Privacy in the Genomic Era

Genome sequencing technology has advanced at a rapid pace and it is now possible to generate highly-detailed genotypes inexpensively. The collection and analysis of such data has the potential to support various applications, including personalized medical services. While the benefits of the genomics revolution are trumpeted by the biomedical community, the increased availability of such data has major implications for personal privacy; notably because the genome has certain essential features, which include (but are not limited to) (i) an association with traits and certain diseases, (ii) identification capability (e.g., forensics), and (iii) revelation of family relationships. Moreover, direct-to-consumer DNA testing increases the likelihood that genome data will be made available in less regulated environments, such as the Internet and for-profit companies. The problem of genome data privacy thus resides at the crossroads of computer science, medicine, and public policy. While the computer scientists have addressed data privacy for various data types, there has been less attention dedicated to genomic data. Thus, the goal of this paper is to provide a systematization of knowledge for the computer science community. In doing so, we address some of the (sometimes erroneous) beliefs of this field and we report on a survey we conducted about genome data privacy with biomedical specialists. Then, after characterizing the genome privacy problem, we review the state-of-the-art regarding privacy attacks on genomic data and strategies for mitigating such attacks, as well as contextualizing these attacks from the perspective of medicine and public policy. This paper concludes with an enumeration of the challenges for genome data privacy and presents a framework to systematize the analysis of threats and the design of countermeasures as the field moves forward

Invisible Pixels Are Dead, Long Live Invisible Pixels!

Privacy has deteriorated in the world wide web ever since the 1990s. The tracking of browsing habits by different third-parties has been at the center of this deterioration. Web cookies and so-called web beacons have been the classical ways to implement third-party tracking. Due to the introduction of more sophisticated technical tracking solutions and other fundamental transformations, the use of classical image-based web beacons might be expected to have lost their appeal. According to a sample of over thirty thousand images collected from popular websites, this paper shows that such an assumption is a fallacy: classical 1 x 1 images are still commonly used for third-party tracking in the contemporary world wide web. While it seems that ad-blockers are unable to fully block these classical image-based tracking beacons, the paper further demonstrates that even limited information can be used to accurately classify the third-party 1 x 1 images from other images. An average classification accuracy of 0.956 is reached in the empirical experiment. With these results the paper contributes to the ongoing attempts to better understand the lack of privacy in the world wide web, and the means by which the situation might be eventually improved.Comment: Forthcoming in the 17th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES 2018), Toronto, AC