Bitcoin and the Rise of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations

Bitcoin represents the first real-world implementation of a “decentralized autonomous organization” (DAO) and offers a new paradigm for organization design. Imagine working for a global business organization whose routine tasks are powered by a software protocol instead of being governed by managers and employees. Task assignments and rewards are randomized by the algorithm. Information is not channelled through a hierarchy but recorded transparently and securely on an immutable public ledger called “blockchain”. Further, the organization decides on design and strategy changes through a democratic voting process involving a previously unseen class of stakeholders called “miners”. Agreements need to be reached at the organizational level for any proposed protocol changes to be approved and activated. How do DAOs solve the universal problem of organizing with such novel solutions? What are the implications? We use Bitcoin as an example to shed light on how a DAO works in the cryptocurrency industry, where it provides a peer-to-peer, decentralized and disintermediated payment system that can compete against traditional financial institutions. We also invite commentaries from renowned organization scholars to share their views on this intriguing phenomenon

CacheCash: A Cryptocurrency-based Decentralized Content Delivery Network

Online content delivery has witnessed dramatic growth recently with traffic consuming over half of today’s Internet bandwidth. This escalating demand has motivated content publishers to move outside the traditional solutions of infrastructure-based content delivery networks (CDNs). Instead, many are employing peer-to-peer data transfers to reduce the service cost and avoid bandwidth over-provision to handle peak demands. Unfortunately, the open access work model of this paradigm, which allows anyone to join, introduces several design challenges related to security, efficiency, and peer availability. In this dissertation, we introduce CacheCash, a cryptocurrency-based decentralized content distribution network designed to address these challenges. CacheCash bypasses the centralized approach of CDN companies for one in which end users organically set up new caches in exchange for cryptocurrency tokens. Thus, it enables publishers to hire caches on an as-needed basis, without constraining these parties with long-term business commitments. To address the challenges encountered as the system evolved, we propose a number of protocols and techniques that represent basic building blocks of CacheCash’s design. First, motivated by the observation that conventional security assessment tools do not suit cryptocurrency-based systems, we propose ABC, a threat modeling framework capable of identifying attacker collusion and the new threat vectors that cryptocurrencies introduce. Second, we propose CAPnet, a defense mechanism against cache accounting attacks (i.e., a client pretends to be served allowing a colluding cache to collect rewards without doing any work). CAPnet features a bandwidth expenditure puzzle that clients must solve over the content before caches are given credit, which bounds the effectiveness of this collusion case. Third, to make it feasible to reward caches per data chunk served, we introduce MicroCash, a decentralized probabilistic micropayment scheme that reduces the overhead of processing these small payments. MicroCash implements several novel ideas that make micropayments more suitable for delay-sensitive applications, such as online content delivery. CacheCash combines the previous techniques to produce a novel service-payment exchange protocol that secures the content distribution process. This protocol utilizes gradual content disclosure and partial payment collection to encourage the honest collaborative work between participants. We present a detailed game theoretic analysis showing how to exploit rational financial incentives to address several security threats. This is in addition to various performance optimization mechanisms that promote system efficiency and scalability. Lastly, we evaluate system performance and show that modest machines can serve/retrieve content at a high bitrate with minimal overhead

Unjamming Lightning: A Systematic Approach

Users of decentralized financial networks suffer from inventive security exploits. Identity-based fraud prevention methods are inapplicable in these networks, as they contradict their privacy-minded design philosophy. Novel mitigation strategies are therefore needed. Their rollout, however, may damage other desirable network properties. In this work, we introduce an evaluation framework for mitigation strategies in decentralized financial networks. This framework allows researchers and developers to examine and compare proposed protocol modifications along multiple axes, such as privacy, security, and user experience. As an example, we focus on the jamming attack in the Lightning Network. Lightning is a peer-to-peer payment channel network on top of Bitcoin. Jamming is a cheap denial-of-service attack that allows an adversary to temporarily disable Lightning channels by flooding them with failing payments. We propose a practical solution to jamming that combines unconditional fees and peer reputation. Guided by the framework, we show that, while discouraging jamming, our solution keeps the protocol incentive compatible. It also preserves security, privacy, and user experience, and is straightforward to implement. We support our claims analytically and with simulations. Moreover, our anti-jamming solution may help alleviate other Lightning issues, such as malicious channel balance probing