Language Assistant Capability Exchange Protocol

This disclosure describes techniques to support language assistance services for communication between devices. Per techniques of this disclosure, language assistant capabilities are exchanged between participating devices during call setup. A call protocol such as session initiation protocol (SIP) is suitably modified to exchange language assistant parameters during call set up. The SIP header fields are extended to add a parameter to indicate language assistant capabilities by indicating a suitable language code. An INVITE request is transmitted from an originating device that includes a language identifier that indicates the language assistant capabilities of the originating device. A corresponding language identifier of the terminating device is requested. A language identifier for the terminating device is obtained from and transmitted to the originating device along with a RING message. When the call is answered at the terminating device, an updated language identifier may be provided along with an OK message

ALEX: Improving SIP Support in Systems with Multiple Network Addresses

The successful and increasingly adopted session initiation protocol (SIP) does not adequately support hosts with multiple network addresses, such as dual-stack (IPv4-IPv6) or IPv6 multi-homed devices. This paper presents the Address List Extension (ALEX) to SIP that adds effective support to systems with multiple addresses, such as dual-stack hosts or multi-homed IPv6 hosts. ALEX enables IPv6 transport to be used for SIP messages, as well as for communication sessions between SIP user agents (UAs), whenever possible and without compromising compatibility with ALEX-unaware UAs and SIP servers

A Survey on Handover Management in Mobility Architectures

This work presents a comprehensive and structured taxonomy of available techniques for managing the handover process in mobility architectures. Representative works from the existing literature have been divided into appropriate categories, based on their ability to support horizontal handovers, vertical handovers and multihoming. We describe approaches designed to work on the current Internet (i.e. IPv4-based networks), as well as those that have been devised for the "future" Internet (e.g. IPv6-based networks and extensions). Quantitative measures and qualitative indicators are also presented and used to evaluate and compare the examined approaches. This critical review provides some valuable guidelines and suggestions for designing and developing mobility architectures, including some practical expedients (e.g. those required in the current Internet environment), aimed to cope with the presence of NAT/firewalls and to provide support to legacy systems and several communication protocols working at the application layer

Covert Channels in SIP for VoIP signalling

In this paper, we evaluate available steganographic techniques for SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) that can be used for creating covert channels during signaling phase of VoIP (Voice over IP) call. Apart from characterizing existing steganographic methods we provide new insights by introducing new techniques. We also estimate amount of data that can be transferred in signalling messages for typical IP telephony call.Comment: 8 pages, 4 figure

SecSip: A Stateful Firewall for SIP-based Networks

SIP-based networks are becoming the de-facto standard for voice, video and instant messaging services. Being exposed to many threats while playing an major role in the operation of essential services, the need for dedicated security management approaches is rapidly increasing. In this paper we present an original security management approach based on a specific vulnerability aware SIP stateful firewall. Through known attack descriptions, we illustrate the power of the configuration language of the firewall which uses the capability to specify stateful objects that track data from multiple SIP elements within their lifetime. We demonstrate through measurements on a real implementation of the firewall its efficiency and performance

Session Initiation Protocol Attacks and Challenges

In recent years, Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) has become widely used in current internet protocols. It is a text-based protocol much like Hyper Text Transport Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP). SIP is a strong enough signaling protocol on the internet for establishing, maintaining, and terminating session. In this paper the areas of security and attacks in SIP are discussed. We consider attacks from diverse related perspectives. The authentication schemes are compared, the representative existing solutions are highlighted, and several remaining research challenges are identified. Finally, the taxonomy of SIP threat will be presented

Providing End-to-End Connectivity to SIP User Agents Behind NATs

The widespread diffusion of private networks in SOHO scenarios is fostering an increased deployment of Network Address Translators (NATs). The presence of NATs seriously limits end-to-end connectivity and prevents protocols like the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) from working properly. This document shows how the Address List Extension (ALEX), which was originally developed to provide dual-stack and multi-homing support to SIP, can be used, with minor modifications, to ensure end-to-end connectivity for both media and signaling flows, without relying on intermediate relay nodes whenever it is possibl

Options for Securing RTP Sessions

The Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) is used in a large number of different application domains and environments. This heterogeneity implies that different security mechanisms are needed to provide services such as confidentiality, integrity, and source authentication of RTP and RTP Control Protocol (RTCP) packets suitable for the various environments. The range of solutions makes it difficult for RTP-based application developers to pick the most suitable mechanism. This document provides an overview of a number of security solutions for RTP and gives guidance for developers on how to choose the appropriate security mechanism