Shape-constrained Estimation of Value Functions

We present a fully nonparametric method to estimate the value function, via simulation, in the context of expected infinite-horizon discounted rewards for Markov chains. Estimating such value functions plays an important role in approximate dynamic programming and applied probability in general. We incorporate "soft information" into the estimation algorithm, such as knowledge of convexity, monotonicity, or Lipchitz constants. In the presence of such information, a nonparametric estimator for the value function can be computed that is provably consistent as the simulated time horizon tends to infinity. As an application, we implement our method on price tolling agreement contracts in energy markets

The use of real options approach in energy sector investments

Energy shortage, global warming, and climate change led to an increase in the use of alternative sources of energy, with renewable energy sources (RES) playing a fundamental role in this new energetic paradigm. However, the investment costs often constitute a major barrier to their spread use. Moreover, the overall benefits of renewable energy technologies are often not well understood and consequently they are often evaluated to be not as cost effective as traditional technologies. From the moment that the energy sector started a deregulation process, with a high level of competitiveness and associated increased market uncertainty, traditional project evaluation techniques alone became insufficient to properly deal with these additional risk and uncertainty factors. The diffusion of the renewable energy technologies is also affected by this feature. The way investors evaluate their investments call now for the use of more sophisticated evaluation techniques. Real options approach can deal with these issues and, as so, began to be considered and applied for the energy sector decision aid. This approach it is now extensively widespread in evaluating investment projects in the energy sector. A large set of applications in almost all fields of energy decision making, from electricity generation technologies appraisal to policy evaluation is available in the literature. However the use of this technique in the field of RES is still limited and worth to be analysed. This paper addresses this issue. A review of the current state of the art in the application of real options approach to investments in non-renewable energy sources and RES is presented, giving perspectives for further research in this field.This work was financed by: the QREN – Operational Programme for Competitiveness Factors, the European Union – European Regional Development Fund and National Funds- Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology, under Project FCOMP-01-0124-FEDER-011377 and Project Pest-OE/EME/UI0252/201

Testing Williamson’s theory on transaction-specific governance structures: Evidence from electricity markets

Long term contracts increase the hazard of ex post maladaptation, creating demand for processes that enable adaptation over the course of long-term exchange. Enabling adaptation, however, may diminish the effectiveness of the long-term contracts, designed as prima facie hold-up remedies. Following Joskow (1987), we attempt to empirically capture the positive relationship between physical asset specificity and the duration of long-term contracts between California electricity generators. In addition, following Masten and Crocker (1985), we try to measure the effect of legal provisions on contract duration and interpret them as efficient instruments for providing flexibility in long-term relationships. The more important the investment in relationship-specific assets, the longer the contractual duration. However, parties mitigate long-term contract inflexibility, based on ex ante bargained terms and conditions, with provisions that allow for contingent adaptation. Our empirical results provide support for the hypothesised relationships under different model specifications and alternative estimation techniques.electricity long-term contracts, idiosyncratic relations, asset specificity, efficient adaptation

Policy Issues in U.S. Transportation Public-Private Partnerships: Lessons from Australia, Research Report 09-15

In this report, the authors examine Australia’s experience with transportation public-private partnerships (PPPs) and the lessons that experience holds for the use of PPPs in the United States. Australia now has decades of experience in PPP use in transportation, and has used the approach to deliver billions of dollars in project value. Although this report explores a range of issues, the authors focus on four policy issues that have been salient in the United States: (1) how the risks inherent in PPP contracts should be distributed across public and private sector partners; (2) when and how to use non-compete (or compensation) clauses in PPP contracts; (3) how concerns about monopoly power are best addressed; and (4) the role and importance of concession length. The study examines those and other questions by surveying the relevant literature on PPP international use. The authors also interviewed 23 Australian PPP experts from the academic, public and private sectors, and distilled lessons from those interviews

