2,655 research outputs found
Specialization through Cross-licensing in a Multi-product Stackelberg Duopoly
We argue that cross-licensing is a device to establish specialization in a multi-product Stackelberg duopoly under process innovation. The optimum licensing contracts are royalty contracts. These are designed so as to implement the joint-profit maximization (monopoly) outcome as the unique Nash equilibrium of the competition game. The monopoly-First-Best optimum is attained: each firm produces solely the good for which it has a technological advantage, firms' joint profits attain the First Best optimum. We study the implications of limitations to contract enforceability and find that this may reduce the attained degree of specialization, but social welfare may increase.cross-licensing, specialization, process innovation, Stackelberg.
Rage Against the Machines: How Subjects Learn to Play Against Computers
We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We test whether subjects try to influence those algorithms to their advantage in a forward-looking way (strategic teaching). We find that strategic teaching occurs frequently and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation. The experiment was conducted, both, on the internet and in the usual laboratory setting. We find some systematic differences, which however can be traced to the different incentives structures rather than the experimental environment
Integrated game-theory modelling for multi enterprise-wide coordination and collaboration under uncertain competitive environment
In this work, an integrated Game Theory (GT) approach is developed for the coordination of multi-enterprise Supply Chains (SCs) in a competitive uncertain environment. The conflicting goals of the different participants are solved through coordination contracts using a non-cooperative non-zero-sum Stackelberg game under the leadership of the manufacturer. The Stackelberg payoff matrix is built under the nominal conditions, and then evaluated under different probable uncertain scenarios using a Monte-Carlo simulation. The competition between the Stackelberg game players and the third parties is solved through a Nash Equilibrium game. A novel way to analyze the game outcome is proposed based on a win–win Stackelberg set of “Pareto-frontiers”. The benefits of the resulting MINLP tactical models are illustrated by a case study with different vendors around a client SC. The results show that the coordinated decisions lead to higher expected payoffs compared to the standalone case, while also leading to uncertainty reduction.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft
Output Commitment through Product Bundling: Experimental Evidence
We analyze the impact of product bundling in experimental markets. A firm has monopoly power in one market but faces competition by a second firm in another market. We compare treatments where the monopolist can bundle its two products to treatments where it cannot, and we contrast simultaneous and sequential order of moves. Our data indicate support for the theory of product bundling, even though substantial payoff differences between players exist. With bundling and simultaneous moves, the monopolist offers the predicted number of units. When the monopolist is the Stackelberg leader, the predicted equilibrium is better attained with bundling although in theory bundling should not make a difference here. In sum: bundling works as a commitment device that enables the transfer of market power from one market to another.
Mixed duopoly, privatization and the shadow costs of public funds
The purpose of this article is to investigate how the introduction of the shadow cost of public funds in the utilitarian measure of the economywide welfare affects the behavior of a welfare maximizer public firm in a mixed duopoly. We prove that when firms play simultaneously, the mixed-Nash equilibrium can dominate any Cournot equilibria implemented after a privatization, with or without efficiency gains. This can be true both in terms of welfare and of public firm's profit. When we consider endogenous timing, we show that either mixed- Nash, private leadership or both Stackelberg equilibria can result as subgameperfect Nash equilibria (SPNE). As a consequence, the sustainability of sequential equilibria enlarges the subspace of parameters such that the market performance with an inefficient public firm is better than the one implemented after a full-efficient privatization. Absent efficiency gains, privatization always lowers welfare
Defeating jamming with the power of silence: a game-theoretic analysis
The timing channel is a logical communication channel in which information is
encoded in the timing between events. Recently, the use of the timing channel
has been proposed as a countermeasure to reactive jamming attacks performed by
an energy-constrained malicious node. In fact, whilst a jammer is able to
disrupt the information contained in the attacked packets, timing information
cannot be jammed and, therefore, timing channels can be exploited to deliver
information to the receiver even on a jammed channel.
Since the nodes under attack and the jammer have conflicting interests, their
interactions can be modeled by means of game theory. Accordingly, in this paper
a game-theoretic model of the interactions between nodes exploiting the timing
channel to achieve resilience to jamming attacks and a jammer is derived and
analyzed. More specifically, the Nash equilibrium is studied in the terms of
existence, uniqueness, and convergence under best response dynamics.
Furthermore, the case in which the communication nodes set their strategy and
the jammer reacts accordingly is modeled and analyzed as a Stackelberg game, by
considering both perfect and imperfect knowledge of the jammer's utility
function. Extensive numerical results are presented, showing the impact of
network parameters on the system performance.Comment: Anti-jamming, Timing Channel, Game-Theoretic Models, Nash Equilibriu
Non-cooperative strategies for dynamic policy games and the problem of time inconsistency: A comment
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