Modal Ω-Logic: Automata, Neo-Logicism, and Set-Theoretic Realism

This essay examines the philosophical significance of $\Omega$-logic in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with choice (ZFC). The duality between coalgebra and algebra permits Boolean-valued algebraic models of ZFC to be interpreted as coalgebras. The modal profile of $\Omega$-logical validity can then be countenanced within a coalgebraic logic, and $\Omega$-logical validity can be defined via deterministic automata. I argue that the philosophical significance of the foregoing is two-fold. First, because the epistemic and modal profiles of $\Omega$-logical validity correspond to those of second-order logical consequence, $\Omega$-logical validity is genuinely logical, and thus vindicates a neo-logicist conception of mathematical truth in the set-theoretic multiverse. Second, the foregoing provides a modal-computational account of the interpretation of mathematical vocabulary, adducing in favor of a realist conception of the cumulative hierarchy of sets

A formal theory of conceptual modeling universals

Conceptual Modeling is a discipline of great relevance to several areas in Computer Science. In a series of papers [1,2,3] we have been using the General Ontological Language (GOL) and its underlying upper level ontology, proposed in [4,5], to evaluate the ontological correctness of conceptual models and to develop guidelines for how the constructs of a modeling language (UML) should be used in conceptual modeling. In this paper, we focus on the modeling metaconcepts of classifiers and objects from an ontological point of view. We use a philosophically and psychologically well-founded theory of universals to propose a UML profile for Ontology Representation and Conceptual Modeling. The formal semantics of the proposed modeling elements is presented in a language of modal logics with quantification restricted to Sortal universals

Logic in the Tractatus

I present a reconstruction of the logical system of the Tractatus, which differs from classical logic in two ways. It includes an account of Wittgenstein’s “form-series” device, which suffices to express some effectively generated countably infinite disjunctions. And its attendant notion of structure is relativized to the fixed underlying universe of what is named. There follow three results. First, the class of concepts definable in the system is closed under finitary induction. Second, if the universe of objects is countably infinite, then the property of being a tautology is \Pi^1_1-complete. But third, it is only granted the assumption of countability that the class of tautologies is \Sigma_1-definable in set theory. Wittgenstein famously urges that logical relationships must show themselves in the structure of signs. He also urges that the size of the universe cannot be prejudged. The results of this paper indicate that there is no single way in which logical relationships could be held to make themselves manifest in signs, which does not prejudge the number of objects

The partition semantics of questions, syntactically

Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984, 1996; Groenendijk 1999) provide a logically attractive theory of the semantics of natural language questions, commonly referred to as the partition theory. Two central notions in this theory are entailment between questions and answerhood. For example, the question "Who is going to the party?" entails the question "Is John going to the party?", and "John is going to the party" counts as an answer to both. Groenendijk and Stokhof define these two notions in terms of partitions of a set of possible worlds. We provide a syntactic characterization of entailment between questions and answerhood . We show that answers are, in some sense, exactly those formulas that are built up from instances of the question. This result lets us compare the partition theory with other approaches to interrogation -- both linguistic analyses, such as Hamblin's and Karttunen's semantics, and computational systems, such as Prolog. Our comparison separates a notion of answerhood into three aspects: equivalence (when two questions or answers are interchangeable), atomic answers (what instances of a question count as answers), and compound answers (how answers compose).Comment: 14 page

Externalism, internalism and logical truth

The aim of this paper is to show what sorts of logics are required by externalist and internalist accounts of the meanings of natural kind nouns. These logics give us a new perspective from which to evaluate the respective positions in the externalist--internalist debate about the meanings of such nouns. The two main claims of the paper are the following: first, that adequate logics for internalism and externalism about natural kind nouns are second-order logics; second, that an internalist second-order logic is a free logic—a second order logic free of existential commitments for natural kind nouns, while an externalist second-order logic is not free of existential commitments for natural kind nouns—it is existentially committed

Revisiting bisimilarity and its modal logic for nondeterministic and probabilistic processes

We consider PML, the probabilistic version of Hennessy-Milner logic introduced by Larsen and Skou to characterize bisimilarity over probabilistic processes without internal nondeterminism.We provide two different interpretations for PML by considering nondeterministic and probabilistic processes as models, and we exhibit two new bisimulation-based equivalences that are in full agreement with those interpretations. Our new equivalences include as coarsest congruences the two bisimilarities for nondeterministic and probabilistic processes proposed by Segala and Lynch. The latter equivalences are instead in agreement with two versions of Hennessy-Milner logic extended with an additional probabilistic operator interpreted over state distributions rather than over individual states. Thus, our new interpretations of PML and the corresponding new bisimilarities offer a uniform framework for reasoning on processes that are purely nondeterministic or reactive probabilistic or are mixing nondeterminism and probability in an alternating/non-alternating way

Tree Languages Defined in First-Order Logic with One Quantifier Alternation

We study tree languages that can be defined in \Delta_2 . These are tree languages definable by a first-order formula whose quantifier prefix is forall exists, and simultaneously by a first-order formula whose quantifier prefix is . For the quantifier free part we consider two signatures, either the descendant relation alone or together with the lexicographical order relation on nodes. We provide an effective characterization of tree and forest languages definable in \Delta_2 . This characterization is in terms of algebraic equations. Over words, the class of word languages definable in \Delta_2 forms a robust class, which was given an effective algebraic characterization by Pin and Weil