A biologically plausible embodied model of action discovery

During development, animals can spontaneously discover action-outcome pairings enabling subsequent achievement of their goals. We present a biologically plausible embodied model addressing key aspects of this process. The biomimetic model core comprises the basal ganglia and its loops through cortex and thalamus. We incorporate reinforcement learning (RL) with phasic dopamine supplying a sensory prediction error, signalling “surprising” outcomes. Phasic dopamine is used in a cortico-striatal learning rule which is consistent with recent data. We also hypothesized that objects associated with surprising outcomes acquire “novelty salience” contingent on the predicability of the outcome. To test this idea we used a simple model of prediction governing the dynamics of novelty salience and phasic dopamine. The task of the virtual robotic agent mimicked an in vivo counterpart (Gancarz et al., 2011) and involved interaction with a target object which caused a light flash, or a control object which did not. Learning took place according to two schedules. In one, the phasic outcome was delivered after interaction with the target in an unpredictable way which emulated the in vivo protocol. Without novelty salience, the model was unable to account for the experimental data. In the other schedule, the phasic outcome was reliably delivered and the agent showed a rapid increase in the number of interactions with the target which then decreased over subsequent sessions. We argue this is precisely the kind of change in behavior required to repeatedly present representations of context, action and outcome, to neural networks responsible for learning action-outcome contingency. The model also showed cortico-striatal plasticity consistent with learning a new action in basal ganglia. We conclude that action learning is underpinned by a complex interplay of plasticity and stimulus salience, and that our model contains many of the elements for biological action discovery to take place

Why it is important to build robots capable of doing science

Science, like any other cognitive activity, is grounded in the sensorimotor interaction of our bodies with the environment. Human embodiment thus constrains the class of scientific concepts and theories which are accessible to us. The paper explores the possibility of doing science with artificial cognitive agents, in the framework of an interactivist-constructivist cognitive model of science. Intelligent robots, by virtue of having different sensorimotor capabilities, may overcome the fundamental limitations of human science and provide important technological innovations. Mathematics and nanophysics are prime candidates for being studied by artificial scientists

Pragmatism and the pragmatic turn in cognitive science

This chapter examines the pragmatist approach to cognition and experience and provides some of the conceptual background to the “pragmatic turn” currently underway in cognitive science. Classical pragmatists wrote extensively on cognition from a naturalistic perspective, and many of their views are compatible with contemporary pragmatist approaches such as enactivist, extended, and embodied-Bayesian approaches to cognition. Three principles of a pragmatic approach to cognition frame the discussion: First, thinking is structured by the interaction of an organism with its environment. Second, cognition develops via exploratory inference, which remains a core cognitive ability throughout the life cycle. Finally, inquiry/problem solving begins with genuinely irritating doubts that arise in a situation and is carried out by exploratory inference

Introduction: The Fourth International Workshop on Epigenetic Robotics

As in the previous editions, this workshop is trying to be a forum for multi-disciplinary research ranging from developmental psychology to neural sciences (in its widest sense) and robotics including computational studies. This is a two-fold aim of, on the one hand, understanding the brain through engineering embodied systems and, on the other hand, building artificial epigenetic systems. Epigenetic contains in its meaning the idea that we are interested in studying development through interaction with the environment. This idea entails the embodiment of the system, the situatedness in the environment, and of course a prolonged period of postnatal development when this interaction can actually take place. This is still a relatively new endeavor although the seeds of the developmental robotics community were already in the air since the nineties (Berthouze and Kuniyoshi, 1998; Metta et al., 1999; Brooks et al., 1999; Breazeal, 2000; Kozima and Zlatev, 2000). A few had the intuition – see Lungarella et al. (2003) for a comprehensive review – that, intelligence could not be possibly engineered simply by copying systems that are “ready made” but rather that the development of the system fills a major role. This integration of disciplines raises the important issue of learning on the multiple scales of developmental time, that is, how to build systems that eventually can learn in any environment rather than program them for a specific environment. On the other hand, the hope is that robotics might become a new tool for brain science similarly to what simulation and modeling have become for the study of the motor system. Our community is still pretty much evolving and “under construction” and for this reason, we tried to encourage submissions from the psychology community. Additionally, we invited four neuroscientists and no roboticists for the keynote lectures. We received a record number of submissions (more than 50), and given the overall size and duration of the workshop together with our desire to maintain a single-track format, we had to be more selective than ever in the review process (a 20% acceptance rate on full papers). This is, if not an index of quality, at least an index of the interest that gravitates around this still new discipline

