A Scale-out Blockchain for Value Transfer with Spontaneous Sharding

Bitcoin, as well as many of its successors, require the whole transaction record to be reliably acquired by all nodes to prevent double-spending. Recently, many blockchains have been proposed to achieve scale-out throughput by letting nodes only acquire a fraction of the whole transaction set. However, these schemes, e.g., sharding and off-chain techniques, suffer from a degradation in decentralization or the capacity of fault tolerance. In this paper, we show that the complete set of transactions is not a necessity for the prevention of double-spending if the properties of value transfers is fully explored. In other words, we show that a value-transfer ledger like Bitcoin has the potential to scale-out by its nature without sacrificing security or decentralization. Firstly, we give a formal definition for the value-transfer ledger and its distinct features from a generic database. Then, we introduce an off-chain based scheme with a shared main chain for consensus and an individual chain for each node for recording transactions. A locally executable validation scheme is proposed with uncompromising validity and consistency. A beneficial consequence of our design is that nodes will spontaneously try to reduce their transmission cost by only providing the transactions needed to show that their transactions are double-spending-proof. As a result, the network is sharded as each node only acquires part of the transaction record and a scale-out throughput could be achieved, which we call "spontaneous sharding".Comment: Accepted by Crypto Valley Conference for Blockchain Technology 201

A Survey on Consensus Mechanisms and Mining Strategy Management in Blockchain Networks

© 2013 IEEE. The past decade has witnessed the rapid evolution in blockchain technologies, which has attracted tremendous interests from both the research communities and industries. The blockchain network was originated from the Internet financial sector as a decentralized, immutable ledger system for transactional data ordering. Nowadays, it is envisioned as a powerful backbone/framework for decentralized data processing and data-driven self-organization in flat, open-access networks. In particular, the plausible characteristics of decentralization, immutability, and self-organization are primarily owing to the unique decentralized consensus mechanisms introduced by blockchain networks. This survey is motivated by the lack of a comprehensive literature review on the development of decentralized consensus mechanisms in blockchain networks. In this paper, we provide a systematic vision of the organization of blockchain networks. By emphasizing the unique characteristics of decentralized consensus in blockchain networks, our in-depth review of the state-of-the-art consensus protocols is focused on both the perspective of distributed consensus system design and the perspective of incentive mechanism design. From a game-theoretic point of view, we also provide a thorough review of the strategy adopted for self-organization by the individual nodes in the blockchain backbone networks. Consequently, we provide a comprehensive survey of the emerging applications of blockchain networks in a broad area of telecommunication. We highlight our special interest in how the consensus mechanisms impact these applications. Finally, we discuss several open issues in the protocol design for blockchain consensus and the related potential research directions

Lever: Breaking the Shackles of Scalable On-chain Validation

Blockchain brings dawn to decentralized applications which coordinate correct computations without a prior trust. However, existing scalable on-chain frameworks are incompetent in dealing with intensive validation. On the one hand, duplicated execution pattern leads to limited throughput and unacceptable expenses. On the other hand, there lack fair and secure incentive mechanisms allocating rewards according to the actual workload of validators, thus deriving bad dilemmas among rational participants and inducing effective attacks from shrewd adversaries. While most solutions rely on off-chain patterns to sidestep the shackles, it further introduces unexpected issues in applicability, fairness and brittle dependency on interactive cooperation. The intrinsic bottleneck of backbone has never been drastically broken. This work presents Lever, the first scalable on-chain framework which supports intensive validation, meanwhile achieves validity, incentive compatibility and cost-efficiency tolerance of f<n/4 Byzantine participants. Lever firstly integrates the evaluation of complexity into the correctness of transaction, thoroughly decoupling intensive validation from regular Byzantine consensus. Significant scalability is then achieved by launching few rounds of novel validation-challenge game between potential adversaries and rational stakeholders; compelling incentive mechanism effectively transfers deposits of adversary to specialized rewards for honest validators, therefore allows the user to lever sufficient endorsement for verification with minimum cost. Combined with game-theoretic insights, a backstop protocol is designed to ensure finality and validity of the framework, breaking through the famous Verifier’s Dilemma. Finally, we streamline Lever under the efficient architecture of sharding, which jointly shows robust to conceivable attacks on validation and performs outstanding ability to purify Byzantine participants. Experimental results show that Lever vastly improves the throughput and reduces expenses of intensive validation with slight compromise in latency