Losing the War Against Dirty Money: Rethinking Global Standards on Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing

Following a brief overview in Part I.A of the overall system to prevent money laundering, Part I.B describes the role of the private sector, which is to identify customers, create a profile of their legitimate activities, keep detailed records of clients and their transactions, monitor their transactions to see if they conform to their profile, examine further any unusual transactions, and report to the government any suspicious transactions. Part I.C continues the description of the preventive measures system by describing the government\u27s role, which is to assist the private sector in identifying suspicious transactions, ensure compliance with the preventive measures requirements, and analyze suspicious transaction reports to determine those that should be investigated. Parts I.D and I.E examine the effectiveness of this system. Part I.D discusses successes and failures in the private sector\u27s role. Borrowing from theory concerning the effectiveness of private sector unfunded mandates, this Part reviews why many aspects of the system are failing, focusing on the subjectivity of the mandate, the disincentives to comply, and the lack of comprehensive data on client identification and transactions. It notes that the system includes an inherent contradiction: the public sector is tasked with informing the private sector how best to detect launderers and terrorists, but to do so could act as a road map on how to avoid detection should such information fall into the wrong hands. Part I.D discusses how financial institutions do not and cannot use scientifically tested statistical means to determine if a particular client or set of transactions is more likely than others to indicate criminal activity. Part I.D then turns to a discussion of a few issues regarding the impact the system has but that are not related to effectiveness, followed by a summary and analysis of how flaws might be addressed. Part I.E continues by discussing the successes and failures in the public sector\u27s role. It reviews why the system is failing, focusing on the lack of assistance to the private sector in and the lack of necessary data on client identification and transactions. It also discusses how financial intelligence units, like financial institutions, do not and cannot use scientifically tested statistical means to determine probabilities of criminal activity. Part I concludes with a summary and analysis tying both private and public roles together. Part II then turns to a review of certain current techniques for selecting income tax returns for audit. After an overview of the system, Part II first discusses the limited role of the private sector in providing tax administrators with information, comparing this to the far greater role the private sector plays in implementing preventive measures. Next, this Part turns to consider how tax administrators, particularly the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, select taxpayers for audit, comparing this to the role of both the private and public sectors in implementing preventive measures. It focuses on how some tax administrations use scientifically tested statistical means to determine probabilities of tax evasion. Part II then suggests how flaws in both private and public roles of implementing money laundering and terrorism financing preventive measures might be theoretically addressed by borrowing from the experience of tax administration. Part II concludes with a short summary and analysis that relates these conclusions to the preventive measures system. Referring to the analyses in Parts I and II, Part III suggests changes to the current preventive measures standard. It suggests that financial intelligence units should be uniquely tasked with analyzing and selecting clients and transactions for further investigation for money laundering and terrorism financing. The private sector\u27s role should be restricted to identifying customers, creating an initial profile of their legitimate activities, and reporting such information and all client transactions to financial intelligence units

The 2003 Money Laundering Regulations

The Money Laundering Regulations 2003 came into force in the early part of 2004 in order to implement the EU Second Money Laundering Directive. They are much wider-ranging than the 1993 Regulations, which had preceded them: in addition to banks and other financial institutions, which were already covered, and bureaux de change and money transmission offices, added in 2001, they also apply to, inter alia, lawyers, accountants, estate agents, casinos and dealers in high value goods, such as jewellers and art dealers. Dealers in high value goods, however, are only covered in respect of transactions which are of a value of at least €15,000 and, moreover, in cash. That customers will be dealt with differently, in respect of the same transaction, depending on how payment is made, is unfortunate. A threshold stated in sterling would also be preferable: jewellers are often less well used to dealing in other currencies than financial institutions. More generally, if particular care is seen as required in relation to cash transactions, the threshold should arguably be lower. The actual requirements imposed have, however, changed little: the only major change is that certain types of business now need to be registered with Customs & Excise

The Determinant of Money Laundering: Evidence from Italian Regions

Following the INTERPOL’s definition, money laundering is: “any act or attempted act to conceal or disguise the identity of illegally obtained proceeds so that they appear to have originated from legitimate sources”. Illegally obtained funds are laundered and moved around the world using front companies, intermediaries and other money transmitters. In this way, the illegal funds remain hidden and are integrated into the legal economy. Such type of crime undermines financial institutions’ and jurisdictions’ reputation, compromises investors’ trust in them, and therefore weakens the entire financial system. By using annual data for the Italian regions (NUTS-2) over the period 2008 to 2015, this work aims to investigate the determinants of money laundering in Italy. Given the high heterogeneity in terms of economic and institutional characteristics, as well as for the activity of organized crime in financial-related activities, Italy is a compelling case study. Our main findings reveal that in most of the Italian regions enforcement activities do exert significant deterrence on criminal behaviors: a negative relationship between enforcement and illegal trafficking of waste can be identified only for very high levels of enforcement efforts. Moreover, we find that the major determinants influencing the rate of money laundering differ between northern-central and southern regions, confirming the existence of a regional dualism. In particular, while in the northern-central area the crime rate is positively related to the level of corruption, the incidence of mafia-type crimes and negatively to the education attainment, in the southern regions money laundering is positively related to the size of the gaming and gambling sector

