71,411 research outputs found

    A Unified View of Large-scale Zero-sum Equilibrium Computation

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    The task of computing approximate Nash equilibria in large zero-sum extensive-form games has received a tremendous amount of attention due mainly to the Annual Computer Poker Competition. Immediately after its inception, two competing and seemingly different approaches emerged---one an application of no-regret online learning, the other a sophisticated gradient method applied to a convex-concave saddle-point formulation. Since then, both approaches have grown in relative isolation with advancements on one side not effecting the other. In this paper, we rectify this by dissecting and, in a sense, unify the two views.Comment: AAAI Workshop on Computer Poker and Imperfect Informatio

    An overview of economic applications of David Schmeidler`s models of decision making under uncertainty

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    This paper surveys some economic applications of the decision theoretic framework pioneered by David Schmeidler to model effects of ambiguity. We have organized the discussion principally around three themes: financial markets, contractual arrangements and game theory. The first section discusses papers that have contributed to a better understanding of financial market outcomes based on ambiguity aversion. The second section focusses on contractual arrangements and is divided into two sub-sections. The first sub-section reports research on optimal risk sharing arrangements, while in the second sub-section, discusses research on incentive contracts. The third section concentrates on strategic interaction and reviews several papers that have extended different game theoretic solution concepts to settings with ambiguity averse players. A final section deals with several contributions which while not dealing with ambiguity per se, are linked at a formal level, in terms of the pure mathematical structures involved, with Schmeidler`s models of decision making under ambiguity. These contributions involve issues such as, inequality measurement, intertemporal decision making and multi-attribute choice.Ellsberg Paradox, Ambiguity aversion, Uncertainty aversion

    Assessing Human Error Against a Benchmark of Perfection

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    An increasing number of domains are providing us with detailed trace data on human decisions in settings where we can evaluate the quality of these decisions via an algorithm. Motivated by this development, an emerging line of work has begun to consider whether we can characterize and predict the kinds of decisions where people are likely to make errors. To investigate what a general framework for human error prediction might look like, we focus on a model system with a rich history in the behavioral sciences: the decisions made by chess players as they select moves in a game. We carry out our analysis at a large scale, employing datasets with several million recorded games, and using chess tablebases to acquire a form of ground truth for a subset of chess positions that have been completely solved by computers but remain challenging even for the best players in the world. We organize our analysis around three categories of features that we argue are present in most settings where the analysis of human error is applicable: the skill of the decision-maker, the time available to make the decision, and the inherent difficulty of the decision. We identify rich structure in all three of these categories of features, and find strong evidence that in our domain, features describing the inherent difficulty of an instance are significantly more powerful than features based on skill or time.Comment: KDD 2016; 10 page

    Heterogeneous Social Preferences

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    Recent research has shown the usefulness of social preferences for explaining behavior in laboratory experiments. This paper demonstrates that models of social preferences are particularly powerful in explaining behavior if they are embedded in a setting of heteroge-neous actors with heterogeneous (social) preferences. For this purpose a simple model is in-troduced that combines the basic ideas of inequity aversion, social welfare preferences, recip-rocity and heterogeneity. This model is applied to 43 games and it can be shown that its pre-dictive accuracy is clearly higher than that of the isolated approaches. Furthermore, it can explain most of the "anomalies" (the "contradictions") that are discussed in Goeree and Holt (2001).

    Analytic Narratives: What they are and how they contribute to historical explanation

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    The expression "analytic narratives" is used to refer to a range of quite recent studies that lie on the boundaries between history, political science, and economics. These studies purport to explain specific historical events by combining the usual narrative approach of historians with the analytic tools that economists and political scientists draw from formal rational choice theories. Game theory, especially of the extensive form version, is currently prominent among these tools, but there is nothing inevitable about such a technical choice. The chapter explains what analytic narratives are by reviewing the studies of the major book Analytic Narratives (1998), which are concerned with the workings of political institutions broadly speaking, as well as several cases drawn from military and security studies, which form an independent source of the analytic narratives literature. At the same time as it gradually develops a definition of analytic narratives, the chapter investigates how they fulfil one of their main purposes, which is to provide explanations of a better standing than those of traditional history. An important principle that will emerge in the course of the discussion is that narration is called upon not only to provide facts and problems, but also to contribute to the explanation itself. The chapter distinguishes between several expository schemes of analytic narratives according to the way they implement this principle. From all the arguments developed here, it seems clear that the current applications of analytic narratives do not exhaust their potential, and in particular that they deserve the attention of economic historians, if only because they are concerned with microeconomic interactions that are not currently their focus of attention

    The Tavern in Colonial America

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    The tavern in Colonial America, or the “ordinary” as it was referred to in Puritan Massachusetts, was a staple in the social, political, and travel lives of colonial citizens from very early in this country’s existence. Samuel Cole in Boston opened the first tavern on March 4, 1634. It was not long before the demand and necessity for taverns in New England, and throughout the colonies, was overwhelming. In 1656 the General Court of Massachusetts held towns accountable with fines if they did not sustain an ordinary

    Seeing the way: visual sociology and the distance runner's perspective

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    Employing visual and autoethnographic data from a two‐year research project on distance runners, this article seeks to examine the activity of seeing in relation to the activity of distance running. One of its methodological aims is to develop the linkage between visual and autoethnographic data in combining an observation‐based narrative and sociological analysis with photographs. This combination aims to convey to the reader not only some of the specific subcultural knowledge and particular ways of seeing, but also something of the runner's embodied feelings and experience of momentum en route. Via the combination of narrative and photographs we seek a more effective way of communicating just how distance runners see and experience their training terrain. The importance of subjecting mundane everyday practices to detailed sociological analysis has been highlighted by many sociologists, including those of an ethnomethodological perspective. Indeed, without the competence of social actors in accomplishing these mundane, routine understandings and practices, it is argued, there would in fact be no social order
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