Correlated Equilibria in Competitive Staff Selection Problem

This paper deals with an extension of the concept of correlated strategies to Markov stopping games. The Nash equilibrium approach to solving nonzero-sum stopping games may give multiple solutions. An arbitrator can suggest to each player the decision to be applied at each stage based on a joint distribution over the players' decisions. This is a form of equilibrium selection. Examples of correlated equilibria in nonzero-sum games related to the staff selection competition in the case of two departments are given. Utilitarian, egalitarian, republican and libertarian concepts of correlated equilibria selection are used.Comment: The idea of this paper was presented at Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, International Conference in Memory of Jerzy Los(1920 - 1998), Warsaw, September 200

Mr. Presidential Candidate: Whom Would You Nominate?

Presidential candidates compete on multiple fronts for votes. Who is more likeable? Who will negotiate more effectively with allies and adversaries? Who has the better vice-presidential running mate? Who will make better appointments to the Supreme Court and the cabinet? This last question is often discussed long before the inauguration, for the impact of a secretary of state or a Supreme Court justice can be tremendous. Despite the importance of such appointments, we do not expect candidates to compete on naming the better slates of nominees. For the candidates themselves, avoiding competition over nominees in the pre-election context has personal benefits—in particular, enabling them to keep a variety of supporters working hard on the campaign in the hope of being chosen as nominees. But from a social perspective, this norm has costs. This Article proposes that candidates be induced out of the status quo. In the current era of candidates responding to internet queries and members of the public asking questions via YouTube, it is plausible that the question—“Whom would you nominate (as secretary of state or for the Supreme Court)?”—might be asked in a public setting. If one candidate is behind in the race, he can be pushed to answer the question—and perhaps increase his chances of winning the election

A versatile force: the future of Australia's special operations capability

This study aims to provide an understanding of the Australian Defence Force\u27s special operations capability and what it offers to government in both peace and wartime. Summary Over the past decade, the demands of the ADF’s global and regional operations saw an unprecedented growth in Australia’s special operations capability. Indeed, Special Operations Forces became the ‘capability of choice’ for the Australian Government. However, as the ADF enters a period of transition from almost constant high-tempo operations to what might be a ‘soft power decade’, there’s a need to consider the future of the capability. Against this background, this study aims to inform policy decisions by providing an understanding of the special operations capability and what it offers to government in both peace and wartime. It argues against possible temptations to cut the capability. In a changing strategic environment, Special Operations Forces will continue to be an important instrument of Australian defence policy. The study entails a number of concrete policy recommendations to strengthen and readjust the special operations capability for a new era

Approaches to Covering the Uninsured: A Guide

Explains the main options for expanding heath insurance coverage -- strengthening the current system, making it more affordable or more accessible, and changing how it is financed -- and their potential impact. Compares current reform proposals

Report on Constitutional Amendments, Senate Report No. 88-1017

Considers presidential inability and residence requirements for voting in presidential elections.https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/twentyfifth_amendment_congressional_materials/1012/thumbnail.jp

Optimal selection with randomly fading memory

AbstractIn this paper, we will consider optimal selection problems in which the recall of a random number of observations and uncertainty of selection are both allowed at each stage of the selection process. General rules as well as closed form solutions for specific examples with Markov memory system and finite memory are obtained