Hybrid Possibilistic Conditioning for Revision under Weighted Inputs

International audienceWe propose and investigate new operators in the possi-bilistic belief revision setting, obtained as different combinations of the conditioning operators on models and countermodels, as well as of how weighted inputs are interpreted. We obtain a family of eight operators that essentially obey the basic postulates of revision, with a few slight differences. These operators show an interesting variety of behaviors, making them suitable to representing changes in the beliefs of an agent in different contexts

Managing different sources of uncertainty in a BDI framework in a principled way with tractable fragments

The Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) architecture is a practical approach for modelling large-scale intelligent systems. In the BDI setting, a complex system is represented as a network of interacting agents – or components – each one modelled based on its beliefs, desires and intentions. However, current BDI implementations are not well-suited for modelling more realistic intelligent systems which operate in environments pervaded by different types of uncertainty. Furthermore, existing approaches for dealing with uncertainty typically do not offer syntactical or tractable ways of reasoning about uncertainty. This complicates their integration with BDI implementations, which heavily rely on fast and reactive decisions. In this paper, we advance the state-of-the-art w.r.t. handling different types of uncertainty in BDI agents. The contributions of this paper are, first, a new way of modelling the beliefs of an agent as a set of epistemic states. Each epistemic state can use a distinct underlying uncertainty theory and revision strategy, and commensurability between epistemic states is achieved through a stratification approach. Second, we present a novel syntactic approach to revising beliefs given unreliable input. We prove that this syntactic approach agrees with the semantic definition, and we identify expressive fragments that are particularly useful for resource-bounded agents. Third, we introduce full operational semantics that extend Can, a popular semantics for BDI, to establish how reasoning about uncertainty can be tightly integrated into the BDI framework. Fourth, we provide comprehensive experimental results to highlight the usefulness and feasibility of our approach, and explain how the generic epistemic state can be instantiated into various representations

A Syntactic Possibilistic Belief Change Operator: Theory and empirical study

International audienceWe propose a syntactic possibilistic belief-change operator, which operates on a belief base of necessity-valued formulas. Such a base may be regarded as a finite and compact encoding of a possibility distribution over a possibly infinite set of interpretations. The proposed operator is designed so that it behaves like a semantic possibilistic belief-change operator for BDI agents recently proposed in the literature. The equivalence of the semantic and syntactic operators is then proved. Experimental results are presented. The aim of these experiments is to demonstrate that the cost of belief revision (expressed in terms of the number of entailment checks required) as well as the size of the belief base do not explode as the number of new pieces of information (formulas) supplied increases

Syntactic Possibilistic Goal Generation

International audienceWe propose syntactic deliberation and goal election al-gorithms for possibilistic agents which are able to deal with incom-plete and imprecise information in a dynamic world. We show that the proposed algorithms are equivalent to their semantic counterparts already presented in the literature. We show that they lead to an ef-ficient implementation of a possibilistic BDI model of agency which integrates goal generation

Bipolar Possibility Theory as a Basis for a Logic of Desire and Beliefs

International audienceBipolar possibility theory relies on the use of four set functions. On the one hand, a weak possibility and a strong necessity measure are increasing set functions, which are respectively max-decomposable with respect to union and min-decomposable with respect to intersection. On the other hand, strong possibility and weak necessity measures are two decreasing set functions, which are respectively min-decomposable with respect to union and max-decomposable with respect to intersection. In the first part of the paper we advocate the use of the last two functions for modeling a notion of graded desire. Moreover, we show that the combination of weak possibility and strong possibility allows us to model a notion of realistic desire, i.e., a desire that does not only account for satisfactoriness but also for its epistemic possibility. In the second part of the paper we show that possibility theory offers a semantic basis for developing a modal logic of beliefs and desires

A Probabilistic Modelling Approach for Rational Belief in Meta-Epistemic Contexts

