Buying Logical Principles with Ontological Coin: The Metaphysical Lessons of Adding epsilon to Intuitionistic Logic

We discuss the philosophical implications of formal results showing the con- sequences of adding the epsilon operator to intuitionistic predicate logic. These results are related to Diaconescu’s theorem, a result originating in topos theory that, translated to constructive set theory, says that the axiom of choice (an “existence principle”) implies the law of excluded middle (which purports to be a logical principle). As a logical choice principle, epsilon allows us to translate that result to a logical setting, where one can get an analogue of Diaconescu’s result, but also can disentangle the roles of certain other assumptions that are hidden in mathematical presentations. It is our view that these results have not received the attention they deserve: logicians are unlikely to read a discussion because the results considered are “already well known,” while the results are simultaneously unknown to philosophers who do not specialize in what most philosophers will regard as esoteric logics. This is a problem, since these results have important implications for and promise signif i cant illumination of contem- porary debates in metaphysics. The point of this paper is to make the nature of the results clear in a way accessible to philosophers who do not specialize in logic, and in a way that makes clear their implications for contemporary philo- sophical discussions. To make the latter point, we will focus on Dummettian discussions of realism and anti-realism. Keywords: epsilon, axiom of choice, metaphysics, intuitionistic logic, Dummett, realism, antirealis

Proof Complexity of Systems of (Non-Deterministic) Decision Trees and Branching Programs

This paper studies propositional proof systems in which lines are sequents of decision trees or branching programs, deterministic or non-deterministic. Decision trees (DTs) are represented by a natural term syntax, inducing the system LDT, and non-determinism is modelled by including disjunction, ?, as primitive (system LNDT). Branching programs generalise DTs to dag-like structures and are duly handled by extension variables in our setting, as is common in proof complexity (systems eLDT and eLNDT). Deterministic and non-deterministic branching programs are natural nonuniform analogues of log-space (L) and nondeterministic log-space (NL), respectively. Thus eLDT and eLNDT serve as natural systems of reasoning corresponding to L and NL, respectively. The main results of the paper are simulation and non-simulation results for tree-like and dag-like proofs in LDT, LNDT, eLDT and eLNDT. We also compare them with Frege systems, constant-depth Frege systems and extended Frege systems

Sense and Substance in Wittgenstein"s Tractatus

In the early pages of his Tractatus, Wittgenstein says that the substance of the world consists of unalterable, simple objects (Gegenstände) (2.021, 2.027). Substance is connected to the Sinn of a proposition in the following cryptic way: "If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense [Sinn] would depend on whether another proposition was true.â€? (2.0211)â€? "In that case we could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false).â€? (2.0212) How can the sense of a proposition depend on the existence of simple, unalterable objects? No connection between Sinn and substance is evident on the basis of these short remarks. Furthermore, the remarks sound strange because elsewhere in the Tractatus Wittgenstein makes it clear that we can understand the sense of a proposition without knowing anything about how things actually stand in the world (see e.g. 4.024)

LTLf and LDLf Monitoring: A Technical Report

Runtime monitoring is one of the central tasks to provide operational decision support to running business processes, and check on-the-fly whether they comply with constraints and rules. We study runtime monitoring of properties expressed in LTL on finite traces (LTLf) and in its extension LDLf. LDLf is a powerful logic that captures all monadic second order logic on finite traces, which is obtained by combining regular expressions and LTLf, adopting the syntax of propositional dynamic logic (PDL). Interestingly, in spite of its greater expressivity, LDLf has exactly the same computational complexity of LTLf. We show that LDLf is able to capture, in the logic itself, not only the constraints to be monitored, but also the de-facto standard RV-LTL monitors. This makes it possible to declaratively capture monitoring metaconstraints, and check them by relying on usual logical services instead of ad-hoc algorithms. This, in turn, enables to flexibly monitor constraints depending on the monitoring state of other constraints, e.g., "compensation" constraints that are only checked when others are detected to be violated. In addition, we devise a direct translation of LDLf formulas into nondeterministic automata, avoiding to detour to Buechi automata or alternating automata, and we use it to implement a monitoring plug-in for the PROM suite

Categoricity, Open-Ended Schemas and Peano Arithmetic

One of the philosophical uses of Dedekind’s categoricity theorem for Peano Arithmetic is to provide support for semantic realism. To this end, the logical framework in which the proof of the theorem is conducted becomes highly significant. I examine different proposals regarding these logical frameworks and focus on the philosophical benefits of adopting open-ended schemas in contrast to second order logic as the logical medium of the proof. I investigate Pederson and Rossberg’s critique of the ontological advantages of open-ended arithmetic when it comes to establishing the categoricity of Peano Arithmetic and show that the critique is highly problematic. I argue that Pederson and Rossberg’s ontological criterion deliver the bizarre result that certain first order subsystems of Peano Arithmetic have a second order ontology. As a consequence, the application of the ontological criterion proposed by Pederson and Rossberg assigns a certain type of ontology to a theory, and a different, richer, ontology to one of its subtheories

Defining Original Presentism

It is surprisingly hard to define presentism. Traditional definitions of the view, in terms of tensed existence statements, have turned out not to to be capable of convincingly distinguishing presentism from eternalism. Picking up on a recent proposal by Tallant, I suggest that we need to locate the break between eternalism and presentism on a much more fundamental level. The problem is that presentists have tried to express their view within a framework that is inherently eternalist. I call that framework the Fregean nexus, as it is defined by Frege’s atemporal understanding of predication. In particular, I show that the tense-logical understanding of tense which is treated as common ground in the debate rests on this very same Fregean nexus, and is thus inadequate for a proper definition of presentism. I contrast the Fregean nexus with what I call the original temporal nexus, which is based on an alternative, inherently temporal form of predication. Finally, I propose to define presentism in terms of the original temporal nexus, yielding original presentism. According to original presentism, temporal propositions are distinguished from atemporal ones not by aspects of their content, as they are on views based on the Fregean nexus, but by their form—in particular, by their form of predication

Non-normal modalities in variants of Linear Logic

This article presents modal versions of resource-conscious logics. We concentrate on extensions of variants of Linear Logic with one minimal non-normal modality. In earlier work, where we investigated agency in multi-agent systems, we have shown that the results scale up to logics with multiple non-minimal modalities. Here, we start with the language of propositional intuitionistic Linear Logic without the additive disjunction, to which we add a modality. We provide an interpretation of this language on a class of Kripke resource models extended with a neighbourhood function: modal Kripke resource models. We propose a Hilbert-style axiomatization and a Gentzen-style sequent calculus. We show that the proof theories are sound and complete with respect to the class of modal Kripke resource models. We show that the sequent calculus admits cut elimination and that proof-search is in PSPACE. We then show how to extend the results when non-commutative connectives are added to the language. Finally, we put the logical framework to use by instantiating it as logics of agency. In particular, we propose a logic to reason about the resource-sensitive use of artefacts and illustrate it with a variety of examples