Trustee: Full Privacy Preserving Vickrey Auction on top of Ethereum

The wide deployment of tokens for digital assets on top of Ethereum implies the need for powerful trading platforms. Vickrey auctions have been known to determine the real market price of items as bidders are motivated to submit their own monetary valuations without leaking their information to the competitors. Recent constructions have utilized various cryptographic protocols such as ZKP and MPC, however, these approaches either are partially privacy-preserving or require complex computations with several rounds. In this paper, we overcome these limits by presenting Trustee as a Vickrey auction on Ethereum which fully preserves bids' privacy at relatively much lower fees. Trustee consists of three components: a front-end smart contract deployed on Ethereum, an Intel SGX enclave, and a relay to redirect messages between them. Initially, the enclave generates an Ethereum account and ECDH key-pair. Subsequently, the relay publishes the account's address and ECDH public key on the smart contract. As a prerequisite, bidders are encouraged to verify the authenticity and security of Trustee by using the SGX remote attestation service. To participate in the auction, bidders utilize the ECDH public key to encrypt their bids and submit them to the smart contract. Once the bidding interval is closed, the relay retrieves the encrypted bids and feeds them to the enclave that autonomously generates a signed transaction indicating the auction winner. Finally, the relay submits the transaction to the smart contract which verifies the transaction's authenticity and the parameters' consistency before accepting the claimed auction winner. As part of our contributions, we have made a prototype for Trustee available on Github for the community to review and inspect it. Additionally, we analyze the security features of Trustee and report on the transactions' gas cost incurred on Trustee smart contract.Comment: Presented at Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2019, 3rd Workshop on Trusted Smart Contract

Scalability and robustness of a market-based network resource allocation system

In this paper, we consider issues related to scalability and robustness in designing a market-based multi-agent system that allocates bandwidth in a communications network. Specifically, an empirical evaluation is carried out to assess the system performance under a variety of design configurations in order to provide an insight into network deployment issues. This extends our previous work in which we developed an application that makes use of market-based software agents that compete in decentralised marketplaces to buy and sell bandwidth resources. Our new results show that given a light to moderate network traffic load, partitioning the network into a few regions, each with a separate market server, gives a higher call success rate than by using a single market. Moreover, a trade-off in the number of regions was also noted between the average call success rate and the number of messages received per market server. Finally, given the possibility of market failures, we observe that the average call success rates increase with an increasing number of markets until a maximum is reached

Insider threats for auctions: formalization, mechanized proof, and code generation

This paper applies machine assisted formal methods to explore insider threats for auctions. Auction systems, like eBay, are an important problem domain for formal analysis because they challenge modelling concepts as well as analysis methods. We use machine assisted formal modelling and proof in Isabelle to demonstrate how security and privacy goals of auction protocols can be formally verified. Applying the costly scrutiny of formal methods is justified for auctions since privacy and trust are prominent issues and auctions are sometimes designed for one-off occasions where high bids are at stake. For example, when radio wave frequencies are on sale, auctions are especially created for just one occasion where fair and consistent behaviour is required. Investigating the threats in auctions and insider collusions, we model and analyze auction protocols for insider threats using the interactive theorem prover Isabelle. We use the existing example of a fictitious cocaine auction protocol from the literature to develop and illustrate our approach. Combining the Isabelle Insider framework with the inductive approach to verifying security protocols in Isabelle, we formalize the cocaine auction protocol, prove that this formal definition excludes sweetheart deals, and also that collusion attacks cannot generally be excluded. The practical implication of the formalization is demonstrated by code generation. Isabelle allows generating code from constructive specifications into the programming language Scala. We provide constructive test functions for cocaine auction traces, prove within Isabelle that these functions conform to the protocol definition, and apply code generation to produce an implementation of the executable test predicate for cocaine auction traces in Scala

Attack and revison of an electronic auction protocol using OFMC

In the article we show an attack on the cryptographic protocol of electronic auction withextended requirements [1]. The found attack consists of authentication breach and secret retrieval.It is a kind of “man in the middle attack”. The intruder impersonates an agent and learns somesecret information. We have discovered this flaw using OFMC an automatic tool of cryptographicprotocol verification. After a description of this attack, we propose a new version of the e-auctionprotocol. We also check with OFMC the secrecy for the new protocol and give an informal proofof the other properties that this new e-auction protocol has to guarantee