The Stages of Legal Reasoning: Formalism, Analogy, and Realism

In the late 19th Century, legal reasoning was dominated by formalistic analysis. Judges and lawyers reasoned deductively from base principles. Legal historians have persuasively described how leading judges and scholars fomented a revolution in legal thought in the 20th Century. Starting about 1910, legal realism--or policy analysis-- entered legal reasoning to the point that today it would be unusual to find a judicial opinion or brief that fails to explore the policy implications of an interpretation of the law. This historical shift from formalism to realism suggests that there are stages of legal reasoning. In this Article, I argue that formalism, analogy and realism should be considered to be the stages of legal reasoning. First, psychological research suggests that these methods of reasoning correspond to stages of cognitive and moral development. Second, examination of judicial opinions in hard cases reveals that courts progress from formalism, to analogy, to realism, in resolving difficult questions of law. Third, these three forms of reasoning are necessary components in the evolution of rules and standards. In characterizing these modes of analysis as stages, I do not mean to imply that analogy is superior to formalism or that realism is superior to them both. In fact, one might reasonably argue, as Justice Antonin Scalia would, that the hierarchy proceeds in the opposite direction, in that one is forced to resort to analogy only where formalism has failed, and that realism is the last resort of all. It would be even more accurate to reject hierarchy altogether, and the concomitant conceit that one form of legal analysis is superior to another. Rather than levels in a hierarchy, formalism, analogy and realism are all stages of a cycle, each of which is necessary for the law to progress. The ultimate purpose of legal analysis is to create a system of laws that is clear, consistent and just, a code of conduct that is universally understood and accepted. But this is a task that is beyond human ability. As H.L.A. Hart observed, a perfect system of laws cannot be created because we are men, not gods. However, formalism, analogy and realism each play a critical role in the attempt to create a code of conduct that is logical, predictable and fair. Accordingly, Part I of this Article defines formalism, analogy and realism by describing the psychological theories of James Mark Baldwin, Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg insofar as they shed light upon the cognitive and moral aspects of legal reasoning in general and formalism, analogy and realism in particular. Formalism represents the rule-bound thinking characteristic of the Piagetian stage of concrete operations and the Kohlbergian stage of conventional thought. Realism, whose concern is what the law might be, represents the Piagetian stage of formal operations and the Kohlbergian stage of postconventional thought. Reasoning by analogy straddles both stages; formalist analogies are concrete and conventional, while realist analogies are abstract and postconventional. Part II illustrates how formalism, analogy and realism are sequentially invoked to resolve hard cases. When society changes, or other unexpected events occur that give rise to unforeseen legal problems, formalist rules fail us and we rely upon analogies. When these analogies prove insufficient as well, we turn to realism, balancing all of the underlying values and interests to develop new rules of law. In hard cases, reasoning by analogy serves as a bridge between formalism and realism. Part III argues that the evolution of rules into standards, and standards into rules, also demonstrates the stages of legal reasoning. Evolution of the law in both directions is achieved by drawing analogies. Realist analogies help turn rules into standards and formalist analogies help turn standards into rules. The law evolves from rules to standards and back again in an unending cycle of assimilation and accommodation. I conclude that none of the three modes of analysis standing alone is adequate to produce a clear, consistent and just system of laws. Legal progress depends upon using all three modes of analysis

The Application of Analogical reasoning in International Criminal Law System; Perhaps, Dos and Don'ts

Analogy as an applied matter does not have the same credibility in the logic and the different areas of the contemporary international law system. In international criminal law, like most domestic legal systems which interdict analogical reasoning in criminal law, according to art.22 (2) Rome Statute of the ICC:the definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. Nevertheless, in the international community as evolving, Criminal rules are not always able to accommodate all the crimes that occur.Hence,the lack of comprehensiveness of law and the emergence of new issues,as well as the use of ambiguous terms such as "other inhuman acts" in most of international criminal documents, made it inevitable to use analogy in international criminal law,not only as a useful tool in identifying applicable rules, but also as a form of interpretation.However,the authors believe that the use of analogy in international criminal proceedings does not have the power to make new crimes and imposes punishment without resorting to a valid criminal code. In addition to expressing a normative framework for analogical reasoning in international criminal law,this article analyzes the role of analogy in the decision-making processes of the international criminal courts and Tribunal

Analogical Reasoning

This chapter from our book Legal Writing in Context aims to demystify analogical reasoning for law students

Semiotics, Analogical Legal Reasoning, and the Cf. Citation: Getting Our Signals Uncrossed

The Bluebook\u27s introductory citation signals are essential to effective legal discourse. The choice of signal can influence not only the interpretation of cited cases, but also the path of the law. In this Article, Professor Ira Robbins examines one commonly used signal: the cf. After exploring its semiotic function, he details the multitude of ways in which this signal has been used and misused. He argues that lawyers\u27 and judges\u27 careless use of the cf. leads to confusing and often incoherent developments in the law, and concludes by proposing a precise working definition for this irksome, but potentially powerful, citation signal

Metaphysics and Law

The dichotomy between questions of fact and questions of law serves as a starting point for the following discussion of the nature of legal reasoning. In the course of the dialogue the author notes similarities and dissimilarities between legal reasoning and philosophical and mathematical reasoning. In the end we are left with a clearer insight into the distinctive features of the adjudicative process

Metaphysics and Law

The dichotomy between questions of fact and questions of law serves as a starting point for the following discussion of the nature of legal reasoning. In the course of the dialogue the author notes similarities and dissimilarities between legal reasoning and philosophical and mathematical reasoning. In the end we are left with a clearer insight into the distinctive features of the adjudicative process

Asymmetric Empirical Similarity

The paper offers a formal model of analogical legal reasoning and takes the model to data. Under the model, the outcome of a new case is a weighted average of the outcomes of prior cases. The weights capture precedential influence and depend on fact similarity (distance in fact space) and precedential authority (position in the judicial hierarchy). The empirical analysis suggests that the model is a plausible model for the time series of U.S. maritime salvage cases. Moreover, the results evince that prior cases decided by inferior courts have less influence than prior cases decided by superior courts

Authority in the common law

Copyright @ 2011 The Author.No abstract available

Second Things First: What Free Speech Can and Can’t Say About Guns

Professor Blocher responds to Gregory Magarian’s article on the implications of the First Amendment for the Second