13,100 research outputs found
A Repeated Game Formulation of Energy-Efficient Decentralized Power Control
Decentralized multiple access channels where each transmitter wants to
selfishly maximize his transmission energy-efficiency are considered.
Transmitters are assumed to choose freely their power control policy and
interact (through multiuser interference) several times. It is shown that the
corresponding conflict of interest can have a predictable outcome, namely a
finitely or discounted repeated game equilibrium. Remarkably, it is shown that
this equilibrium is Pareto-efficient under reasonable sufficient conditions and
the corresponding decentralized power control policies can be implemented under
realistic information assumptions: only individual channel state information
and a public signal are required to implement the equilibrium strategies.
Explicit equilibrium conditions are derived in terms of minimum number of game
stages or maximum discount factor. Both analytical and simulation results are
provided to compare the performance of the proposed power control policies with
those already existing and exploiting the same information assumptions namely,
those derived for the one-shot and Stackelberg games.Comment: 25 pages, 5 figures, accepted for publication in IEEE Transaction on
Wireless Communicatio
Cross-layer distributed power control: A repeated games formulation to improve the sum energy-efficiency
The main objective of this work is to improve the energy-efficiency (EE) of a
multiple access channel (MAC) system, through power control, in a distributed
manner. In contrast with many existing works on energy-efficient power control,
which ignore the possible presence of a queue at the transmitter, we consider a
new generalized cross-layer EE metric. This approach is relevant when the
transmitters have a non-zero energy cost even when the radiated power is zero
and takes into account the presence of a finite packet buffer and packet
arrival at the transmitter. As the Nash equilibrium (NE) is an
energy-inefficient solution, the present work aims at overcoming this deficit
by improving the global energy-efficiency. Indeed, as the considered system has
multiple agencies each with their own interest, the performance metric
reflecting the individual interest of each decision maker is the global
energy-efficiency defined then as the sum over individual energy-efficiencies.
Repeated games (RG) are investigated through the study of two dynamic games
(finite RG and discounted RG), whose equilibrium is defined when introducing a
new operating point (OP), Pareto-dominating the NE and relying only on
individual channel state information (CSI). Accordingly, closed-form
expressions of the minimum number of stages of the game for finite RG (FRG) and
the maximum discount factor of the discounted RG (DRG) were established. The
cross-layer model in the RG formulation leads to achieving a shorter minimum
number of stages in the FRG even for higher number of users. In addition, the
social welfare (sum of utilities) in the DRG decreases slightly with the
cross-layer model when the number of users increases while it is reduced
considerably with the Goodman model. Finally, we show that in real systems with
random packet arrivals, the cross-layer power control algorithm outperforms the
Goodman algorithm.Comment: 36 pages, single column draft forma
Mean Field Energy Games in Wireless Networks
This work tackles the problem of energy-efficient distributed power control
in wireless networks with a large number of transmitters. The problem is
modeled by a dynamic game. Each transmitter-receiver communication is
characterized by a state given by the available energy and/or the individual
channel state and whose evolution is governed by certain dynamics. Since
equilibrium analysis in such a (stochastic) game is generally difficult and
even impossible, the problem is approximated by exploiting the large system
assumption. Under an appropriate exchangeability assumption, the corresponding
mean field game is well defined and studied in detail for special cases. The
main contribution of this work is to show how mean field games can be applied
to the problem under investigation and provide illustrative numerical results.
Our results indicate that this approach can lead to significant gains in terms
of energy-efficiency at the resulting equilibrium.Comment: IEEE Proc. of Asilomar Conf. on Signals, Systems, and Computers, Nov.
2012, Pacific Grove, CA, US
Stochastic Differential Games and Energy-Efficient Power Control
One of the contributions of this work is to formulate the problem of
energy-efficient power control in multiple access channels (namely, channels
which comprise several transmitters and one receiver) as a stochastic
differential game. The players are the transmitters who adapt their power level
to the quality of their time-varying link with the receiver, their battery
level, and the strategy updates of the others. The proposed model not only
allows one to take into account long-term strategic interactions but also
long-term energy constraints. A simple sufficient condition for the existence
of a Nash equilibrium in this game is provided and shown to be verified in a
typical scenario. As the uniqueness and determination of equilibria are
difficult issues in general, especially when the number of players goes large,
we move to two special cases: the single player case which gives us some useful
insights of practical interest and allows one to make connections with the case
of large number of players. The latter case is treated with a mean-field game
approach for which reasonable sufficient conditions for convergence and
uniqueness are provided. Remarkably, this recent approach for large system
analysis shows how scalability can be dealt with in large games and only relies
on the individual state information assumption.Comment: The final publication is available at
http://www.springerlink.com/openurl.asp?genre=article\&id=doi:10.1007/s13235-012-0068-
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