Cloud/fog computing resource management and pricing for blockchain networks

The mining process in blockchain requires solving a proof-of-work puzzle, which is resource expensive to implement in mobile devices due to the high computing power and energy needed. In this paper, we, for the first time, consider edge computing as an enabler for mobile blockchain. In particular, we study edge computing resource management and pricing to support mobile blockchain applications in which the mining process of miners can be offloaded to an edge computing service provider. We formulate a two-stage Stackelberg game to jointly maximize the profit of the edge computing service provider and the individual utilities of the miners. In the first stage, the service provider sets the price of edge computing nodes. In the second stage, the miners decide on the service demand to purchase based on the observed prices. We apply the backward induction to analyze the sub-game perfect equilibrium in each stage for both uniform and discriminatory pricing schemes. For the uniform pricing where the same price is applied to all miners, the existence and uniqueness of Stackelberg equilibrium are validated by identifying the best response strategies of the miners. For the discriminatory pricing where the different prices are applied to different miners, the Stackelberg equilibrium is proved to exist and be unique by capitalizing on the Variational Inequality theory. Further, the real experimental results are employed to justify our proposed model.Comment: 16 pages, double-column version, accepted by IEEE Internet of Things Journa

Transforming Energy Networks via Peer to Peer Energy Trading: Potential of Game Theoretic Approaches

Peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading has emerged as a next-generation energy management mechanism for the smart grid that enables each prosumer of the network to participate in energy trading with one another and the grid. This poses a significant challenge in terms of modeling the decision-making process of each participant with conflicting interest and motivating prosumers to participate in energy trading and to cooperate, if necessary, for achieving different energy management goals. Therefore, such decision-making process needs to be built on solid mathematical and signal processing tools that can ensure an efficient operation of the smart grid. This paper provides an overview of the use of game theoretic approaches for P2P energy trading as a feasible and effective means of energy management. As such, we discuss various games and auction theoretic approaches by following a systematic classification to provide information on the importance of game theory for smart energy research. Then, the paper focuses on the P2P energy trading describing its key features and giving an introduction to an existing P2P testbed. Further, the paper zooms into the detail of some specific game and auction theoretic models that have recently been used in P2P energy trading and discusses some important finding of these schemes.Comment: 38 pages, single column, double spac

Peer to Peer Mobile Coupons: Adding Incentives without Sacrificing Security

Mobile commerce is flourishing today due to the advance of the mobile technology. Many conventional marketing activities are moving their ways to the mobile environment. Efficient marketing instruments such as the paper coupons and the electronic coupons are also evolving into the mobile coupons. In comparison with conventional coupons, mobile coupons are personalized and suitable for peer to peer delivery. Coupons are commonly issued by the merchants, used by the interested customers, and discarded by the uninterested receivers. Raising the redemption rate of the coupon will increase the sales of the promoted items. The raise can be accomplished by forwarding coupons from uninterested receivers to potentially interested customers. The ease-of-use exchange mechanism in mobile devices pushes the delivery in the peer to peer environment. Moreover, the characteristic of personalization inspires trust into mobile coupons. Thus, adding the incentives of coupon forwarding, such as a reward bonus, may activate the movement of stationary coupons and eventually increase the redemption rate of mobile coupons. Nevertheless, the incentives adding may bring the threats of alterations and forgery; if the adding mechanism is improperly made. Additionally, complicated security means are hindered by the limitations of storage space, computation power, and communication bandwidth of mobile devices. Therefore, we propose a scheme that uses digital signatures for verifying the incentive-added coupons and design a hash chain to detect possible forgery. The proposed scheme may increase the use of peer to peer mobile coupons without sacrificing the security

Analysis of a Reputation System for Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks with Liars

The application of decentralized reputation systems is a promising approach to ensure cooperation and fairness, as well as to address random failures and malicious attacks in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks. However, they are potentially vulnerable to liars. With our work, we provide a first step to analyzing robustness of a reputation system based on a deviation test. Using a mean-field approach to our stochastic process model, we show that liars have no impact unless their number exceeds a certain threshold (phase transition). We give precise formulae for the critical values and thus provide guidelines for an optimal choice of parameters.Comment: 17 pages, 6 figure