Why factors facilitating collusion may not predict cartel occurrence — experimental evidence

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Wiley via the DOI in this recordFactors facilitating collusion may not successfully predict cartel occurrence: When a factor predicts that collusion (explicit and tacit) becomes easier, firms might be less inclined to set up a cartel simply because tacit coordination already tends to go in hand with supra‐competitive profits. We illustrate this issue with laboratory data. We run n‐firm Cournot experiments with written cheap‐talk communication between players and we compare them to treatments without the possibility to talk. We conduct this comparison for two, four, and six firms. We find that two firms indeed find it easier to collude tacitly but that the number of firms does not significantly affect outcomes with communication. As a result, the payoff gain from communication increases with the number of firms, at a decreasing rate

Incentive Mechanisms for Participatory Sensing: Survey and Research Challenges

Participatory sensing is a powerful paradigm which takes advantage of smartphones to collect and analyze data beyond the scale of what was previously possible. Given that participatory sensing systems rely completely on the users' willingness to submit up-to-date and accurate information, it is paramount to effectively incentivize users' active and reliable participation. In this paper, we survey existing literature on incentive mechanisms for participatory sensing systems. In particular, we present a taxonomy of existing incentive mechanisms for participatory sensing systems, which are subsequently discussed in depth by comparing and contrasting different approaches. Finally, we discuss an agenda of open research challenges in incentivizing users in participatory sensing.Comment: Updated version, 4/25/201

Tax Incentives for Attracting Foreign Direct Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Comparative Study of Ghana and Kenya

Developing countries have increasingly resorted to the use of tax incentives to attract FDI, despite existing evidence of the shortcomings of tax incentives. In sub-Saharan Africa, tax incentives are a prominent feature of many investment codes. Sub-Saharan African countries find tax incentives as a means of attracting FDI because there are no viable alternatives per se, and they believe that tax incentives can be structured to ensure that FDI advances socio-economic and technological development. But the reliance on tax incentives at the expense of maximizing domestic tax revenue poses a challenge to sustainable development. This study examines Ghana and Kenya to see which of them will better achieve this balance, and makes recommendations on how this balance can be enhanced. The study finds that tax incentives are not well designed and administered. The recommendations suggest that legislative and administrative reforms be undertaken to make tax incentives more effective

Exploring the feasibility of bioenergy crop production with a multi-analytical approach: a case study from Kentucky

Bioenergy crops can provide a reliable and adequate supply of biomass feedstocks to support the bioenergy industry. However, commercial scale production of bioenergy crops has not been established to meet the increasing energy demand for the bioenergy industry. Thus, there is a need to explore the full potential of bioenergy crop production to support energy generation. This dissertation examined the feasibility of bioenergy crop production in the southern United States with a case study from Kentucky. For the feasibility of bioenergy crop production, I (1) analyzed trade-offs among the major components of bioenergy crop production, (2) assessed landowners’ willingness to promote bioenergy crops and, (3) evaluated potential bioenergy policies and prioritized them based on their effectiveness to support the promotion of sustainable bioenergy production. I used multiple approaches including a multi-objective optimization model, a questionnaire survey, and an analytic hierarchy process (AHP) model, to examine the feasibility of bioenergy production. The trade-off analysis highlighted potential opportunities and risks in bioenergy production. Even though there were suitable lands for growing bioenergy crops, the production was not economically beneficial. Further, higher bioenergy production generated concerns for negative impact on the environment. Thus, results from the trade-off analysis showed a need to find the best balance among the trade-offs for better production decisions. The landowner survey indicated that they were relatively more willing to grow bioenergy crops themselves than rent their land to others. Current land management practices and socio-economic and environmental factors affected their land use decisions about bioenergy crop production. Finally, my policy analysis highlighted that policies that incorporate environmental conservation are key to establishing bioenergy crops. In addition, consideration should also be given to efficient technological support while designing specific policy to promote bioenergy production. Overall, results from the whole study can be useful to design effective policies, develop outreach activities, and support technological investments that would promote bioenergy crop production in ways that are economically efficient as well as compatible with social, and environmental factors

The Globalization (Americanization?) of Executive Pay

In the United States, the remuneration packages of top executives are characterized by a strong emphasis on pay-for-performance and by a highly lucrative upside. There is much discussion of the possibility that executive pay practices will globalize in accordance with this pattern. This Article assesses whether such convergence is likely to occur. After surveying briefly the key components of managerial remuneration and after examining the essential elements of the U.S. pay paradigm, the Article considers market-oriented dynamics that could constitute a global compensation imperative. These include wider dispersion of share ownership, more cross-border hiring of executives, growing international merger and acquisition activity, and expansion of business activity by multinational enterprises. The Article will also take into account possible obstacles to the Americanization of executive pay. These could arise from various legal sources (such as corporate law, tax rules, and labor law) as well as soft law and culture. It must be recognized, however, that law could foster as well as hinder a move toward U.S.-style remuneration. For instance, the introduction of tougher disclosure rules seems particularly likely to have this effect. This Article does not assess in detail whether the Americanization of executive pay would be a good thing. It makes a normative contribution, however, by identifying obstacles policymakers should address if they want to promote convergence. It also draws attention to strategies regulators might adopt if they conclude that a move towards U.S.-style compensation arrangements would be a mistake

Market Design in the Presence of Repugnancy: A Market for Children

A market-like mechanism for the allocation of children in both the primary market (market for babies) and the secondary market (adoption market) will result in greater social welfare, and hence be more efficient, than the current allocation methods used in practice, even in the face of repugnancy. Since a market for children falls under the realm of repugnant transactions, it is necessary to design a market with enough safeguards to bypass repugnancy while avoiding the excessive regulations that unnecessarily distort the supply and demand pressures of a competitive market. The goal of designing a market for children herein is two-fold: 1) by creating a feasible market for children, a set of generalizable rules and principles can be realized for designing functioning and efficient markets in the face of repugnancy and 2) the presence of a potential, credible and efficient market in the presence of this repugnancy will stimulate debate into the need for such markets in other similar areas, especially in cases creating a tradable market for organs for transplantation, wherein the absence of the transaction is often a death sentence for those who wish to, but are prevented from, participating in the market