A Theory of Pricing Private Data

Personal data has value to both its owner and to institutions who would like to analyze it. Privacy mechanisms protect the owner's data while releasing to analysts noisy versions of aggregate query results. But such strict protections of individual's data have not yet found wide use in practice. Instead, Internet companies, for example, commonly provide free services in return for valuable sensitive information from users, which they exploit and sometimes sell to third parties. As the awareness of the value of the personal data increases, so has the drive to compensate the end user for her private information. The idea of monetizing private data can improve over the narrower view of hiding private data, since it empowers individuals to control their data through financial means. In this paper we propose a theoretical framework for assigning prices to noisy query answers, as a function of their accuracy, and for dividing the price amongst data owners who deserve compensation for their loss of privacy. Our framework adopts and extends key principles from both differential privacy and query pricing in data markets. We identify essential properties of the price function and micro-payments, and characterize valid solutions.Comment: 25 pages, 2 figures. Best Paper Award, to appear in the 16th International Conference on Database Theory (ICDT), 201

The typology of partial credit guarantee funds around the world

This paper presents data on 76 partial credit guarantee schemes across 46 developed and developing countries. Based on theory, the authors discuss different organizational features of credit guarantee schemes and their variation across countries. They focus on the respective role of government and the private sector and different pricing and risk reduction tools and how they are correlated across countries. The findings show that government has an important role to play in funding and management, but less so in risk assessment and recovery. There is a surprisingly low use of risk-based pricing and limited use of risk management mechanisms.

Intertemporal substitution, risk aversion, and private savings in Mexico

The decline in private savings since 1982 is arguably the most important problem in high debt countries. A reversal of the trend is essential if growth is to be restored. Three factors predominate : 1) the extent of intertemporal substitution; 2) attitudes toward risk; and 3) private/public savings interaction. These factors lie at the core of the authors'research. They test the issue of debt neutrality - whether future taxes are recognized as an offset for the value of any government debt held - and the response of private savings to real interest rates and uncertainty. The authors estimated two configurations of a joint portfolio-choice/savings model. First, they included equity, domestic bonds, and flight capital. In the second configuration they eliminated flight capital. The authors conclusions include the following : i) the intertemporal approach to consumption is supported by the data; ii) the results imply rejection of the traditional, expected utility approach; iii) risk aversion is significant but lower than many have argued from analysis of static versions of the capital asset pricing model; iv) results on the intertemporal substitution elasticity are much weaker; and v) domestic government bonds probably are considered as part of private wealth, although significantly less than one for one, thus rejecting debt neutrality.Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,Inequality

Cost recovery and pricing of payment services

A modern payment system is essential for promoting domestic and international trade and exchange as well as developing financial markets. Payment users will be directed toward the most efficient payment methods when the costs of producing those services are reflected in the prices paid. Resources are being wasted in the United States because consumers see no important difference in transaction prices or bank costs between using a check or using electronic direct debit in paying a bill, even though the social costs of these two instruments are different. Electronic payments cost only a third to half as much as paper-based payments. An estimated $100 billion (or 1.5 percent of GDP) is being lost by the continued use of paper-based checks. When payment instruments are not appropriately priced, the costs must be covered elsewhere. One common solution is to let loan revenues cover part of payment expenses (keeping loan rates higher to compensate). When prices reflect the full cost of producing the service, users demand the services that use the fewest real resources. The authors give examples of payment prices and price schedules and show how underlying cost data are used to"build up"to a price. They outline how payment services may best be structured to: a) Appropriately reflect economies of scale or scope in the production of payment services; b) Adjust cost recovery percentages to accommodate how much demand conditions associated with start-up differ from those associated with mature operation. (During a new system's early years of operation, the transaction volume may be low and some form of underrecovery of costs may be required to encourage use of the system. But any such underrecovery must be built into future pricing arrangements oncethe systems are established and traffic volumes are at a level where full cost recovery is practical. To ensure fairness, the pricing structure must also guarantee that latecomers to the system not get more favorable treatment than the initial user group.); and c) Induce efficient use of scarce resources. They note the economic principles that recommend certain pricing methods over others and apply equally to payment services provided by the private sector or through a government agency. They show why costs should be recovered through user transaction fees.Banks&Banking Reform,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Economic Theory&Research,Markets and Market Access,Decentralization,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,Environmental Economics&Policies,Markets and Market Access

Mark-Up Pricing in Bulgarian Manufacturing

The pricing policy of Bulgarian manufacturing firms is analysed in the paper in the context of the theory of the price-setting behaviour of firms endowed with market power, and more specifically, using the notion of mark-up pricing. Using some recent derivations in the literature, we estimate mark-up ratios for Bulgarian manufacturing sectors at the NACE 2-digit and NACE 3-digit levels. The estimated mark-ups are then tested against a set of variables measuring the degree of competitive pressure on a sectoral level.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39773/3/wp389.pd

Collateral Damage: Private Merger Lawsuits in the Wake of Section 2’s Contraction

For over 100 years, the Clayton Act has ostensibly prohibited anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions. Yet, as fears of market concentration and market power grow, it seems high time for a boost in enforcement. Armed with statutory causes of action for injunctive relief and treble damages, private plaintiffs could provide that needed boost. However, these plaintiffs face an unexpected hurdle to enforcing the merger laws: section 2 of the Sherman Act. This Note argues that the narrowing of liability under section 2 over the past three decades has had a collateral impact on private plaintiffs’—especially rival firms’—ability to satisfy the antitrust injury requirement to challenge an anticompetitive merger. The 1986 Supreme Court decision in Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc. requires plaintiffs to allege that newly merged firms will act anticompetitively in a way that injures the plaintiffs. To make such allegations successfully, plaintiffs must rely on accepted theories of antitrust liability, which will often sound in the predatory behaviors prohibited by section 2. But as section 2 has shrunk, so too has the ability to challenge the merger

Are the dimensions of private information more multiple than expected? Information asymmetries in the market of supplementary private health insurance in England

Our study reexamines standard econometric approaches for the detection of information asymmetries on insurance markets. We claim that evidence based on a standard framework with 2 equations, which uses potential sources of information asymmetries, should stress the importance of heterogeneity in the parameters. We argue that conclusions derived from this methodology can be misleading if the estimated coefficients in such an `unused characteristics' framework are driven by different parts of the population. We show formally that an individual's expected risk from the perspective of insurance, conditioned on certain characteristics (which are not used for calculating the risk premium), can equal the population's expectation in risk { although such characteristics are both related to risk and insurance probability, which is usually interpreted as an indicator of information asymmetries. We provide empirical evidence on the existence of information asymmetries in the market for supplementary private health insurance in the UK. Overall, we found evidence for advantageous selection into the private risk pool; ie people with lower health risk tend to insure more. The main drivers of this phenomenon seem to be characteristics such as income and wealth. Nevertheless, we also found parameter heterogeneity to be relevant, leading to possible misinterpretation if the standard `unused characteristics' approach is applied