2,891 research outputs found
A Signaling-based Incentive Mechanism for Device-to-Device Content Sharing in Cellular Networks
In this letter, we model the Device-to-device (D2D)
content sharing problem as a labor market where the base station
(BS) acts as the principal and content providers serve as agents.
A signaling-based content-sharing incentive (SCSI) mechanism is
designed to encourage candidate content providers to participate
in content sharing, and the optimal strategy for each content
provider is derived to maximize their utility (monetary profit)
while guaranteeing a non-negative utility for the BS. Simulation
results show that the proposed SCSI mechanism can increase the
content provider’s utility and participating enthusiasm in D2D
content sharing
Game-theoretic Resource Allocation Methods for Device-to-Device (D2D) Communication
Device-to-device (D2D) communication underlaying cellular networks allows
mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets to use the licensed spectrum
allocated to cellular services for direct peer-to-peer transmission. D2D
communication can use either one-hop transmission (i.e., in D2D direct
communication) or multi-hop cluster-based transmission (i.e., in D2D local area
networks). The D2D devices can compete or cooperate with each other to reuse
the radio resources in D2D networks. Therefore, resource allocation and access
for D2D communication can be treated as games. The theories behind these games
provide a variety of mathematical tools to effectively model and analyze the
individual or group behaviors of D2D users. In addition, game models can
provide distributed solutions to the resource allocation problems for D2D
communication. The aim of this article is to demonstrate the applications of
game-theoretic models to study the radio resource allocation issues in D2D
communication. The article also outlines several key open research directions.Comment: Accepted. IEEE Wireless Comms Mag. 201
Social Data Offloading in D2D-Enhanced Cellular Networks by Network Formation Games
Recently, cellular networks are severely overloaded by social-based services,
such as YouTube, Facebook and Twitter, in which thousands of clients subscribe
a common content provider (e.g., a popular singer) and download his/her content
updates all the time. Offloading such traffic through complementary networks,
such as a delay tolerant network formed by device-to-device (D2D)
communications between mobile subscribers, is a promising solution to reduce
the cellular burdens. In the existing solutions, mobile users are assumed to be
volunteers who selfishlessly deliver the content to every other user in
proximity while moving. However, practical users are selfish and they will
evaluate their individual payoffs in the D2D sharing process, which may highly
influence the network performance compared to the case of selfishless users. In
this paper, we take user selfishness into consideration and propose a network
formation game to capture the dynamic characteristics of selfish behaviors. In
the proposed game, we provide the utility function of each user and specify the
conditions under which the subscribers are guaranteed to converge to a stable
network. Then, we propose a practical network formation algorithm in which the
users can decide their D2D sharing strategies based on their historical
records. Simulation results show that user selfishness can highly degrade the
efficiency of data offloading, compared with ideal volunteer users. Also, the
decrease caused by user selfishness can be highly affected by the cost ratio
between the cellular transmission and D2D transmission, the access delays, and
mobility patterns
An Economic Aspect of Device-to-Device Assisted Offloading in Cellular Networks
Traffic offloading via device-to-device (D2D) communications
has been proposed to alleviate the traffic burden
on base stations (BSs) and to improve the spectral and energy
efficiency of cellular networks. The success of D2D communications
relies on the willingness of users to share contents. In
this paper, we study the economic aspect of traffic offloading via
content sharing among multiple devices and propose an incentive
framework for D2D assisted offloading. In the proposed incentive
framework, the operator improves its overall profit, defined as
the network economic efficiency (ECE), by encouraging users
to act as D2D transmitters (D2D-Txs) which broadcast their
popular contents to nearby users. We analytically characterize
D2D assisted offloading in cellular networks for two operating
modes: 1) underlay mode and 2) overlay mode. We model the
optimization of network ECE as a two-stage Stackelberg game,
considering the densities of cellular users and D2D-Tx’s, the
operator’s incentives and the popularity of contents. The closedform
expressions of network ECE for both underlay and overlay
modes of D2D communications are obtained. Numerical results
show that the achievable network ECE of the proposed incentive
D2D assisted offloading network can be significantly improved
with respect to the conventional cellular networks where the D2D
communications are disabled
Will SDN be part of 5G?
For many, this is no longer a valid question and the case is considered
settled with SDN/NFV (Software Defined Networking/Network Function
Virtualization) providing the inevitable innovation enablers solving many
outstanding management issues regarding 5G. However, given the monumental task
of softwarization of radio access network (RAN) while 5G is just around the
corner and some companies have started unveiling their 5G equipment already,
the concern is very realistic that we may only see some point solutions
involving SDN technology instead of a fully SDN-enabled RAN. This survey paper
identifies all important obstacles in the way and looks at the state of the art
of the relevant solutions. This survey is different from the previous surveys
on SDN-based RAN as it focuses on the salient problems and discusses solutions
proposed within and outside SDN literature. Our main focus is on fronthaul,
backward compatibility, supposedly disruptive nature of SDN deployment,
business cases and monetization of SDN related upgrades, latency of general
purpose processors (GPP), and additional security vulnerabilities,
softwarization brings along to the RAN. We have also provided a summary of the
architectural developments in SDN-based RAN landscape as not all work can be
covered under the focused issues. This paper provides a comprehensive survey on
the state of the art of SDN-based RAN and clearly points out the gaps in the
technology.Comment: 33 pages, 10 figure
An Economic Aspect of Device-to-Device Assisted Offloading in Cellular Networks
Traffic offloading via device-to-device (D2D) communications
has been proposed to alleviate the traffic burden
on base stations (BSs) and to improve the spectral and energy
efficiency of cellular networks. The success of D2D communications
relies on the willingness of users to share contents. In
this paper, we study the economic aspect of traffic offloading via
content sharing among multiple devices and propose an incentive
framework for D2D assisted offloading. In the proposed incentive
framework, the operator improves its overall profit, defined as
the network economic efficiency (ECE), by encouraging users
to act as D2D transmitters (D2D-Txs) which broadcast their
popular contents to nearby users. We analytically characterize
D2D assisted offloading in cellular networks for two operating
modes: 1) underlay mode and 2) overlay mode. We model the
optimization of network ECE as a two-stage Stackelberg game,
considering the densities of cellular users and D2D-Tx’s, the
operator’s incentives and the popularity of contents. The closedform
expressions of network ECE for both underlay and overlay
modes of D2D communications are obtained. Numerical results
show that the achievable network ECE of the proposed incentive
D2D assisted offloading network can be significantly improved
with respect to the conventional cellular networks where the D2D
communications are disabled
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