Performance-Related Pay : The Expected and the Unexpected

Acknowledgement Responsible Section Editor: Klaus F. Zimmermann. The article has benefitted from valuable comments of the editors and anonymous referees. Financial support by the UK ESRC (Grant ES/R01163X/1) for related research for Professor Bender is gratefully noted. There is no conflict of interest.Postprin

Interval Tree-Based Task Scheduling Method for Mobile Crowd Sensing Systems

Nowadays there is an increasing demand to provide a real-time environmental information. So, the growing number of mobile devices carried by users establish a new and fastgrowing sensing paradigm to satisfy this need, which is called Mobile Crowd Sensing (MCS). The MCS uses different sensing abilities to acquire local knowledge through enhanced mobile devices. In MCS, it is very important to collect high-quality sensory data that satisfies the needs of all assigned tasks and the task organizers with a minimum cost for the participants. One of the most important factors which affect the MCS cost is how to schedule different sensing tasks which must be assigned to a smartphone with the objective of minimizing sensing energy consumption while ensuring high-quality sensory data. In this paper, the problem of task scheduling the which have mutual sensor is formulated and a scheduling method to minimize the energy consumption by reducing the sensor utilization is proposed. The proposed method will incentive the users to participate in multiple tasks at the same time, which minimizes the total cost of the performed tasks and increases his rewards. The experimental results by using synthetic and real data show that the proposed scheduling method can minimize the energy consumption and preserve the task requirements compared to existing algorithms

Keep Charity Charitable

This Article responds to recent claims, most prominently by Malani, Posner, and Henderson, that much of the work of the charitable sector should be farmed out to for-profit firms. For-profit firms are said to be more efficient because they can offer higher-powered incentives to cut costs. I argue, however, that because of the high costs of monitoring and the presence of externalities, low-powered incentives are preferable for firms that produce public goods. Further, allowing some for-profit firms to receive charitable subsidies would raise the cost of producing those goods in government or other firms, because it would diminish the “warm glow” workers enjoy from being recognized as self-sacrificing

The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley

The closer one looks at SOX and its origins in the financial scandals of the early 2000s, the blurrier the picture, which lets commentators see what they want to see and draw inferences accordingly. That is why social construction is so crucial. My aim in this paper is to illuminate the social nature of SOX\u27s diffusion into practice. I will leave to the reader the judgment about whether this has been or will be good or bad, and for whom. If I seem to challenge SOX\u27s critics more than its supporters, it is because the critics have been more venomous than is fair. Venom aside, the bite still deserves attention

Incentive mechanism design for heterogeneous crowdsourcing using all-pay contests

Many crowdsourcing scenarios are heterogeneous in the sense that, not only the workers\u27 types (e.g., abilities or costs) are different, but the beliefs (probabilistic knowledge) about their respective types are also different. In this paper, we design an incentive mechanism for such scenarios using an asymmetric all-pay contest (or auction) model. Our design objective is an optimal mechanism, i.e., one that maximizes the crowdsourcing revenue minus cost. To achieve this, we furnish the contest with a prize tuple which is an array of reward functions each for a potential winner. We prove and characterize the unique equilibrium of this contest, and solve the optimal prize tuple. In addition, this study discovers a counter-intuitive property, called strategy autonomy (SA), which means that heterogeneous workers behave independently of one another as if they were in a homogeneous setting. In game-theoretical terms, it says that an asymmetric auction admits a symmetric equilibrium. Not only theoretically interesting, but SA also has important practical implications on mechanism complexity, energy efficiency, crowdsourcing revenue, and system scalability. By scrutinizing seven mechanisms, our extensive performance evaluation demonstrates the superior performance of our mechanism as well as offers insights into the SA property