A review of cyber threats and defence approaches in emergency management

Emergency planners, first responders and relief workers increasingly rely on computational and communication systems that support all aspects of emergency management, from mitigation and preparedness to response and recovery. Failure of these systems, whether accidental or because of malicious action, can have severe implications for emergency management. Accidental failures have been extensively documented in the past and significant effort has been put into the development and introduction of more resilient technologies. At the same time researchers have been raising concerns about the potential of cyber attacks to cause physical disasters or to maximise the impact of one by intentionally impeding the work of the emergency services. Here, we provide a review of current research on the cyber threats to communication, sensing, information management and vehicular technologies used in emergency management. We emphasise on open issues for research, which are the cyber threats that have the potential to affect emergency management severely and for which solutions have not yet been proposed in the literature

A policy and program for invigorating science and technology for national security: consultation paper – April 2014

This paper outlines the development of a new science and technology (S&T) policy for national security, and invites submissions. Introduction The Hon Stuart Robert MP, Assistant Minister for Defence is championing the development of a new framework for achieving a whole-of-government approach to national security science and technology (S&T). The framework will comprise a national security S&T policy statement and supporting Program. The intention is to transition from poorly coordinated and under-resourced S&T effort to a collaborative co-investment approach between government, academia and industry that effectively and efficiently delivers innovative S&T solutions in priority national security areas for Australia. The Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) is responsible for leading and coordinating national security S&T, a role transferred from the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet to the Department of Defence in February 2012. As part of that role, DSTO is leading the development of a new policy and supporting program in consultation with the national security S&T communities, for consideration and endorsement by Government in 2014. The national security S&T policy will: enunciate the Government’s priorities for national security S&T, provide a means by which S&T investment can be balanced to support short-term national security operational needs in addition to enduring security challenges, establish an efficient management and governance framework that delivers S&T outcomes to national security agencies, and encourage shared public and private investment in national security S&T, and facilitate commercialisation of research outcomes for national benefit. The policy will be delivered through a coherent and coordinated national security S&T program that address national security S&T priorities and delivers real tangible outcomes for national security users. The national security S&T policy and supporting program will harness S&T providers, including publicly funded research agencies (PFRAs), universities and industry to benefit national security ‘user’ agencies, including policy agencies, regulators, emergency response agencies, policing and law enforcement agencies, border protection agencies and the intelligence community. This paper aims to promote discussion and elicit input from government agencies and the S&T community that will assist in developing a national security S&T policy and program that will improve the delivery and application of S&T to address Australia’s national security challenges now and into the future.   Find out more about making a submission her

Agenda for change: strategic choices for the next government

The next government has a primary requirement to be well briefed on the challenges inherent in Australia’s strategic circumstances and the policy options available to it. ASPI is publishing this report to layout our strategic choices and to provide recommendations. Contributors are Peter Jennings on strategic policy, Mark Thomson and Andrew Davies on defence, Anthony Bergin and Kristy Bryden on homeland security, Russell Trood on foreign policy and Ryan Stokes on economic security. This body of ideas makes a compelling contribution to the discussions which ought always to characterise the Australian strategic and defence debate

Europe ́s Coherence Gap in External Crisis and Conflict Management The EU’s Integrated Approach between Political Rhetoric and Institutional Practice. November 2019

The European Union (EU) aspires to play a part in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict peace- building through civil and/or military operations, through stabilisation efforts, and by building resilience at home and abroad. To bring this ambition to fruition, EU institutions have gradually expanded their ‘comprehensive approach to external conflict and crisis’ (CA) to become a full-fledged ‘integrated approach to conflict and crisis’ (IA).1 In their most basic form, CAs seek coordination and coherence in responding to external conflicts and crises by adopting a system-wide ‘whole-of-government approach’ (WGA). In their more elaborate form, IAs have incorpo- rated non-traditional security concepts, variously known as conflict transformation, (non-liberal) peacebuilding and human-security approaches. In their most expansive form, IAs may even be understood to apply to external action writ large

The future of Cybersecurity in Italy: Strategic focus area

This volume has been created as a continuation of the previous one, with the aim of outlining a set of focus areas and actions that the Italian Nation research community considers essential. The book touches many aspects of cyber security, ranging from the definition of the infrastructure and controls needed to organize cyberdefence to the actions and technologies to be developed to be better protected, from the identification of the main technologies to be defended to the proposal of a set of horizontal actions for training, awareness raising, and risk management

Full spectrum defence: re-thinking the fundamentals of Australian defence strategy

This report argues that successive Australian governments have failed to define an effective national defence strategy. Executive summary Australia’s inability to clearly and succinctly define its defence strategy is a perennial failing that will have serious policy and operational consequences if not addressed. Australia’s recent defence white papers are part of the problem: they lack coherence, their messaging is poor, and many of their underlying assumptions and planning practices are questionable. The forthcoming defence white paper provides the first real opportunity for the Abbott government to carry out a much-needed reset of Australia’s defence and military strategies. In place of a maritime strategy, Australia needs to adopt a “full spectrum” approach to defence that can provide protection against military threats from outer space and cyber space, as well as the conventional domains of land, sea and air. Full spectrum defence must be underpinned by deeper and broader regional defence partnerships and by a risk assessment process that encourages critical thinking about strategy and the future capabilities of the Australian Defence Force