141,486 research outputs found

    A Stable Marriage Requires Communication

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    The Gale-Shapley algorithm for the Stable Marriage Problem is known to take Θ(n2)\Theta(n^2) steps to find a stable marriage in the worst case, but only Θ(nlogn)\Theta(n \log n) steps in the average case (with nn women and nn men). In 1976, Knuth asked whether the worst-case running time can be improved in a model of computation that does not require sequential access to the whole input. A partial negative answer was given by Ng and Hirschberg, who showed that Θ(n2)\Theta(n^2) queries are required in a model that allows certain natural random-access queries to the participants' preferences. A significantly more general - albeit slightly weaker - lower bound follows from Segal's general analysis of communication complexity, namely that Ω(n2)\Omega(n^2) Boolean queries are required in order to find a stable marriage, regardless of the set of allowed Boolean queries. Using a reduction to the communication complexity of the disjointness problem, we give a far simpler, yet significantly more powerful argument showing that Ω(n2)\Omega(n^2) Boolean queries of any type are indeed required for finding a stable - or even an approximately stable - marriage. Notably, unlike Segal's lower bound, our lower bound generalizes also to (A) randomized algorithms, (B) allowing arbitrary separate preprocessing of the women's preferences profile and of the men's preferences profile, (C) several variants of the basic problem, such as whether a given pair is married in every/some stable marriage, and (D) determining whether a proposed marriage is stable or far from stable. In order to analyze "approximately stable" marriages, we introduce the notion of "distance to stability" and provide an efficient algorithm for its computation

    A Stable Marriage Requires Communication

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    Fast distributed almost stable marriages

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    In their seminal work on the Stable Marriage Problem, Gale and Shapley describe an algorithm which finds a stable matching in O(n2)O(n^2) communication rounds. Their algorithm has a natural interpretation as a distributed algorithm where each player is represented by a single processor. In this distributed model, Floreen, Kaski, Polishchuk, and Suomela recently showed that for bounded preference lists, terminating the Gale-Shapley algorithm after a constant number of rounds results in an almost stable matching. In this paper, we describe a new deterministic distributed algorithm which finds an almost stable matching in O(log5n)O(\log^5 n) communication rounds for arbitrary preferences. We also present a faster randomized variant which requires O(log2n)O(\log^2 n) rounds. This run-time can be improved to O(1)O(1) rounds for "almost regular" (and in particular complete) preferences. To our knowledge, these are the first sub-polynomial round distributed algorithms for any variant of the stable marriage problem with unbounded preferences.Comment: Various improvements in version 2: algorithms for general (not just "almost regular") preferences; deterministic variant of the algorithm; streamlined proof of approximation guarante

    A Note on Distributed Stable Matching

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    We consider the distributed complexity of the stable mar-riage problem. In this problem, the communication graph is undirected and bipartite, and each node ranks its neigh-bors. Given a matching of the nodes, a pair of unmatched nodes is called blocking if they prefer each other to their assigned match. A matching is called stable if it does not induce any blocking pair. In the distributed model, nodes exchange messages in each round over the communication links, until they find a stable matching. We show that if mes-sages may contain at most B bits each, then any distributed algorithm that solves the stable marriage problem requires Ω( n/B log n) communication rounds in the worst case, even for graphs of diameter O(log n), where n is the num-ber of nodes in the graph. Furthermore, the lower bound holds even if we allow the output to contain O( n) block-ing pairs. We also consider ε-stability, where a pair is called ε-blocking if they can improve the quality of their match by more than an ε fraction, for some 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1. Our lower bound extends to ε-stability where ε is arbitrarily close to 1/2. We also present a simple distributed algorithm for ε-stability whose time complexity is O(n/ε).

    Matching Theory for Future Wireless Networks: Fundamentals and Applications

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    The emergence of novel wireless networking paradigms such as small cell and cognitive radio networks has forever transformed the way in which wireless systems are operated. In particular, the need for self-organizing solutions to manage the scarce spectral resources has become a prevalent theme in many emerging wireless systems. In this paper, the first comprehensive tutorial on the use of matching theory, a Nobelprize winning framework, for resource management in wireless networks is developed. To cater for the unique features of emerging wireless networks, a novel, wireless-oriented classification of matching theory is proposed. Then, the key solution concepts and algorithmic implementations of this framework are exposed. Then, the developed concepts are applied in three important wireless networking areas in order to demonstrate the usefulness of this analytical tool. Results show how matching theory can effectively improve the performance of resource allocation in all three applications discussed

    Stable Matchings for the Room-mates Problem

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    We show that, given two matchings for a room-mates problem of which say the second is stable, and given a non-empty subset of agents S if (a) no agent in S prefers the first matching to the second, and (b) no agent in S and his room-mate in S under the second matching prefer each other to their respective room-mates in the first matching, then no room-mate of an agent in S prefers the second matching to the first. This result is a strengthening of a result originally due to Knuth (1976). In a paper by Sasaki and Toda (1992) it is shown that if a marriage problem has more than one stable matchings, then given any one stable matching, it is possible to add agents and thereby obtain exactly one stable matching, whose restriction over the original set of agents, coincides with the given stable matching. We are able to extend this result here to the domain of room-mates problems. We also extend a result due to Roth and Sotomayor (1990) originally established for two-sided matching problems in the following manner: If in a room-mates problem, the number of agents increases, then given any stable matching for the old problem and any stable matching for the new one, there is at least one agent who is acceptable to this new agent who prefers the new matching to the old one and his room-mate under the new matching prefers the old matching to the new one. Sasaki and Toda (1992) shows that the solution correspondence which selects the set of all stable matchings, satisfies Pareto Optimality, Anonymity, Consistency and Converse Consistency on the domain of marriage problems. We show here that if a solution correspondence satisfying Consistency and Converse Consistency agrees with the solution correspondence comprising stable matchings for all room-mates problems involving four or fewer agents, then it must agree with the solution correspondence comprising stable matchings for all room-mates problems.Stable matchings, Room-mate problem

    What’s Love Got To Do With It? A Proposal for Elevating the Status of Marriage by Narrowing its Definition, While Universally Extending the Rights and Benefits Enjoyed by Married Couples

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    [...] opposite-sex couples desiring a traditional marriage could choose the option that generally adopts portions of the covenant marriage law enacted thus far by three states. According to Professors Jennifer Drobac and Antony Page, [b]efore the late eighteenth century, marriage typically only served one or more of three goals: (1) to consolidate wealth and resources, (2) to forge political alliances, and (3) to consummate peace treaties
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