4,386 research outputs found
Fighting Cybercrime After \u3cem\u3eUnited States v. Jones\u3c/em\u3e
In a landmark non-decision last term, five Justices of the United States Supreme Court would have held that citizens possess a Fourth Amendment right to expect that certain quantities of information about them will remain private, even if they have no such expectations with respect to any of the information or data constituting that whole. This quantitative approach to evaluating and protecting Fourth Amendment rights is certainly novel and raises serious conceptual, doctrinal, and practical challenges. In other works, we have met these challenges by engaging in a careful analysis of this “mosaic theory” and by proposing that courts focus on the technologies that make collecting and aggregating large quantities of information possible. In those efforts, we focused on reasonable expectations held by “the people” that they will not be subjected to broad and indiscriminate surveillance. These expectations are anchored in Founding-era concerns about the capacity for unfettered search powers to promote an authoritarian surveillance state. Although we also readily acknowledged that there are legitimate and competing governmental and law enforcement interests at stake in the deployment and use of surveillance technologies that implicate reasonable interests in quantitative privacy, we did little more. In this Article, we begin to address that omission by focusing on the legitimate governmental and law enforcement interests at stake in preventing, detecting, and prosecuting cyber-harassment and healthcare fraud
Logic Locking based Trojans: A Friend Turns Foe
Logic locking and hardware Trojans are two fields in hardware security that
have been mostly developed independently from each other. In this paper, we
identify the relationship between these two fields. We find that a common
structure that exists in many logic locking techniques has desirable properties
of hardware Trojans (HWT). We then construct a novel type of HWT, called
Trojans based on Logic Locking (TroLL), in a way that can evade
state-of-the-art ATPG-based HWT detection techniques. In an effort to detect
TroLL, we propose customization of existing state-of-the-art ATPG-based HWT
detection approaches as well as adapting the SAT-based attacks on logic locking
to HWT detection. In our experiments, we use random sampling as reference. It
is shown that the customized ATPG-based approaches are the best performing but
only offer limited improvement over random sampling. Moreover, their efficacy
also diminishes as TroLL's triggers become longer, i.e., have more bits
specified). We thereby highlight the need to find a scalable HWT detection
approach for TroLL.Comment: 9 pages, double column, 8 figures, IEEE forma
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