Targeting the profits of illicit drug trafficking through proceeds of crime action

This study sought to identify the disruptive effect of proceeds of crime action on criminal activity, and to identify factors associated with successful proceeds of crime action. Executive summary Illicit drug trafficking is a source of funds for further trafficking and for supporting the lifestyles of criminals. Drug trafficking has been closely linked with organised crime and with social harms. This project had two main aims: • To identify the disruptive effect of proceeds of crime action on criminal activity. The project attempted to measure the disruptive effect by developing an economic model that estimated the multiplier impact of the reinvestment of the profits of drug trafficking. • The project also attempted to identify factors associated with successful proceeds of crime action. There are two main audiences for the findings of this study. Senior police, police intelligence, policymakers and researchers will be interested primarily in measuring the disruptive effect of proceeds of crime action. Police responsible for managing proceeds of crime investigations and senior investigators will be interested in the practical applications of findings relating to success factors in financial investigations. The results of the project should improve agencies’ ability to target trafficking and increase the seizure of proceeds of crime. The proposed index of the disruptive effect of proceeds of crime action—the Proceeds of Crime Drug Disruption Index (POCDDI)—will also allow agencies to provide both the Government and the community with a more accurate assessment of the value of their proceeds of crime initiatives

Aligning anti-money laundering, combating of financing of terror and financial inclusion : Questions to consider when FATF standards are clarified

Purpose &ndash; The purpose of this paper is to identify key questions that should be addressed to enable the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to provide guidance regarding the alignment of anti-money laundering, combating of financing of terror and financial inclusion objectives.Design/methodology/approach &ndash; The paper draws on relevant research and documents of the FATF to identify questions that are relevant to consider when it formulates guidance regarding the alignment between financial integrity and financial inclusion objectives.Findings &ndash; The FATF advises that its risk-based approach enables countries and institutions to further financial inclusion. It is, however, not clear what the FATF means when its uses the terms &ldquo;risk&rdquo; and &ldquo;low risk&rdquo;. It is also unclear whether current proposals for financial inclusion regulatory models will necessarily limit money laundering (ML) aswell as terror financing risks to levels that can be described as &ldquo;low&rdquo;. The FATF will need to clarify its own thinking regarding low money laundering and low terror financing risk before it will be able to provide clear guidance to national regulators and financial institutions.Originality/value &ndash; This paper was drafted to inform current FATF discussions regarding guidance on financial inclusion. The questions are relevant to all stakeholders in financial regulation.<br /

Money Laundering and Financial Means of Organized Crime: Some Preliminary Empirical Findings

After giving a short literature review, the paper tries a quantification of the volume of money laundering activities, with the help of a MIMIC estimation procedure for the years 1995 to 2006 for 20 highly developed OECD countries. The volume of laundered money was 273 billions USD in the year 1995 for these 20 OECD countries and increased to 603 billions USD in 2006. The overall turnover in organized crime had a value of 595 billion USD in 2001 and increased to 790 billion USD in 2006. These figures are very preliminary but give a clear indication how important money laundering and the turnover of organized crime is nowadays.Definition and stages of money laundering, volume of money laundering, MIMIC estimation, financial means of organized crime

Development, intervention, and international order

© 2013, Cambridge University Press. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Development, intervention, and international order, which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0260210513000260

The role of information systems in the prevention and detection of transnational and international crime

© Cambridge University Press 2014. All around the world criminal activity remains at the forefront of governmental concerns, not only as a problem that distorts the very fabric of society within the confines of national jurisdictions, but also as a problem that cuts across national borders to exhibit a global dimension. The international dimension of criminal activity remains critical and is generally characterized by a complexity that is unique and requires action on many different levels. Criminals set out to mask their illegal activities and deliberately generate complexity as a means of concealment. In doing so, they exploit new developments in technology that assist them in achieving their ends. This criminality exhibits forms of innovation that stretch far beyond traditional criminal activity (e.g., drug and human trafficking) and manages to attach itself within the broader fabric of society by exploiting the very latest developments. This evolution is necessary as criminals seek not only to escape arrest, prosecution and conviction, but also to enjoy the fruits of their criminality (mostly financial gains). Thus, they seek to develop ways of exploiting the various diffuse norms of social interaction (e.g., trust), financial modes of conduct (e.g., cash-based economies), technological and communication developments (e.g., Internet), and thereby minimize the possibility for detection. By limiting the resources that can be made available for prevention (or making them obsolete when developing new criminal behaviour), they participate in this co-evolution actively; and this they achieve by generating complexity