Super Logic Programs

The Autoepistemic Logic of Knowledge and Belief (AELB) is a powerful nonmonotic formalism introduced by Teodor Przymusinski in 1994. In this paper, we specialize it to a class of theories called `super logic programs'. We argue that these programs form a natural generalization of standard logic programs. In particular, they allow disjunctions and default negation of arbibrary positive objective formulas. Our main results are two new and powerful characterizations of the static semant ics of these programs, one syntactic, and one model-theoretic. The syntactic fixed point characterization is much simpler than the fixed point construction of the static semantics for arbitrary AELB theories. The model-theoretic characterization via Kripke models allows one to construct finite representations of the inherently infinite static expansions. Both characterizations can be used as the basis of algorithms for query answering under the static semantics. We describe a query-answering interpreter for super programs which we developed based on the model-theoretic characterization and which is available on the web.Comment: 47 pages, revised version of the paper submitted 10/200

A Plausibility Semantics for Abstract Argumentation Frameworks

We propose and investigate a simple ranking-measure-based extension semantics for abstract argumentation frameworks based on their generic instantiation by default knowledge bases and the ranking construction semantics for default reasoning. In this context, we consider the path from structured to logical to shallow semantic instantiations. The resulting well-justified JZ-extension semantics diverges from more traditional approaches.Comment: Proceedings of the 15th International Workshop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning (NMR 2014). This is an improved and extended version of the author's ECSQARU 2013 pape

A QBF-based Formalization of Abstract Argumentation Semantics

Supported by the National Research Fund, Luxembourg (LAAMI project) and by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC, UK), grant ref. EP/J012084/1 (SAsSY project).Peer reviewedPostprin

Complexity of Non-Monotonic Logics

Over the past few decades, non-monotonic reasoning has developed to be one of the most important topics in computational logic and artificial intelligence. Different ways to introduce non-monotonic aspects to classical logic have been considered, e.g., extension with default rules, extension with modal belief operators, or modification of the semantics. In this survey we consider a logical formalism from each of the above possibilities, namely Reiter's default logic, Moore's autoepistemic logic and McCarthy's circumscription. Additionally, we consider abduction, where one is not interested in inferences from a given knowledge base but in computing possible explanations for an observation with respect to a given knowledge base. Complexity results for different reasoning tasks for propositional variants of these logics have been studied already in the nineties. In recent years, however, a renewed interest in complexity issues can be observed. One current focal approach is to consider parameterized problems and identify reasonable parameters that allow for FPT algorithms. In another approach, the emphasis lies on identifying fragments, i.e., restriction of the logical language, that allow more efficient algorithms for the most important reasoning tasks. In this survey we focus on this second aspect. We describe complexity results for fragments of logical languages obtained by either restricting the allowed set of operators (e.g., forbidding negations one might consider only monotone formulae) or by considering only formulae in conjunctive normal form but with generalized clause types. The algorithmic problems we consider are suitable variants of satisfiability and implication in each of the logics, but also counting problems, where one is not only interested in the existence of certain objects (e.g., models of a formula) but asks for their number.Comment: To appear in Bulletin of the EATC

Argument-based Belief in Topological Structures

This paper combines two studies: a topological semantics for epistemic notions and abstract argumentation theory. In our combined setting, we use a topological semantics to represent the structure of an agent's collection of evidence, and we use argumentation theory to single out the relevant sets of evidence through which a notion of beliefs grounded on arguments is defined. We discuss the formal properties of this newly defined notion, providing also a formal language with a matching modality together with a sound and complete axiom system for it. Despite the fact that our agent can combine her evidence in a 'rational' way (captured via the topological structure), argument-based beliefs are not closed under conjunction. This illustrates the difference between an agent's reasoning abilities (i.e. the way she is able to combine her available evidence) and the closure properties of her beliefs. We use this point to argue for why the failure of closure under conjunction of belief should not bear the burden of the failure of rationality.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2017, arXiv:1707.0825