Platform interconnection and quality incentives

We analyze competition between two platforms with positive network externalities. Platforms can choose to interconnect or alternatively, operate exclusively. We examine how this decision will affect pricing behaviour and incentives to invest in Platform quality. We find that interconnection is aa means to reduce externalities one side exerts on the other. It changes the mode of competition for subscribers and resultsin higher subscription prices. Further, even though interconnection allows for quaality spillovers to the rival platform, it results in higher quality investment than the case of exclusive platforms. Coordination will facilitate collusion on the lowest quality levels possible if its provision is costly. For low quality costs it will lead to asymmetric networks. Therefore, interconnection without coordinated investment activities is welfare maximising. --Two-sided markets,interconnection,investment in transaction quality

Anatomy of the Third-Party Web Tracking Ecosystem

The presence of third-party tracking on websites has become customary. However, our understanding of the third-party ecosystem is still very rudimentary. We examine third-party trackers from a geographical perspective, observing the third-party tracking ecosystem from 29 countries across the globe. When examining the data by region (North America, South America, Europe, East Asia, Middle East, and Oceania), we observe significant geographical variation between regions and countries within regions. We find trackers that focus on specific regions and countries, and some that are hosted in countries outside their expected target tracking domain. Given the differences in regulatory regimes between jurisdictions, we believe this analysis sheds light on the geographical properties of this ecosystem and on the problems that these may pose to our ability to track and manage the different data silos that now store personal data about us all

Towards Socially Intelligent Agents with Mental State Transition and Human Utility

Building a socially intelligent agent involves many challenges, one of which is to track the agent's mental state transition and teach the agent to make rational decisions guided by its utility like a human. Towards this end, we propose to incorporate a mental state parser and utility model into dialogue agents. The hybrid mental state parser extracts information from both the dialogue and event observations and maintains a graphical representation of the agent's mind; Meanwhile, the utility model is a ranking model that learns human preferences from a crowd-sourced social commonsense dataset, Social IQA. Empirical results show that the proposed model attains state-of-the-art performance on the dialogue/action/emotion prediction task in the fantasy text-adventure game dataset, LIGHT. We also show example cases to demonstrate: (\textit{i}) how the proposed mental state parser can assist agent's decision by grounding on the context like locations and objects, and (\textit{ii}) how the utility model can help the agent make reasonable decisions in a dilemma. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first work that builds a socially intelligent agent by incorporating a hybrid mental state parser for both discrete events and continuous dialogues parsing and human-like utility modeling

Social Assets

We present a model incorporating both social and economic components, and analyze their interaction. The notion of a social asset, an attribute that has value only because of the social institutions governing society, is introduced. In the basic model, agents match on the basis of income and unproductive attributes. An attribute has value in some equilibrium social institutions (matching patterns), but not in others. We then show that productive attributes (such as education) can have their value increased above their inherent productive value by some social institutions, leading to the notion of the social value of an asset.Social assets, social capital, social arrangements, nonmarket interactions, social norms

Social Assets

We present a model incorporating both social and economic components, and analyze their interaction. The notion of a social asset, an attribute that has value only because of the social institutions governing society, is introduced. In the basic model, agents match on the basis of income and unproductive attributes. An attribute has value in some equilibrium social institutions (matching patterns), but not in others. We then show that productive attributes (such as education) can have their value increased above their inherent productive value by some social institutions, leading to the notion of the social value of an asset.Social assets, social capital, social arrangements, nonmarket interactions, social norms