The development of Ghana's aluminium industry

Imperial Users onl

A Quantitative Analysis of Pricing Behavior In California’s Wholesale Electricity Market During Summer 2000

During the Summer of 2000, wholesale electricity prices in California were nearly 500% higher than they were during the same months in 1998 or 1999. This price explosion was unexpected and has called into question whether electricity restructuring will bring the benefits of competition promised to consumers. The purpose of this paper is to examine the factors that explain this increase in wholesale electricity prices. We simulate competitive benchmark prices for Summer of 2000 taking account of all relevant supply and demand factors --- gas prices, demand, imports from other states, and emission permit prices. We then compare the simulated competitive benchmark prices with the actual prices observed. We find that there is a large gap between our benchmark competitive prices and observed prices, suggesting that the prices observed during summer 2000 reflect, in part, the exercise of market power by suppliers. We then proceed to examine supplier behavior during high-price hours. We find evidence that suppliers withheld supply from the market that would have been profitable for price-taking firms to sell at the market price.electricity, market power, deregulation

Optimal quantization for the pricing of swing options

In this paper, we investigate a numerical algorithm for the pricing of swing options, relying on the so-called optimal quantization method. The numerical procedure is described in details and numerous simulations are provided to assert its efficiency. In particular, we carry out a comparison with the Longstaff-Schwartz algorithm.Comment: 27

Getting us there: funding the transport infrastructure of tomorrow

One of the key challenges facing policymakers is the question of how to fund new transport infrastructure in an increasingly fiscally restrained environment. Infrastructure expenditure is already failing to keep up with community expectations, and population growth is driving demand for new services. Meanwhile, state governments are increasingly restricted by the need to ensure that their credit ratings remain strong. As government continues to balance growing costs and proportionally declining revenue, competition for scare budget dollars will increase and infrastructure investments will be increasingly judged on their long term financial cost to government. To ensure that vital new transport infrastructure is not left off the table in future government budgets, this report has examined a number of options available for boosting the revenue streams associated with currently cost-inhibitive infrastructure classes

Integrating independent power producers into emerging wholesale power markets

Many developing and industrial countries have sought to open their electricity industries to competition. In both contexts, policymakers and investors have to deal with the consequences of earlier, more partial sector liberalization measures. Foremost among these is the existence of long-term contracts with independent power producers (IPPs). The long-term nature of these contracts has complicated the introduction of more far-reaching sectoral reform designed to harness competitive market forces for the benefit of consumers. In developing countries, introducing competition is often coupled with breaking up and privatizing state-owned electricity monopolies. In this context, discussion of renegotiation of power purchase agreements has tended toward the polemical. At one end are those who resist any change, arguing that the"sanctity of contracts"precludes modification of contract terms. At the other end are those who favor governments taking coercive measures to modify existing contracts in the name of maximizing economic welfare and minimizing the burden of sector reform on consumers and on the state. Drawing on recent country experiences, the authors analyze alternative approaches to restructuring contracts and designing power markets to reduce rigidities and incentivize IPPs to participate more fully in wholesale power markets and to take on greater market risk. The authors conclude that forced market integration or forced contract negotiation have failed and are counterproductive. Conversely, in countries where IPPs provide a sizable proportion of generation capacity, ignoring market integration may result in insufficient market liquidity and discourage new entry, attenuating the scope for market forces to act for the benefit of consumers. Failure to adapt power purchase contracts and market rules imposes huge resource costs on the economy beyond the financial obligations consumers and taxpayers must bear. Based on recent experience, a combination of measures, including adaptation of specific market rules, contractual alternatives for enhancing market liquidity, contract buyout provisions, transitional financing mechanisms, and characteristics of the successor entity to the power purchaser, offer promising approaches for reconciling preexisting IPP contracts with new market structures and reducing the magnitude of above-market costs associated with such contracts.Markets and Market Access,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,General Technology,Labor Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,Markets and Market Access,Access to Markets,Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Theory&Research,General Technology