Decentralized Pricing in Minimum Cost Spanning Trees

In the minimum cost spanning tree model we consider decentralized pricing rules, i.e. rules that cover at least the efficient cost while the price charged to each user only depends upon his own connection costs. We define a canonical pricing rule and provide two axiomatic characterizations. First, the canonical pricing rule is the smallest among those that improve upon the Stand Alone bound, and are either superadditive or piece-wise linear in connection costs. Our second, direct characterization relies on two simple properties highlighting the special role of the source cost.pricing rules; minimum cost spanning trees; canonical pricing rule; stand-alone cost; decentralization

A fair rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems

We study minimum cost spanning tree problems and define a cost sharing rule that satisfies many more properties than other rules in the literature. Furthermore, we provide an axiomatic characterization based on monotonicity properties.minimum cost spanning tree, cost sharing

The Bird Core for Minimum Cost Spanning Tree problems Revisited:Monotonicity and Additivity Aspects

A new way is presented to define for minimum cost spanning tree (mcst-) games the irreducible core, which is introduced by Bird in 1976.The Bird core correspondence turns out to have interesting monotonicity and additivity properties and each stable cost monotonic allocation rule for mcst-problems is a selection of the Bird core correspondence.Using the additivity property an axiomatic characterization of the Bird core correspondence is obtained.

Induced Rules for Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Problems:towards Merge-proofness and Coalitional Stability

This paper examines cost allocation rules for minimum cost spanning tree (MCST) problems, focusing on the properties of merge-proofness and coalitional stability. Merge-proofness ensures that no coalition of agents has the incentive to merge before participating in the cost allocation process. On the other hand, coalitional stability ensures that no coalition has the incentive to withdraw from the cost allocation process after the cost allocation proposal is made. We propose a novel class of rules called induced rules, which are derived recursively from base rules designed for two-person MCST problems. We demonstrate that induced rules exhibit both merge-proofness and coalitional stability within a restricted domain, provided that the corresponding base rules satisfy specific conditions