Governance-technology co-evolution and misalignment in the electricity industry

This paper explores some reasons why the alignment between governance and technology in infrastructures may be unstable or not easy to achieve. Focusing on the electricity industry, we claim that the decentralization of governance – an essential step towards a decentralized technical coordination - may be hampered by if deregulation magnifies behavioural uncertainties and asset specificities; and that in a technically decentralized system, political demand for centralized coordination may arise if the players are able to collude and lobby, and if such practices lead to higher electricity rates and lower efficiency. Our claims are supported by insights coming from approaches as diverse as transaction cost economics, the competence-based view of the firm, and political economy.Governance; Technology; Coherence; Competence; Transaction costs; Regulation.

A hierarchical distributed control model for coordinating intelligent systems

A hierarchical distributed control (HDC) model for coordinating cooperative problem-solving among intelligent systems is described. The model was implemented using SOCIAL, an innovative object-oriented tool for integrating heterogeneous, distributed software systems. SOCIAL embeds applications in 'wrapper' objects called Agents, which supply predefined capabilities for distributed communication, control, data specification, and translation. The HDC model is realized in SOCIAL as a 'Manager'Agent that coordinates interactions among application Agents. The HDC Manager: indexes the capabilities of application Agents; routes request messages to suitable server Agents; and stores results in a commonly accessible 'Bulletin-Board'. This centralized control model is illustrated in a fault diagnosis application for launch operations support of the Space Shuttle fleet at NASA, Kennedy Space Center

Initiating a Collaborative Cybersecurity Governance Framework at the State Level

Cybersecurity risk is dynamic and rapidly evolving. Today, cyber incidents can significantly impair government operations, erode public confidence, undermine operations of critical infrastructures, and put citizen data and whole industries at risk. Managing these risks to cyber assets must be part of a state’s overall risk management portfolio. To do this successfully, state leaders must have effective cybersecurity governance. To achieve this, governors and state legislatures must ensure that their states have the essential governance mechanisms necessary for understanding and managing cybersecurity risk and for translating awareness about cyber threats into action. This dissertation gives an overview of three different governance models (centralized, decentralized, and hybrid), comparing effectiveness of each by state. Most literature suggests that a centralized cybersecurity governance approach, where one organization is designated and has authority to make all of the decisions about cybersecurity and IT security, is the most effective at the state level. However, this is not always feasible due to budget constraints, lack of trained personnel, and state culture. Comparing Nationwide Cybersecurity Review (NCSR) governance data and answers from cybersecurity governance interviews with individuals responsible for cybersecurity in their respective states, this study tests the hypothesis that states with centralized authority over cybersecurity governance will have higher NCSR scores (higher scores = more successful cybersecurity programs) than states that utilize a decentralized or hybrid model. While initial data supports the hypothesis, it also suggests that a hybrid cybersecurity governance model (encompassing a mixture of centralized and decentralized) could be the answer for states struggling to become centralized

Private Ordering, Collective Action, and the Self-Enforcing Range of Contracts. The Case of French Livestock Industry

Contract enforcement is acknowledged as a major issue in Law and in Economics. Contrasting substitution and complementary perspectives with respect to the role of private versus public enforcement institutions, this article analyses how contract law can support private institutions, and enhance economic efficiency. With multilateral agreements at stake, self-regulation and reputation mechanisms at the core of private ordering have limitations that collective organizations backed by the Law help to overcome. The analysis is substantiated by empirical data from the cattle industry. Our results suggest the need for a broader approach to contract regulation by legal scholars and antitrust-authorities.Contract Law, Private Enforcement, Transaction Costs, Self-Regulation, Coalitions, Cartels, Collective Organization

Overcoming Barriers in Supply Chain Analytics—Investigating Measures in LSCM Organizations

While supply chain analytics shows promise regarding value, benefits, and increase in performance for logistics and supply chain management (LSCM) organizations, those organizations are often either reluctant to invest or unable to achieve the returns they aspire to. This article systematically explores the barriers LSCM organizations experience in employing supply chain analytics that contribute to such reluctance and unachieved returns and measures to overcome these barriers. This article therefore aims to systemize the barriers and measures and allocate measures to barriers in order to provide organizations with directions on how to cope with their individual barriers. By using Grounded Theory through 12 in-depth interviews and Q-Methodology to synthesize the intended results, this article derives core categories for the barriers and measures, and their impacts and relationships are mapped based on empirical evidence from various actors along the supply chain. Resultingly, the article presents the core categories of barriers and measures, including their effect on different phases of the analytics solutions life cycle, the explanation of these effects, and accompanying examples. Finally, to address the intended aim of providing directions to organizations, the article provides recommendations for overcoming the identified barriers in organizations

The Stewardship of Trust in the Global Value Chain

Global governance has not yet caught up with the globalization of business. As a result, our headlines provide daily accounts of the extent and consequences of these governance gaps. The ability of corporations to evade state control also contributes to an unusual, even frightening, phenomenon: corporations are governing like states. Some governance functions traditionally delivered by state actors are now increasingly undertaken by transnational corporations. One area that is experiencing this substitution is dispute resolution of human rights. Corporations and other business enterprises, individually or collectively, are creating a variety of grievance mechanisms to address human rights and other conflicts associated – even caused – by their business activities. When these roles are fulfilled by state actors, we rely on procedural fairness to guide, even discipline, decision-makers. Procedural fairness improves our faith in decision-makers and their institutions even if we might disagree with the outcomes reached. What does procedural fairness mean when it is undertaken by a corporation providing quasi-public governance? What factors might improve its disciplining potential on corporations and increase the likelihood that the watching public, local and global, might accept the outcomes reached? Current guidance to corporations is based upon public law traditions. Consequently, success has been limited because these approaches fail to address the characteristics and dynamics of governance by the business sector. By contrast, this Article offers a new framework for procedural fairness that is based upon a neglected but significant source: contract law. This framework draws upon interdisciplinary research on relational contracts to develop a strategy for trust-building that can improve the quality of governance performed by the transnational business sector