Understanding Contextual Factors of Bring Your Own Device and Employee Information Security Behaviors from the Work-Life Domain Perspective

Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) is no longer the exception, but rather the norm. Most prior research on employees’ compliance with organizational security policies has been primarily conducted with the assumption that work takes place in a specified workplace, not remotely. However, due to advances in technology, almost every employee brings his or her own device(s) to work. Further, particularly as a result of the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic, remote working has become very popular, with many employees using their own devices for work- related activities. BYOD brings new challenges in ensuring employees’ compliance with information security rules and policies by creating a gray area between the work and life domains as it diminishes the boundaries that separate them and thus affects employees’ perception of them. As yet, little is known about how BYOD changes individuals’ perception of work-life domains and how such perception may subsequently affect their compliance behavior. Building on prior research on information security behaviors and work-life domain management, this thesis investigates the possible effects of BYOD on employees’ compliance behavior through the changes it brings about in their work-life domain perspective. It extends existing border theory by identifying and empirically validating new border marking factors— namely, device ownership and data sensitivity—in employees’ interpretation of their work and life domains. Subsequently, protection motivation theory, a theory widely used in explaining employees’ compliance behavior, was used to examine why and how the perception of work- life domains is relevant and necessary to consider in examining employees’ intention to comply with information security policies

The Retrieval of Liberalism in Policing

There is a growing sense that many liberal states are in the midst of a shift in legal and political norms—a shift that is happening slowly and for a variety of reasons relating to security. The internet and tech booms—paving the way for new forms of electronic surveillance—predated the 9/11 attacks by several years, while the police’s vast use of secret informants and deceptive operations began well before that. On the other hand, the recent uptick in reactionary movements—movements in which the rule of law seems expendable—began many years after 9/11 and continues to this day. One way to describe this book is an examination of the moral limits on modern police practices that flow from the basic legal and political tenets of the liberal tradition. The central argument is that policing in liberal states is constrained by a liberal conception of persons coupled with particular rule of law principles. Part I consists of three chapters that constitute the book’s theoretical foundation, including an overview of the police’s law enforcement role in the liberal polity and a methodology for evaluating that role. Part II consists of three chapters that address applications of the theory, including the police’s use of informants, deceptive operations, and surveillance. The upshot is that policing in liberal societies has become illiberal in light of its response to both internal and external threats to security. The book provides an account of what it might mean to retrieve policing that is consistent with the basic tenets of liberalism and the limits imposed by those tenets. [This is an uncorrected draft of the book's preface and introduction, forthcoming from Oxford University Press.

Convergence towards a European strategic culture? A constructivist framework for explaining changing norms.

The article contributes to the debate about the emergence of a European strategic culture to underpin a European Security and Defence Policy. Noting both conceptual and empirical weaknesses in the literature, the article disaggregates the concept of strategic culture and focuses on four types of norms concerning the means and ends for the use of force. The study argues that national strategic cultures are less resistant to change than commonly thought and that they have been subject to three types of learning pressures since 1989: changing threat perceptions, institutional socialization, and mediatized crisis learning. The combined effect of these mechanisms would be a process of convergence with regard to strategic norms prevalent in current EU countries. If the outlined hypotheses can be substantiated by further research the implications for ESDP are positive, especially if the EU acts cautiously in those cases which involve norms that are not yet sufficiently shared across countries

Towards a Theory of 'Late Rentierism' in the Arab States of the Gulf

Rentier state theory (RST) gained currency in the late 1980s, and remains widely cited or accepted, as an explanation for the lack of democratization and for economic problems in oil- and gasproducing states of the Middle East. It postulates that externally-derived, unproductively-derived 'rents' such as oil and gas revenues (or fees, foreign aid, and the like) give the state autonomy from society, removing pressures for democratization, economic liberalization, and other policies in response to societal antagonism or pressure. Societal pressures are 'bought off' by rents, and rents also pay the cost of an expansive state repressive capacity. This argument is, of course, simplistic, and the development strategies of the Gulf in the past two decades - including the spectacular globalized development of Dubai and, more recently, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, and others - suggests that a simple argument of state autonomy from society is inaccurate or incomplete, and that RST requires refinement and sophisticatization. The paper is a preliminary attempt at that refinement, specifically arguing that while rents allow allocative states to restrict or even avoid pressure for democratization, the state still relies - as all do - on a base level of legitimacy and societal toleration of the regime. Thus, rentiers must still be politically responsive, yet not democratic, to a core set of societal needs and values. The state must balance repression and cooptation - a rentier does not have unlimited repressive ability, whatever its financial capacity - and especially, if it is to survive, a rentier state must be adaptable to the changes brought by globalization and must provide opportunity and employment through economic diversification. Yet the rentier state is relieved of democratic accountability, while never truly autonomous from society, and thus still has a non-democratic or quasi-democratic accountability attached to the rentier bargain. The paper that follows makes this case, and argues for the concept of a 'late-stage rentier state' in the case of the Arab states of the Gulf. The paper begins by outlining the tenets and constraints of orthodox RST, and then makes the case for a more sophisticated understanding of these states' rent-based relationships with society, and highlights their main characteristics in the Gulf from the 1990s to today

