12 research outputs found
Decentralized and stable matching in Peer-to-Peer energy trading
In peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading, a secured infrastructure is required to
manage trade and record monetary transactions. A central server/authority can
be used for this. But there is a risk of central authority influencing the
energy price. So blockchain technology is being preferred as a secured
infrastructure in P2P trading. Blockchain provides a distributed repository
along with smart contracts for trade management. This reduces the influence of
central authority in trading. However, these blockchain-based systems still
rely on a central authority to pair/match sellers with consumers for trading
energy. The central authority can interfere with the matching process to profit
a selected set of users. Further, a centralized authority also charges for its
services, thereby increasing the cost of energy. We propose two distributed
mechanisms to match sellers with consumers. The first mechanism doesn't allow
for price negotiations between sellers and consumers, whereas the second does.
We also calculate the time complexity and the stability of the matching process
for both mechanisms. Using simulation, we compare the influence of centralized
control and energy prices between the proposed and the existing mechanisms. The
overall work strives to promote the free market and reduce energy prices
Coordination in Service Value Networks - A Mechanism Design Approach
The fundamental paradigm shift from traditional value chains to agile service value networks (SVN) implies new economic and organizational challenges. This work provides an auction-based coordination mechanism that enables the allocation and pricing of service compositions in SVNs. The mechanism is multidimensional incentive compatible and implements an ex-post service level enforcement. Further extensions of the mechanism are evaluated following analytical and numerical research methods
Achieving reliability and fairness in online task computing environments
MenciĂłn Internacional en el tĂtulo de doctorWe consider online task computing environments such as volunteer computing platforms running
on BOINC (e.g., SETI@home) and crowdsourcing platforms such as Amazon Mechanical
Turk. We model the computations as an Internet-based task computing system under the masterworker
paradigm. A master entity sends tasks across the Internet, to worker entities willing to
perform a computational task. Workers execute the tasks, and report back the results, completing
the computational round. Unfortunately, workers are untrustworthy and might report an incorrect
result. Thus, the first research question we answer in this work is how to design a reliable masterworker
task computing system. We capture the workers’ behavior through two realistic models:
(1) the “error probability model” which assumes the presence of altruistic workers willing to
provide correct results and the presence of troll workers aiming at providing random incorrect
results. Both types of workers suffer from an error probability altering their intended response.
(2) The “rationality model” which assumes the presence of altruistic workers, always reporting
a correct result, the presence of malicious workers always reporting an incorrect result, and the
presence of rational workers following a strategy that will maximize their utility (benefit). The
rational workers can choose among two strategies: either be honest and report a correct result,
or cheat and report an incorrect result. Our two modeling assumptions on the workers’ behavior
are supported by an experimental evaluation we have performed on Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Given the error probability model, we evaluate two reliability techniques: (1) “voting” and (2)
“auditing” in terms of task assignments required and time invested for computing correctly a set
of tasks with high probability. Considering the rationality model, we take an evolutionary game
theoretic approach and we design mechanisms that eventually achieve a reliable computational
platform where the master receives the correct task result with probability one and with minimal
auditing cost. The designed mechanisms provide incentives to the rational workers, reinforcing
their strategy to a correct behavior, while they are complemented by four reputation schemes that
cope with malice. Finally, we also design a mechanism that deals with unresponsive workers by
keeping a reputation related to the workers’ response rate. The designed mechanism selects the
most reliable and active workers in each computational round. Simulations, among other, depict
the trade-off between the master’s cost and the time the system needs to reach a state where
the master always receives the correct task result. The second research question we answer in
this work concerns the fair and efficient distribution of workers among the masters over multiple computational rounds. Masters with similar tasks are competing for the same set of workers at
each computational round. Workers must be assigned to the masters in a fair manner; when the
master values a worker’s contribution the most. We consider that a master might have a strategic
behavior, declaring a dishonest valuation on a worker in each round, in an attempt to increase its
benefit. This strategic behavior from the side of the masters might lead to unfair and inefficient assignments
of workers. Applying renown auction mechanisms to solve the problem at hand can be
infeasible since monetary payments are required on the side of the masters. Hence, we present an
alternative mechanism for fair and efficient distribution of the workers in the presence of strategic
masters, without the use of monetary incentives. We show analytically that our designed mechanism
guarantees fairness, is socially efficient, and is truthful. Simulations favourably compare
our designed mechanism with two benchmark auction mechanisms.This work has been supported by IMDEA Networks Institute and the Spanish Ministry of Education grant FPU2013-03792.Programa Oficial de Doctorado en IngenierĂa MatemáticaPresidente: Alberto Tarable.- Secretario: JosĂ© Antonio Cuesta Ruiz.- Vocal: Juan Julián Merelo GuervĂł
Automated Markets and Trading Agents
Computer automation has the potential, just starting to be realized, of transforming the
design and operation of markets, and the behaviors of agents trading in them. We discuss
the possibilities for automating markets, presenting a broad conceptual framework
covering resource allocation as well as enabling marketplace services such as search
and transaction execution. One of the most intriguing opportunities is provided by markets
implementing computationally sophisticated negotiation mechanisms, for example
combinatorial auctions. An important theme that emerges from the literature is the centrality
of design decisions about matching the domain of goods over which a mechanism
operates to the domain over which agents have preferences. When the match is imperfect
(as is almost inevitable), the market game induced by the mechanism is analytically
intractable, and the literature provides an incomplete characterization of rational bidding
policies. A review of the literature suggests that much of our existing knowledge
comes from computational simulations, including controlled studies of abstract market
designs (e.g., simultaneous ascending auctions), and research tournaments comparing
agent strategies in a variety of market scenarios. An empirical game-theoretic methodology
combines the advantages of simulation, agent-based modeling, and statistical and
game-theoretic analysis.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/49510/1/ace_galleys.pd
Coordination in Service Value Networks : A Mechanism Design Approach
The fundamental paradigm shift from traditional value chains to agile service value networks (SVN) implies new economic and organizational challenges. This work provides an auction-based coordination mechanism that enables the allocation and pricing of service compositions in SVNs. The mechanism is multidimensional incentive compatible and implements an ex-post service level enforcement. Further extensions of the mechanism are evaluated following analytical and numerical research methods