The Oracle - a New Intelligent Cooperative Strategy of Attacks on Trust and Reputation Systems

The paper presents a new concept of attack on trust and reputation systems. The oracleattack could violate the security provided by some of the existing reputation systems. The formalmodel of the attack is presented in the article on the base of the reference trust model, provided bythe author. The author has proved that this type of attack could be eficient. On the other hand,a sort of measures is provided in the paper which could be implemented in the reputation systemsto overcome identified vulnerabilities, unfortunately at the cost of increase of system complication.The paper also provides a definition of intelligent strategies of attacks on trust and reputation systemsbased on cooperation of many malicious nodes and justifies why this type of attacks is a serious threat

Collusion in Peer-to-Peer Systems

Peer-to-peer systems have reached a widespread use, ranging from academic and industrial applications to home entertainment. The key advantage of this paradigm lies in its scalability and flexibility, consequences of the participants sharing their resources for the common welfare. Security in such systems is a desirable goal. For example, when mission-critical operations or bank transactions are involved, their effectiveness strongly depends on the perception that users have about the system dependability and trustworthiness. A major threat to the security of these systems is the phenomenon of collusion. Peers can be selfish colluders, when they try to fool the system to gain unfair advantages over other peers, or malicious, when their purpose is to subvert the system or disturb other users. The problem, however, has received so far only a marginal attention by the research community. While several solutions exist to counter attacks in peer-to-peer systems, very few of them are meant to directly counter colluders and their attacks. Reputation, micro-payments, and concepts of game theory are currently used as the main means to obtain fairness in the usage of the resources. Our goal is to provide an overview of the topic by examining the key issues involved. We measure the relevance of the problem in the current literature and the effectiveness of existing philosophies against it, to suggest fruitful directions in the further development of the field

LCT: A Lightweight Cross-domain Trust Model for the Mobile Distributed Environment

In the mobile distributed environment, an entity may move across domains with great frequency. How to utilize the trust information in the previous domains and quickly establish trust relationships with others in the current domain remains a challenging issue. The classic trust models do not support cross-domain and the existing cross-domain trust models are not in a fully distributed way

Location reliability and gamification mechanisms for mobile crowd sensing

People-centric sensing with smart phones can be used for large scale sensing of the physical world by leveraging the sensors on the phones. This new type of sensing can be a scalable and cost-effective alternative to deploying static wireless sensor networks for dense sensing coverage across large areas. However, mobile people-centric sensing has two main issues: 1) Data reliability in sensed data and 2) Incentives for participants. To study these issues, this dissertation designs and develops McSense, a mobile crowd sensing system which provides monetary and social incentives to users. This dissertation proposes and evaluates two protocols for location reliability as a step toward achieving data reliability in sensed data, namely, ILR (Improving Location Reliability) and LINK (Location authentication through Immediate Neighbors Knowledge). ILR is a scheme which improves the location reliability of mobile crowd sensed data with minimal human efforts based on location validation using photo tasks and expanding the trust to nearby data points using periodic Bluetooth scanning. LINK is a location authentication protocol working independent of wireless carriers, in which nearby users help authenticate each other’s location claims using Bluetooth communication. The results of experiments done on Android phones show that the proposed protocols are capable of detecting a significant percentage of the malicious users claiming false location. Furthermore, simulations with the LINK protocol demonstrate that LINK can effectively thwart a number of colluding user attacks. This dissertation also proposes a mobile sensing game which helps collect crowd sensing data by incentivizing smart phone users to play sensing games on their phones. We design and implement a first person shooter sensing game, “Alien vs. Mobile User”, which employs techniques to attract users to unpopular regions. The user study results show that mobile gaming can be a successful alternative to micro-payments for fast and efficient area coverage in crowd sensing. It is observed that the proposed game design succeeds in achieving good player engagement

A lightweight group-key management protocol for secure ad-hoc-network routing

AbstractSecure routing protocols for ad hoc networks use group keys for authenticating control messages without high energy consumption. A distributed and robust group-key management is, thus, essential. This paper proposes and specifies a protocol for distributing and managing group keys in ad hoc environments based on the Secure Optimized Link State Routing protocol (SOLSR). The proposed protocol manages group keys taking into consideration frequent network partitions/mergers and also reduces the impact of non-authorized users that try to illegitimately obtain the group key to use network resources. The analysis shows that our proposal provides high availability and presents low energy consumption for the two most important group events in ad hoc network: joining-node events and network-partition-merging events. Our protocol reduces both the number of control messages and the energy spent with cryptographic operations by up to three orders of magnitude when compared to contributory group-key agreement algorithms. The proposed protocol provides an efficient key management in a timely manner

Incentive-driven QoS in peer-to-peer overlays

A well known problem in peer-to-peer overlays is that no single entity has control over the software, hardware and configuration of peers. Thus, each peer can selfishly adapt its behaviour to maximise its benefit from the overlay. This thesis is concerned with the modelling and design of incentive mechanisms for QoS-overlays: resource allocation protocols that provide strategic peers with participation incentives, while at the same time optimising the performance of the peer-to-peer distribution overlay. The contributions of this thesis are as follows. First, we present PledgeRoute, a novel contribution accounting system that can be used, along with a set of reciprocity policies, as an incentive mechanism to encourage peers to contribute resources even when users are not actively consuming overlay services. This mechanism uses a decentralised credit network, is resilient to sybil attacks, and allows peers to achieve time and space deferred contribution reciprocity. Then, we present a novel, QoS-aware resource allocation model based on Vickrey auctions that uses PledgeRoute as a substrate. It acts as an incentive mechanism by providing efficient overlay construction, while at the same time allocating increasing service quality to those peers that contribute more to the network. The model is then applied to lagsensitive chunk swarming, and some of its properties are explored for different peer delay distributions. When considering QoS overlays deployed over the best-effort Internet, the quality received by a client cannot be adjudicated completely to either its serving peer or the intervening network between them. By drawing parallels between this situation and well-known hidden action situations in microeconomics, we propose a novel scheme to ensure adherence to advertised QoS levels. We then apply it to delay-sensitive chunk distribution overlays and present the optimal contract payments required, along with a method for QoS contract enforcement through reciprocative strategies. We also present a probabilistic model for application-layer delay as a function of the prevailing network conditions. Finally, we address the incentives of managed overlays, and the prediction of their behaviour. We propose two novel models of multihoming managed overlay incentives in which overlays can freely allocate their traffic flows between different ISPs. One is obtained by optimising an overlay utility function with desired properties, while the other is designed for data-driven least-squares fitting of the cross elasticity of demand. This last model is then used to solve for ISP profit maximisation