933 research outputs found
A Stackelberg Game for Multi-Period Demand Response Management in the Smart Grid
This paper studies a multi-period demand response management problem in the
smart grid where multiple utility companies compete among themselves. The
user-utility interactions are modeled by a noncooperative game of a Stackelberg
type where the interactions among the utility companies are captured through a
Nash equilibrium. It is shown that this game has a unique Stackelberg
equilibrium at which the utility companies set prices to maximize their
revenues (within a Nash game) while the users respond accordingly to maximize
their utilities subject to their budget constraints. Closed-form expressions
are provided for the corresponding strategies of the users and the utility
companies. It is shown that the multi- period scheme, compared with the
single-period case, provides more incentives for the users to participate in
the game. A necessary and sufficient condition on the minimum budget needed for
a user to participate is provided.Comment: Accepted for Proc. 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Contro
Multi-period demand response management in the smart grid: a Stackelberg game approach
This thesis studies a multi-period demand response management problem in the smart grid where multiple utility companies compete among themselves. The user-utility interactions are modeled by a noncooperative game of a Stackelberg type where the interactions among the utility companies are captured through a Nash equilibrium. It is shown that this game has a unique Stackelberg equilibrium at which the utility companies set prices to maximize their revenues (within a Nash game) while the users respond accordingly to maximize their utilities subject to their budget constraints. Closed-form expressions are provided for the corresponding strategies of the users and the utility companies. It is shown, both analytically and numerically, that the multi-period scheme, compared with the single-period one, provides more incentives for energy consumers to participate in demand response programs. A necessary and sufficient condition on the minimum budget needed for a user to participate is provided. The large population regime is also investigated and an appropriate company-to-user ratio is provided
Transforming Energy Networks via Peer to Peer Energy Trading: Potential of Game Theoretic Approaches
Peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading has emerged as a next-generation energy
management mechanism for the smart grid that enables each prosumer of the
network to participate in energy trading with one another and the grid. This
poses a significant challenge in terms of modeling the decision-making process
of each participant with conflicting interest and motivating prosumers to
participate in energy trading and to cooperate, if necessary, for achieving
different energy management goals. Therefore, such decision-making process
needs to be built on solid mathematical and signal processing tools that can
ensure an efficient operation of the smart grid. This paper provides an
overview of the use of game theoretic approaches for P2P energy trading as a
feasible and effective means of energy management. As such, we discuss various
games and auction theoretic approaches by following a systematic classification
to provide information on the importance of game theory for smart energy
research. Then, the paper focuses on the P2P energy trading describing its key
features and giving an introduction to an existing P2P testbed. Further, the
paper zooms into the detail of some specific game and auction theoretic models
that have recently been used in P2P energy trading and discusses some important
finding of these schemes.Comment: 38 pages, single column, double spac
- …