This work is part of the larger project INTEGRITY. Integrity develops a conceptual frame integrating beliefs with individual (and consensual group) decision making and action based on belief awareness. Comments and criticisms are most welcome via email. The text introduces the conceptual (internalism, externalism), quantitative (probabilism) and logical perspectives (logics for reasoning about probabilities by Fagin, Halpern, Megiddo and MEL by Banerjee, Dubois) for the framework

A Probabilistic Modelling Approach for Rational Belief in Meta-Epistemic Contexts

This work is part of the larger project INTEGRITY. Integrity develops a conceptual frame integrating beliefs with individual (and consensual group) decision making and action based on belief awareness. Comments and criticisms are most welcome via email. The text introduces the conceptual (internalism, externalism), quantitative (probabilism) and logical perspectives (logics for reasoning about probabilities by Fagin, Halpern, Megiddo and MEL by Banerjee, Dubois) for the framework

A Probabilistic Modelling Approach for Rational Belief in Meta-Epistemic Contexts

This work is part of the larger project INTEGRITY. Integrity develops a conceptual frame integrating beliefs with individual (and consensual group) decision making and action based on belief awareness. Comments and criticisms are most welcome via email. Starting with a thorough discussion of the conceptual embedding in existing schools of thought and liter- ature we develop a framework that aims to be empirically adequate yet scalable to epistemic states where an agent might testify to uncertainly believe a propositional formula based on the acceptance that a propositional formula is possible, called accepted truth. The familiarity of human agents with probability assignments make probabilism particularly appealing as quantitative modelling framework for defeasible reasoning that aspires empirical adequacy for gradual belief expressed as credence functions. We employ the inner measure induced by the probability measure, going back to Halmos, interpreted as estimate for uncertainty. Doing so omits generally requiring direct probability assignments testi�ed as strength of belief and uncertainty by a human agent. We provide a logical setting of the two concepts uncertain belief and accepted truth, completely relying on the the formal frameworks of 'Reasoning about Probabilities' developed by Fagin, Halpern and Megiddo and the 'Metaepistemic logic MEL' developed by Banerjee and Dubois. The purport of Probabilistic Uncertainty is a framework allowing with a single quantitative concept (an inner measure induced by a probability measure) expressing two epistemological concepts: possibilities as belief simpliciter called accepted truth, and the agents' credence called uncertain belief for a criterion of evaluation, called rationality. The propositions accepted to be possible form the meta-epistemic context(s) in which the agent can reason and testify uncertain belief or suspend judgement

A Probabilistic Modelling Approach for Rational Belief in Meta-Epistemic Contexts

This work is part of the larger project INTEGRITY. Integrity develops a conceptual frame integrating beliefs with individual (and consensual group) decision making and action based on belief awareness. Comments and criticisms are most welcome via email. Starting with a thorough discussion of the conceptual embedding in existing schools of thought and liter- ature we develop a framework that aims to be empirically adequate yet scalable to epistemic states where an agent might testify to uncertainly believe a propositional formula based on the acceptance that a propositional formula is possible, called accepted truth. The familiarity of human agents with probability assignments make probabilism particularly appealing as quantitative modelling framework for defeasible reasoning that aspires empirical adequacy for gradual belief expressed as credence functions. We employ the inner measure induced by the probability measure, going back to Halmos, interpreted as estimate for uncertainty. Doing so omits generally requiring direct probability assignments testi�ed as strength of belief and uncertainty by a human agent. We provide a logical setting of the two concepts uncertain belief and accepted truth, completely relying on the the formal frameworks of 'Reasoning about Probabilities' developed by Fagin, Halpern and Megiddo and the 'Metaepistemic logic MEL' developed by Banerjee and Dubois. The purport of Probabilistic Uncertainty is a framework allowing with a single quantitative concept (an inner measure induced by a probability measure) expressing two epistemological concepts: possibilities as belief simpliciter called accepted truth, and the agents' credence called uncertain belief for a criterion of evaluation, called rationality. The propositions accepted to be possible form the meta-epistemic context(s) in which the agent can reason and testify uncertain belief or suspend judgement