31,436 research outputs found

    Intellectual Property and the Prisoner’s Dilemma: A Game Theory Justification of Copyrights, Patents, and Trade Secrets

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    In this article, I will offer an argument for the protection of intellectual property based on individual self-interest and prudence. In large part, this argument will parallel considerations that arise in a prisoner’s dilemma game. In brief, allowing content to be unprotected in terms of free access leads to a sub-optimal outcome where creation and innovation are suppressed. Adopting the institutions of copyright, patent, and trade secret is one way to avoid these sub-optimal results

    Systematizing Decentralization and Privacy: Lessons from 15 Years of Research and Deployments

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    Decentralized systems are a subset of distributed systems where multiple authorities control different components and no authority is fully trusted by all. This implies that any component in a decentralized system is potentially adversarial. We revise fifteen years of research on decentralization and privacy, and provide an overview of key systems, as well as key insights for designers of future systems. We show that decentralized designs can enhance privacy, integrity, and availability but also require careful trade-offs in terms of system complexity, properties provided, and degree of decentralization. These trade-offs need to be understood and navigated by designers. We argue that a combination of insights from cryptography, distributed systems, and mechanism design, aligned with the development of adequate incentives, are necessary to build scalable and successful privacy-preserving decentralized systems

    The Epistemological Importance of Trust in Science

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    I argue that trust is epistemically important because it is the foundation of social practices that confer significant epistemic benefits on scientific communities. I begin by showing the limitations of the dominant rational choice account of trust, which maintains that trust is rational when the truster has good reason to believe that it is in the trusted's self-interest to act trustworthily. These limitations motivate my alternative account of trust, which recognizes non-self-interested motivations for acting trustworthily, such as having a sense of duty. The first part of the account captures the cognitive aspect of trust. When we trust, we take a particular cognitive attitude towards the claim that the trusted will do what we expect her to do; I argue that this cognitive attitude can be either belief or acceptance, in the sense outlined by Michael Bratman. The second part of my account captures the emotional and moral aspects of trust by providing a framework to understand the connection between trust and betrayal—the feeling that usually results from being let down by a person one trusts. I provide an account of betrayal as a reactive emotion that connects it to beliefs about relational obligations. Thus when we trust, we depend on the trusted because we believe that our relationship with the trusted morally obliges her to act as expected. Using this account of trust, I argue that scientific communities can garner significant epistemic benefits when scientists are trustworthy and when they trust each other. Applying a framework adapted from Alvin Goldman's work on social epistemology, I argue that trust fosters epistemically beneficial sharing between scientists. These arguments are supported by a case study of the role that trust played in the achievements made by the community of early 20th Century Drosophilists. Finally, using recent examples of scientific fraud in cloning research and public policy responses to much-publicized 'crises in trust', I argue that the epistemic success of science results, in part, from science's ability to balance competition and cooperation, trust and distrust, self-interest and other-interest

    Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory of Private Ordering

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    This Essay formulates a positive model that predicts when commercial parties will employ private ordering to enforce their agreements. The typical enforcement mechanism associated with private ordering is the reputation mechanism, in which a merchant community punishes parties in breach of contract by denying them future business. The growing private ordering literature argues that these private enforcement mechanisms can be superior to the traditional, less efficient enforcement measures provided by public courts. However, previous comparisons between public and private contractual enforcement have presented a misleading dichotomy by failing to consider a third enforcement mechanim: the vertically integrated firm. This Essay develops a model that comprehensively addresses three distinct types of enforcement mechanisms--firms, courts, and reputation-based private ordering. The model rests on a synthesis of transaction cost economics, which compares the efficiencies of firms versus markets, and the private ordering literature, which compares the efficiencies of public courts versus private ordering. It hypothesizes that private ordering will arise when agreements present enforcement difficulties, high-powered market incentives are important, and the costs of entry barriers are low. The Essay then conducts an illustrative test by comparing the model\u27s predictions to documented instances of private ordering

    Pervasive incentives, disparate innovation and intellectual property law

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