Byzantine Attack and Defense in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Survey

The Byzantine attack in cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS), also known as the spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attack in the literature, is one of the key adversaries to the success of cognitive radio networks (CRNs). In the past couple of years, the research on the Byzantine attack and defense strategies has gained worldwide increasing attention. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive survey and tutorial on the recent advances in the Byzantine attack and defense for CSS in CRNs. Specifically, we first briefly present the preliminaries of CSS for general readers, including signal detection techniques, hypothesis testing, and data fusion. Second, we analyze the spear and shield relation between Byzantine attack and defense from three aspects: the vulnerability of CSS to attack, the obstacles in CSS to defense, and the games between attack and defense. Then, we propose a taxonomy of the existing Byzantine attack behaviors and elaborate on the corresponding attack parameters, which determine where, who, how, and when to launch attacks. Next, from the perspectives of homogeneous or heterogeneous scenarios, we classify the existing defense algorithms, and provide an in-depth tutorial on the state-of-the-art Byzantine defense schemes, commonly known as robust or secure CSS in the literature. Furthermore, we highlight the unsolved research challenges and depict the future research directions.Comment: Accepted by IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutoiral

People tracking by cooperative fusion of RADAR and camera sensors

Accurate 3D tracking of objects from monocular camera poses challenges due to the loss of depth during projection. Although ranging by RADAR has proven effective in highway environments, people tracking remains beyond the capability of single sensor systems. In this paper, we propose a cooperative RADAR-camera fusion method for people tracking on the ground plane. Using average person height, joint detection likelihood is calculated by back-projecting detections from the camera onto the RADAR Range-Azimuth data. Peaks in the joint likelihood, representing candidate targets, are fed into a Particle Filter tracker. Depending on the association outcome, particles are updated using the associated detections (Tracking by Detection), or by sampling the raw likelihood itself (Tracking Before Detection). Utilizing the raw likelihood data has the advantage that lost targets are continuously tracked even if the camera or RADAR signal is below the detection threshold. We show that in single target, uncluttered environments, the proposed method entirely outperforms camera-only tracking. Experiments in a real-world urban environment also confirm that the cooperative fusion tracker produces significantly better estimates, even in difficult and ambiguous situations

Computational intelligence approaches to robotics, automation, and control [Volume guest editors]

No abstract available