Corporate sustainability reporting index and baseline data for the cruise industry

Sustainability policies and corporate reports demonstrate the impacts cruise companies acknowledge as their responsibility, and the actions put in place to address them. This paper develops a corporate social responsibility index based on the Global Reporting Initiative, with industry specific additions including labor and human rights, health and safety, and environmental and economic aspects. Companies disclose more management than performance data, which is typical of early stages of development. Companies disclosing less information focus on soft indicators which are easy to mimic and demonstrate posturing. Items disclosed tend to be marginal to the core of the business, have a positive economic impact or pre-empt sector regulation. Reports echo the voice of the corporations and not the demands of stakeholders. Institutional isomorphism has not influenced a homogenization in reporting, with only the largest firms reporting at this stage

Warfighting for cyber deterrence: a strategic and moral imperative

Theories of cyber deterrence are developing rapidly. However, the literature is missing an important ingredient—warfighting for deterrence. This controversial idea, most commonly associated with nuclear strategy during the later stages of the Cold War, affords a number of advantages. It provides enhanced credibility for deterrence, offers means to deal with deterrence failure (including intrawar deterrence and damage limitation), improves compliance with the requirements of just war and ultimately ensures that strategy continues to function in the post-deterrence environment. This paper assesses whether a warfighting for deterrence approach is suitable for the cyber domain. In doing so, it challenges the notion that warfighting concepts are unsuitable for operations in cyberspace. To do this, the work constructs a conceptual framework that is then applied to cyber deterrence. It is found that all of the advantages of taking a warfighting stance apply to cyber operations. The paper concludes by constructing a warfighting model for cyber deterrence. This model includes passive and active defences and cross-domain offensive capabilities. The central message of the paper is that a theory of victory (strategy) must guide the development of cyber deterrence

Process as a world transaction

Transaction is process closure: for a transaction is the limiting process of process itself. In the process world view the universe is the ultimate (intensional) transaction of all its extensional limiting processes that we call reality. ANPA’s PROGRAM UNIVERSE is a computational model which can be explored empirically in commercial database transactions where there has been a wealth of activity over the real world for the last 40 years. Process category theory demonstrates formally the fundamental distinctions between the classical model of a transaction as in PROGRAM UNIVERSE and physical reality. The paper concludes with a short technical summary for those who do not wish to read all the detail

Chevron Meets Youngstown: National Security and the Administrative State

The past several years have witnessed a burst of scholarship at the intersection of national security and administrative law. Many supporters of this approach endorse a heightened, “super-strong” brand of Chevron deference to presidential decisionmaking during times of emergency. Believing that the Executive’s comparative advantage in expertise, access to information, and accountability warrant minimal judicial scrutiny, these Chevron-backers advance an Executive-centric view of national security powers. Other scholars, by contrast, dispute Chevron’s relevance to national security. These Chevron-detractors argue for an interventionist judiciary in national security matters. Both camps criticize the Supreme Court’s scaling of deference to the Executive after 9/11: Chevron-backers argue that the Court failed to accord sufficient deference to the President, while Chevron-detractors argue that the Court failed to clarify the scope of individual liberties. However, neither side appreciates the role that Justice Jackson’s seminal Youngstown concurrence has played in the Court’s resolution of recent national security cases. Youngstown makes congressional legislation – not Executive power or individual rights – the central judicial concern in cases pitting individual liberty against Executive power. The post-9/11 Supreme Court, following Justice Jackson, has used judicial review to catalyze congressional action by remanding to Congress policy questions lacking joint political branch support. This dual-branch theory of governance preserves a critical rule-of-law basis for judicial review of national security decisionmaking that Chevron’s backers and its detractors overlook