Tracking RFID

RFID-Radio Frequency Identification-is a powerful enabling technology with a wide range of potential applications. Its proponents initially overhyped its capabilities and business case: RFID deployment is proceeding along a much slower and less predictable trajectory than was initially thought. Nonetheless, in the end it is plausible that we will find ourselves moving in the direction of a world with pervasive RFID: a world in which objects\u27 wireless self-identification will become much more nearly routine, and networked devices will routinely collect and process the resulting information. RFID-equipped goods and documents present privacy threats: they may reveal information about themselves, and hence about the people carrying them, wirelessly to people whom the subjects might not have chosen to inform. That information leakage follows individuals, and reveals how they move through space. Not only does the profile that RFID technology helps construct contain information about where the subject is and has been, but RFID signifiers travel with the subject in the physical world, conveying information to devices that otherwise would not recognize it and that can take actions based on that information. RFID implementations, thus, can present three related privacy threats, which this article categorizes as surveillance, profiling, and action. RFID privacy consequences will differ in different implementations. It would be a mistake to conclude that an RFID implementation will pose no meaningful privacy threat because a tag does not directly store personally identifiable information, instead containing only a pointer to information contained in a separate database. Aside from any privacy threats presented by the database proprietor, privacy threats from third parties will depend on the extent to which those third parties can buy, barter, or otherwise gain database access. Where a tag neither points to nor carries personal identifying information, the extent of the privacy threat will depend in part on the degree to which data collectors will be able to link tag numbers with personally identifying information. Yet as profiling accelerates in the modem world, aided by the automatic, networked collection of information, information compiled by one data collector will increasingly be available to others as well; linking persistent identifiers to personally identifying information may turn out to be easy. Nor are sophisticated access controls and other cryptographic protections a complete answer to RFID privacy threats. The cost of those protections will make them impractical for many applications, though, and even with more sophisticated technology, security problems will remain. This article suggests appropriate government and regulatory responses to two important categories of RFID implementation. It concludes with a way of looking at, and an agenda for further research on, wireless identification technology more generally

Security and Privacy in RFID Applications

Concerns about privacy and security may limit the deployment of RFID technology and its benefits, therefore it is important they are identified and adequately addressed. System developers and other market actors are aware of the threats and are developing a number of counter measures. RFID systems can never be absolutely secure but effort needs to be made to ensure a proper balance between the risks and the costs of counter measures. The approach taken to privacy and security should depend on the application area and the context of a specific application. In this chapter, we selected and discussed four application areas, but there are many others where privacy and security issues are relevant.JRC.J.4-Information Societ

Two Novel E-Visas Verification Schemes Based On Public Key Infrastructure (Pki) And Identity Based Encryption (Ibe).

Visa merupakan dokumen perjalanan yang sangat penting yang membenarkan kita memasuki sesebuah negara yang akan kita lawati. Visa is a very important traveling document, which is an essential need at the point of entry of any country we are visiting

A security framework for networked RFID

In the last decade RFID technology has become a major contender for managing large scale logistics operations and generating and distributing the massive amount of data involved in such operations. One of the main obstacles to the widespread deployment and adoption of RFID systems is the security issues inherent in them. This is compounded by a noticeable lack of literature on how to identify the vulnerabilities of a RFID system and then effectively identify and develop counter measures to combat the threats posed by those vulnerabilities. In this chapter, the authors develop a conceptual framework for analysing the threats, attacks, and security requirements pertaining to networked RFID systems. The vulnerabilities of, and the threats to, the system are identified using the threat model. The security framework itself consists of two main concepts: (1) the attack model, which identifies and classifies the possible attacks, and (2) the system model, which identifies the security requirements. The framework gives readers a method with which to analyse the threats any given system faces. Those threats can then be used to identify the attacks possible on that system and get a better understanding of those attacks. It also allows the reader to easily identify all the security requirements of that system and identify how those requirements can be met

When Big Brother Privatizes: Commercial Surveillance, the Privacy Act of 1974, and the Future of RFID

RFID is a powerful new technology that has the potential to allow commercial retailers to undermine individual control over private information. Despite the potential of RFID to undermine personal control over such information, the federal government has not enacted a set of practicable standards to ensure that personal data does not become widely misused by commercial entities. Although some potential privacy abuses could be addressed by modifying RFID technology, this iBrief argues that it would be wise to amend the Privacy Act of 1974 so that corporations would have a statutory obligation to preserve individual anonymity and respect the privacy preferences of consumers

Biometric ID Cybersurveillance

The implementation of a universal digitalized biometric ID system risks normalizing and integrating mass cybersurveillance into the daily lives of ordinary citizens. ID documents such as driver’s licenses in some states and all U.S. passports are now implanted with radio frequency identification (RFID) technology. In recent proposals, Congress has considered implementing a digitalized biometric identification card—such as a biometric-based, “high-tech” Social Security Card—which may eventually lead to the development of a universal multimodal biometric database (e.g., the collection of the digital photos, fingerprints, iris scans, and/or DNA of all citizens and noncitizens). Such “hightech” IDs, once merged with GPS-RFID tracking technology, would facilitate exponentially a convergence of cybersurveillance-body tracking and data surveillance, or dataveillance-biographical tracking. Yet, the existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is tethered to a “reasonable expectation of privacy” test that does not appear to restrain the comprehensive, suspicionless amassing of databases that concern the biometric data, movements, activities, and other personally identifiable information of individuals. In this Article, I initiate a project to explore the constitutional and other legal consequences of big data cybersurveillance generally and mass biometric dataveillance in particular. This Article focuses on how biometric data is increasingly incorporated into identity management systems through bureaucratized cybersurveillance or the normalization of cybersurveillance through the daily course of business and integrated forms of governance

A Taxonomy of Security Threats and Solutions for RFID Systems

RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) is a method of wireless data collection technology that uses RFID tags or transponders to electronically store and retrieve data. RFID tags are quickly replacing barcodes as the “identification system of choice” [1]. Since RFID devices are electronic devices, they can be hacked into by an outsider, and their data can be accessed or modified without the user knowing. New threats to RFID-enabled systems are always on the horizon. A systematic classification should be used to categorize these threats to help reduce confusion. This paper will look at the problem of security threats towards RFID systems, and provide a taxonomy for these threats