Multi-agent simulations for emergency situations in an airport scenario

This paper presents a multi-agent framework using Net- Logo to simulate humanand collective behaviors during emergency evacuations. Emergency situationappears when an unexpected event occurs. In indoor emergency situation, evacuation plans defined by facility manager explain procedure and safety ways tofollow in an emergency situation. A critical and public scenario is an airportwhere there is an everyday transit of thousands of people. In this scenario theimportance is related with incidents statistics regarding overcrowding andcrushing in public buildings. Simulation has the objective of evaluating buildinglayouts considering several possible configurations. Agents could be based onreactive behavior like avoid danger or follow other agent, or in deliberative behaviorbased on BDI model. This tool provides decision support in a real emergencyscenario like an airport, analyzing alternative solutions to the evacuationprocess.Publicad

A multi-agent system with application in project scheduling

The new economic and social dynamics increase project complexity and makes scheduling problems more difficult, therefore scheduling requires more versatile solutions as Multi Agent Systems (MAS). In this paper the authors analyze the implementation of a Multi-Agent System (MAS) considering two scheduling problems: TCPSP (Time-Constrained Project Scheduling), and RCPSP (Resource-Constrained Project Scheduling). The authors propose an improved BDI (Beliefs, Desires, and Intentions) model and present the first the MAS implementation results in JADE platform.multi-agent architecture, scheduling, project management, BDI architecture, JADE.

Joint Optimal Pricing and Electrical Efficiency Enforcement for Rational Agents in Micro Grids

In electrical distribution grids, the constantly increasing number of power generation devices based on renewables demands a transition from a centralized to a distributed generation paradigm. In fact, power injection from Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) can be selectively controlled to achieve other objectives beyond supporting loads, such as the minimization of the power losses along the distribution lines and the subsequent increase of the grid hosting capacity. However, these technical achievements are only possible if alongside electrical optimization schemes, a suitable market model is set up to promote cooperation from the end users. In contrast with the existing literature, where energy trading and electrical optimization of the grid are often treated separately or the trading strategy is tailored to a specific electrical optimization objective, in this work we consider their joint optimization. Specifically, we present a multi-objective optimization problem accounting for energy trading, where: 1) DERs try to maximize their profit, resulting from selling their surplus energy, 2) the loads try to minimize their expense, and 3) the main power supplier aims at maximizing the electrical grid efficiency through a suitable discount policy. This optimization problem is proved to be non convex, and an equivalent convex formulation is derived. Centralized solutions are discussed first, and are subsequently distributed. Numerical results to demonstrate the effectiveness of the so obtained optimal policies are then presented

Rational Verification in Iterated Electric Boolean Games

Electric boolean games are compact representations of games where the players have qualitative objectives described by LTL formulae and have limited resources. We study the complexity of several decision problems related to the analysis of rationality in electric boolean games with LTL objectives. In particular, we report that the problem of deciding whether a profile is a Nash equilibrium in an iterated electric boolean game is no harder than in iterated boolean games without resource bounds. We show that it is a PSPACE-complete problem. As a corollary, we obtain that both rational elimination and rational construction of Nash equilibria by a supervising authority are PSPACE-complete problems.Comment: In Proceedings SR 2016, arXiv:1607.0269

Aspects of cooperating agents

An overview on aspects about cooperating agents is presented. As multiagent systems are various, we start with a classification of multiagent systems which is particularly influenced by an article from Decker, Durfee, and Lesser [Decker& 89]. In the following, the aspects of communication, planning, and negotiation are examined. On the occasion of communication, the discussion is split into: no communication - simple protocols - artificial languages. The planning aspect is broken into sections: from classical to multiagent planning - a general multiagent planning theory - intention - intention-directed multiagent planning. Finally, a summary of Brigitte and Hassan Lâasri and Victor Lesser\u27s negotiation theory will be presented

Evolutionary Tournament-Based Comparison of Learning and Non-Learning Algorithms for Iterated Games

Evolutionary tournaments have been used effectively as a tool for comparing game-playing algorithms. For instance, in the late 1970's, Axelrod organized tournaments to compare algorithms for playing the iterated prisoner's dilemma (PD) game. These tournaments capture the dynamics in a population of agents that periodically adopt relatively successful algorithms in the environment. While these tournaments have provided us with a better understanding of the relative merits of algorithms for iterated PD, our understanding is less clear about algorithms for playing iterated versions of arbitrary single-stage games in an environment of heterogeneous agents. While the Nash equilibrium solution concept has been used to recommend using Nash equilibrium strategies for rational players playing general-sum games, learning algorithms like fictitious play may be preferred for playing against sub-rational players. In this paper, we study the relative performance of learning and non-learning algorithms in an evolutionary tournament where agents periodically adopt relatively successful algorithms in the population. The tournament is played over a testbed composed of all possible structurally distinct 2×2 conflicted games with ordinal payoffs: a baseline, neutral testbed for comparing algorithms. Before analyzing results from the evolutionary tournament, we discuss the testbed, our choice of representative learning and non-learning algorithms and relative rankings of these algorithms in a round-robin competition. The results from the tournament highlight the advantage of learning algorithms over players using static equilibrium strategies for repeated plays of arbitrary single-stage games. The results are likely to be of more benefit compared to work on static analysis of equilibrium strategies for choosing decision procedures for open, adapting agent society consisting of a variety of competitors.Repeated Games, Evolution, Simulation