at the Dagstuhl Workshop. It is a declaration of our views on Knowledge
Representation: its origins, goals, milestones, and current foci; its relation
to other disciplines, especially to Artificial Intelligence; and on its
challenges, along with key priorities for the next decade
Belief and Degrees of Belief
Degrees of belief are familiar to all of us. Our confidence in the truth of some propositions is higher than our confidence in the truth of other propositions. We are pretty confident that our computers will boot when we push their power button, but we are much more confident that the sun will rise tomorrow. Degrees of belief formally represent the strength with which we believe the truth of various propositions. The higher an agent's degree of belief for a particular proposition, the higher her confidence in the truth of that proposition. For instance, Sophia's degree of belief that it will be sunny in Vienna tomorrow might be .52, whereas her degree of belief that the train will leave on time might be .23. The precise meaning of these statements depends, of course, on the underlying theory of degrees of belief. These theories offer a formal tool to measure degrees of belief, to investigate the relations between various degrees of belief in different propositions, and to normatively evaluate degrees of belief.
The purpose of this book is to provide a comprehensive overview and assessment of the currently prevailing theories of degrees of belief. Degrees of belief are primarily studied in formal epistemology, but also in computer science and artificial intelligence, where they find applications in so-called expert systems and elsewhere. In the former case the aim is to adequately describe and, much more importantly, to normatively evaluate the epistemic state of an ideally rational agent. By employing the formal tools of logic and mathematics theories of degrees of belief allow a precise analysis that is hard to come by with traditional philosophical methods.
Different theories of degrees of belief postulate different ways in which degrees of beliefs are related to each other and, more generally, how epistemic states should be modeled. After getting a handle on the objects of belief in section 2, we briefly survey the most important accounts in section 3. Section 4 continues this survey by focusing on the relation between belief and degrees of belief. Section 5 concludes this introduction by pointing at some relations to belief revision and nonmonotonic reasoning
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