1,760 research outputs found

    An efficient and private RFID authentication protocol supporting ownership transfer

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    Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) systems are getting pervasively deployed in many daily life applications. But this increased usage of RFID systems brings some serious problems together, security and privacy. In some applications, ownership transfer of RFID labels is sine qua non need. Specifically, the owner of RFID tag might be required to change several times during its lifetime. Besides, after ownership transfer, the authentication protocol should also prevent the old owner to trace the tags and disallow the new owner to trace old transactions of the tags. On the other hand, while achieving privacy and security concerns, the computation complexity should be considered. In order to resolve these issues, numerous authentication protocols have been proposed in the literature. Many of them failed and their computation load on the server side is very high. Motivated by this need, we propose an RFID mutual authentication protocol to provide ownership transfer. In our protocol, the server needs only a constant-time complexity for identification when the tag and server are synchronized. In case of ownership transfer, our protocol preserves both old and new owners’ privacy. Our protocol is backward untraceable against a strong adversary who compromise tag, and also forward untraceable under an assumption

    On the Privacy of Two Tag Ownership Transfer Protocols for RFIDs

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    In this paper, the privacy of two recent RFID tag ownership transfer protocols are investigated against the tag owners as adversaries. The first protocol called ROTIV is a scheme which provides a privacy-preserving ownership transfer by using an HMAC-based authentication with public key encryption. However, our passive attack on this protocol shows that any legitimate owner which has been the owner of a specific tag is able to trace it either in the past or in the future. Tracing the tag is also possible via an active attack for any adversary who is able to tamper the tag and extract its information. The second protocol called, Chen et al.'s protocol, is an ownership transfer protocol for passive RFID tags which conforms EPC Class1 Generation2 standard. Our attack on this protocol shows that the previous owners of a particular tag are able to trace it in future. Furthermore, they are able even to obtain the tag's secret information at any time in the future which makes them capable of impersonating the tag

    Cryptanalysis of two mutual authentication protocols for low-cost RFID

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    Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is appearing as a favorite technology for automated identification, which can be widely applied to many applications such as e-passport, supply chain management and ticketing. However, researchers have found many security and privacy problems along RFID technology. In recent years, many researchers are interested in RFID authentication protocols and their security flaws. In this paper, we analyze two of the newest RFID authentication protocols which proposed by Fu et al. and Li et al. from several security viewpoints. We present different attacks such as desynchronization attack and privacy analysis over these protocols.Comment: 17 pages, 2 figures, 1 table, International Journal of Distributed and Parallel system

    A secure and private RFID authentication protocol based on quadratic residue

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    Radio Frequency IDentification based systems are getting pervasively deployed in many real-life applications in various settings for identification and authentication of remote objects. However, the messages that are transmitted over a insecure channel, are vulnerable to security and privacy concerns such as data privacy, location privacy of tag owner and etc. Recently, Yeh et al.'s proposed a RFID authentication protocol based on quadratic residue which is claimed to provide location privacy and prevent possible attacks. In this paper, we formally analyzed the protocol and we proved that the protocol provides destructive privacy according to Vaudenay privacy model. Moreover, we proposed a unilateral authentication protocol and we prove that our protocol satisfies higher privacy level such as narrow strong privacy. Besides, we proposed an enhanced version of our proposed protocol, which has same privacy level as Yeh at al protocol, but has reader authentication against stronger adversaries. Furthermore, the enhanced version of our protocol uses smaller number of cryptographic operations when compared to Yeh at al protocol and it is also cost efficient at the server and tag side and requires O(1) complexity to identify a RFID tag

    Practical Schemes For Privacy & Security Enhanced RFID

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    Proper privacy protection in RFID systems is important. However, many of the schemes known are impractical, either because they use hash functions instead of the more hardware efficient symmetric encryption schemes as a efficient cryptographic primitive, or because they incur a rather costly key search time penalty at the reader. Moreover, they do not allow for dynamic, fine-grained access control to the tag that cater for more complex usage scenarios. In this paper we investigate such scenarios, and propose a model and corresponding privacy friendly protocols for efficient and fine-grained management of access permissions to tags. In particular we propose an efficient mutual authentication protocol between a tag and a reader that achieves a reasonable level of privacy, using only symmetric key cryptography on the tag, while not requiring a costly key-search algorithm at the reader side. Moreover, our protocol is able to recover from stolen readers.Comment: 18 page

    Tag Ownership Transfer in Radio Frequency Identification Systems: A Survey of Existing Protocols and Open Challenges

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    Radio frequency identification (RFID) is a modern approach to identify and track several assets at once in a supply chain environment. In many RFID applications, tagged items are frequently transferred from one owner to another. Thus, there is a need for secure ownership transfer (OT) protocols that can perform the transfer while, at the same time, protect the privacy of owners. Several protocols have been proposed in an attempt to fulfill this requirement. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive and systematic review of the RFID OT protocols that appeared over the years of 2005-2018. In addition, we compare these protocols based on the security goals which involve their support of OT properties and their resistance to attacks. From the presented comparison, we draw attention to the open issues in this field and provide suggestions for the direction that future research should follow. Furthermore, we suggest a set of guidelines to be considered in the design of new protocols. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive survey that reviews the available OT protocols from the early start up to the current state of the art

    Survey on Lightweight Primitives and Protocols for RFID in Wireless Sensor Networks

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    The use of radio frequency identification (RFID) technologies is becoming widespread in all kind of wireless network-based applications. As expected, applications based on sensor networks, ad-hoc or mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) can be highly benefited from the adoption of RFID solutions. There is a strong need to employ lightweight cryptographic primitives for many security applications because of the tight cost and constrained resource requirement of sensor based networks. This paper mainly focuses on the security analysis of lightweight protocols and algorithms proposed for the security of RFID systems. A large number of research solutions have been proposed to implement lightweight cryptographic primitives and protocols in sensor and RFID integration based resource constraint networks. In this work, an overview of the currently discussed lightweight primitives and their attributes has been done. These primitives and protocols have been compared based on gate equivalents (GEs), power, technology, strengths, weaknesses and attacks. Further, an integration of primitives and protocols is compared with the possibilities of their applications in practical scenarios
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