80 research outputs found
Security of the SHA-3 candidates Keccak and Blue Midnight Wish: Zero-sum property
The SHA-3 competition for the new cryptographic standard was initiated by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2007. In the following years, the event grew to one of the top areas currently being researched by the CS and cryptographic communities. The first objective of this thesis is to overview, analyse, and critique the SHA-3 competition. The second one is to perform an in-depth study of the security of two candidate hash functions, the finalist Keccak and the second round candidate Blue Midnight Wish. The study shall primarily focus on zero-sum distinguishers. First we attempt to attack reduced versions of these hash functions and see if any vulnerabilities can be detected. This is followed by attacks on their full versions. In the process, a novel approach is utilized in the search of zero-sum distinguishers by employing SAT solvers. We conclude that while such complex attacks can theoretically uncover undesired properties of the two hash functions presented, such attacks are still far from being fully realized due to current limitations in computing power
Automatic Preimage Attack Framework on \ascon Using a Linearize-and-Guess Approach
\ascon is the final winner of the lightweight cryptography standardization competition .
In this paper, we focus on preimage attacks against round-reduced \ascon.
The preimage attack framework, utilizing the linear structure with the allocating model, was initially proposed by Guo \textit{et al.} at ASIACRYPT 2016 and subsequently improved by Li \textit{et al.} at EUROCRYPT 2019, demonstrating high effectiveness in breaking the preimage resistance of \keccak.
In this paper, we extend this preimage attack framework to \ascon from two aspects. Firstly, we propose a linearize-and-guess approach by analyzing the algebraic properties of the \ascon permutation. As a result, the complexity of finding a preimage for 2-round \ascon-\xof with a 64-bit hash value can be significantly reduced from guesses to guesses.
To support the effectiveness of our approach, we find an actual preimage of all ‘0’ hash in practical time.
Secondly, we develop a SAT-based automatic preimage attack framework using the linearize-and-guess approach, which is efficient to search for the optimal structures exhaustively. Consequently, we present the best theoretical preimage attacks on 3-round and 4-round \ascon-\xof so far
Parameterized Synthesis with Safety Properties
Parameterized synthesis offers a solution to the problem of constructing
correct and verified controllers for parameterized systems. Such systems occur
naturally in practice (e.g., in the form of distributed protocols where the
amount of processes is often unknown at design time and the protocol must work
regardless of the number of processes). In this paper, we present a novel
learning based approach to the synthesis of reactive controllers for
parameterized systems from safety specifications. We use the framework of
regular model checking to model the synthesis problem as an infinite-duration
two-player game and show how one can utilize Angluin's well-known L* algorithm
to learn correct-by-design controllers. This approach results in a synthesis
procedure that is conceptually simpler than existing synthesis methods with a
completeness guarantee, whenever a winning strategy can be expressed by a
regular set. We have implemented our algorithm in a tool called L*-PSynth and
have demonstrated its performance on a range of benchmarks, including robotic
motion planning and distributed protocols. Despite the simplicity of L*-PSynth
it competes well against (and in many cases even outperforms) the
state-of-the-art tools for synthesizing parameterized systems.Comment: 18 page
- …