How to Knit Your Own Markov Blanket

Hohwy (Hohwy 2016, Hohwy 2017) argues there is a tension between the free energy principle and leading depictions of mind as embodied, enactive, and extended (so-called ‘EEE1 cognition’). The tension is traced to the importance, in free energy formulations, of a conception of mind and agency that depends upon the presence of a ‘Markov blanket’ demarcating the agent from the surrounding world. In what follows I show that the Markov blanket considerations do not, in fact, lead to the kinds of tension that Hohwy depicts. On the contrary, they actively favour the EEE story. This is because the Markov property, as exemplified in biological agents, picks out neither a unique nor a stationary boundary. It is this multiplicity and mutability– rather than the absence of agent-environment boundaries as such - that EEE cognition celebrates

Evolution of swarming behavior is shaped by how predators attack

Animal grouping behaviors have been widely studied due to their implications for understanding social intelligence, collective cognition, and potential applications in engineering, artificial intelligence, and robotics. An important biological aspect of these studies is discerning which selection pressures favor the evolution of grouping behavior. In the past decade, researchers have begun using evolutionary computation to study the evolutionary effects of these selection pressures in predator-prey models. The selfish herd hypothesis states that concentrated groups arise because prey selfishly attempt to place their conspecifics between themselves and the predator, thus causing an endless cycle of movement toward the center of the group. Using an evolutionary model of a predator-prey system, we show that how predators attack is critical to the evolution of the selfish herd. Following this discovery, we show that density-dependent predation provides an abstraction of Hamilton's original formulation of ``domains of danger.'' Finally, we verify that density-dependent predation provides a sufficient selective advantage for prey to evolve the selfish herd in response to predation by coevolving predators. Thus, our work corroborates Hamilton's selfish herd hypothesis in a digital evolutionary model, refines the assumptions of the selfish herd hypothesis, and generalizes the domain of danger concept to density-dependent predation.Comment: 25 pages, 11 figures, 5 tables, including 2 Supplementary Figures. Version to appear in "Artificial Life

Final report key contents: main results accomplished by the EU-Funded project IM-CLeVeR - Intrinsically Motivated Cumulative Learning Versatile Robots

This document has the goal of presenting the main scientific and technological achievements of the project IM-CLeVeR. The document is organised as follows: 1. Project executive summary: a brief overview of the project vision, objectives and keywords. 2. Beneficiaries of the project and contacts: list of Teams (partners) of the project, Team Leaders and contacts. 3. Project context and objectives: the vision of the project and its overall objectives 4. Overview of work performed and main results achieved: a one page overview of the main results of the project 5. Overview of main results per partner: a bullet-point list of main results per partners 6. Main achievements in detail, per partner: a throughout explanation of the main results per partner (but including collaboration work), with also reference to the main publications supporting them

Engineering simulations for cancer systems biology

Computer simulation can be used to inform in vivo and in vitro experimentation, enabling rapid, low-cost hypothesis generation and directing experimental design in order to test those hypotheses. In this way, in silico models become a scientific instrument for investigation, and so should be developed to high standards, be carefully calibrated and their findings presented in such that they may be reproduced. Here, we outline a framework that supports developing simulations as scientific instruments, and we select cancer systems biology as an exemplar domain, with a particular focus on cellular signalling models. We consider the challenges of lack of data, incomplete knowledge and modelling in the context of a rapidly changing knowledge base. Our framework comprises a process to clearly separate scientific and engineering concerns in model and simulation development, and an argumentation approach to documenting models for rigorous way of recording assumptions and knowledge gaps. We propose interactive, dynamic visualisation tools to enable the biological community to interact with cellular signalling models directly for experimental design. There is a mismatch in scale between these cellular models and tissue structures that are affected by tumours, and bridging this gap requires substantial computational resource. We present concurrent programming as a technology to link scales without losing important details through model simplification. We discuss the value of combining this technology, interactive visualisation, argumentation and model separation to support development of multi-scale models that represent biologically plausible cells arranged in biologically plausible structures that model cell behaviour, interactions and response to therapeutic interventions

The emergence of choice: Decision-making and strategic thinking through analogies

Consider the chess game: When faced with a complex scenario, how does understanding arise in one’s mind? How does one integrate disparate cues into a global, meaningful whole? how do humans avoid the combinatorial explosion? How are abstract ideas represented? The purpose of this paper is to propose a new computational model of human chess intuition and intelligence. We suggest that analogies and abstract roles are crucial to solving these landmark problems. We present a proof-of-concept model, in the form of a computational architecture, which may be able to account for many crucial aspects of human intuition, such as (i) concentration of attention to relevant aspects, (ii) \ud how humans may avoid the combinatorial explosion, (iii) perception of similarity at a strategic level, and (iv) a state of meaningful anticipation over how a global scenario \ud may evolve