8,668 research outputs found
A Second Replicated Quantitative Analysis of Fault Distributions in Complex Software Systems
Background. Software engineering is in search for general principles that apply across contexts, for example to help guide software quality assurance. Fenton and Ohlsson presented such observations on fault distributions, which have been replicated once. Objectives.We intend to replicate their study a second time in a new environment. Method.We conducted a close replication, collecting defect data from five consecutive releases of a large software system in the telecommunications domain, and conducted the same analysis as in the original study. Results. The replication confirms results on un-evenly distributed faults over modules, and that fault proneness distribution persist over test phases. Size measures are not useful as predictors of fault proneness, while fault densities are of the same order of magnitude across releases and contexts. Conclusions. This replication confirms that the un-even distribution of defects motivates un-even distribution of quality assurance efforts, although predictors for such distribution of efforts are not sufficiently precise
An Exploratory Study of Field Failures
Field failures, that is, failures caused by faults that escape the testing
phase leading to failures in the field, are unavoidable. Improving verification
and validation activities before deployment can identify and timely remove many
but not all faults, and users may still experience a number of annoying
problems while using their software systems. This paper investigates the nature
of field failures, to understand to what extent further improving in-house
verification and validation activities can reduce the number of failures in the
field, and frames the need of new approaches that operate in the field. We
report the results of the analysis of the bug reports of five applications
belonging to three different ecosystems, propose a taxonomy of field failures,
and discuss the reasons why failures belonging to the identified classes cannot
be detected at design time but shall be addressed at runtime. We observe that
many faults (70%) are intrinsically hard to detect at design-time
An Exploratory Study of Field Failures
Field failures, that is, failures caused by faults that escape the testing
phase leading to failures in the field, are unavoidable. Improving verification
and validation activities before deployment can identify and timely remove many
but not all faults, and users may still experience a number of annoying
problems while using their software systems. This paper investigates the nature
of field failures, to understand to what extent further improving in-house
verification and validation activities can reduce the number of failures in the
field, and frames the need of new approaches that operate in the field. We
report the results of the analysis of the bug reports of five applications
belonging to three different ecosystems, propose a taxonomy of field failures,
and discuss the reasons why failures belonging to the identified classes cannot
be detected at design time but shall be addressed at runtime. We observe that
many faults (70%) are intrinsically hard to detect at design-time
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Analysis of operating system diversity for intrusion tolerance
One of the key benefits of using intrusion-tolerant systems is the possibility of ensuring correct behavior in the presence of attacks and intrusions. These security gains are directly dependent on the components exhibiting failure diversity. To what extent failure diversity is observed in practical deployment depends on how diverse are the components that constitute the system. In this paper, we present a study with operating system's (OS's) vulnerability data from the NIST National Vulnerability Database (NVD). We have analyzed the vulnerabilities of 11 different OSs over a period of 18 years, to check how many of these vulnerabilities occur in more than one OS. We found this number to be low for several combinations of OSs. Hence, although there are a few caveats on the use of NVD data to support definitive conclusions, our analysis shows that by selecting appropriate OSs, one can preclude (or reduce substantially) common vulnerabilities from occurring in the replicas of the intrusion-tolerant system
OS diversity for intrusion tolerance: Myth or reality?
One of the key benefits of using intrusion-tolerant systems is the possibility of ensuring correct behavior in the presence of attacks and intrusions. These security gains are directly dependent on the components exhibiting failure diversity. To what extent failure diversity is observed in practical deployment depends on how diverse are the components that constitute the system. In this paper we present a study with operating systems (OS) vulnerability data from the NIST National Vulnerability Database. We have analyzed the vulnerabilities of 11 different OSes over a period of roughly 15 years, to check how many of these vulnerabilities occur in more than one OS. We found this number to be low for several combinations of OSes. Hence, our analysis provides a strong indication that building a system with diverse OSes may be a useful technique to improve its intrusion tolerance capabilities
Benefits and Challenges of Model-based Software Engineering: Lessons Learned based on Qualitative and Quantitative Findings
Even though Model-based Software Engineering (MBSwE) techniques and Autogenerated Code (AGC) have been increasingly used to produce complex software systems, there is only anecdotal knowledge about the state-of-thepractice. Furthermore, there is a lack of empirical studies that explore the potential quality improvements due to the use of these techniques. This paper presents in-depth qualitative findings about development and Software Assurance (SWA) practices and detailed quantitative analysis of software bug reports of a NASA mission that used MBSwE and AGC. The missions flight software is a combination of handwritten code and AGC developed by two different approaches: one based on state chart models (AGC-M) and another on specification dictionaries (AGC-D). The empirical analysis of fault proneness is based on 380 closed bug reports created by software developers. Our main findings include: (1) MBSwE and AGC provide some benefits, but also impose challenges. (2) SWA done only at a model level is not sufficient. AGC code should also be tested and the models and AGC should always be kept in-sync. AGC must not be changed manually. (3) Fixes made to address an individual bug report were spread both across multiple modules and across multiple files. On average, for each bug report 1.4 modules, that is, 3.4 files were fixed. (4) Most bug reports led to changes in more than one type of file. The majority of changes to auto-generated source code files were made in conjunction to changes in either file with state chart models or XML files derived from dictionaries. (5) For newly developed files, AGC-M and handwritten code were of similar quality, while AGC-D files were the least fault prone
Statistical modelling of software reliability
During the six-month period from 1 April 1991 to 30 September 1991 the following research papers in statistical modeling of software reliability appeared: (1) A Nonparametric Software Reliability Growth Model; (2) On the Use and the Performance of Software Reliability Growth Models; (3) Research and Development Issues in Software Reliability Engineering; (4) Special Issues on Software; and (5) Software Reliability and Safety
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Modeling software design diversity
Design diversity has been used for many years now as a means of achieving a degree of fault tolerance in software-based systems. Whilst there is clear evidence that the approach can be expected to deliver some increase in reliability compared with a single version, there is not agreement about the extent of this. More importantly, it remains difficult to evaluate exactly how reliable a particular diverse fault-tolerant system is. This difficulty arises because assumptions of independence of failures between different versions have been shown not to be tenable: assessment of the actual level of dependence present is therefore needed, and this is hard. In this tutorial we survey the modelling issues here, with an emphasis upon the impact these have upon the problem of assessing the reliability of fault tolerant systems. The intended audience is one of designers, assessors and project managers with only a basic knowledge of probabilities, as well as reliability experts without detailed knowledge of software, who seek an introduction to the probabilistic issues in decisions about design diversity
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