885 research outputs found

    Constrained Non-Monotone Submodular Maximization: Offline and Secretary Algorithms

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    Constrained submodular maximization problems have long been studied, with near-optimal results known under a variety of constraints when the submodular function is monotone. The case of non-monotone submodular maximization is less understood: the first approximation algorithms even for the unconstrainted setting were given by Feige et al. (FOCS '07). More recently, Lee et al. (STOC '09, APPROX '09) show how to approximately maximize non-monotone submodular functions when the constraints are given by the intersection of p matroid constraints; their algorithm is based on local-search procedures that consider p-swaps, and hence the running time may be n^Omega(p), implying their algorithm is polynomial-time only for constantly many matroids. In this paper, we give algorithms that work for p-independence systems (which generalize constraints given by the intersection of p matroids), where the running time is poly(n,p). Our algorithm essentially reduces the non-monotone maximization problem to multiple runs of the greedy algorithm previously used in the monotone case. Our idea of using existing algorithms for monotone functions to solve the non-monotone case also works for maximizing a submodular function with respect to a knapsack constraint: we get a simple greedy-based constant-factor approximation for this problem. With these simpler algorithms, we are able to adapt our approach to constrained non-monotone submodular maximization to the (online) secretary setting, where elements arrive one at a time in random order, and the algorithm must make irrevocable decisions about whether or not to select each element as it arrives. We give constant approximations in this secretary setting when the algorithm is constrained subject to a uniform matroid or a partition matroid, and give an O(log k) approximation when it is constrained by a general matroid of rank k.Comment: In the Proceedings of WINE 201

    Constrained Monotone Function Maximization and the Supermodular Degree

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    The problem of maximizing a constrained monotone set function has many practical applications and generalizes many combinatorial problems. Unfortunately, it is generally not possible to maximize a monotone set function up to an acceptable approximation ratio, even subject to simple constraints. One highly studied approach to cope with this hardness is to restrict the set function. An outstanding disadvantage of imposing such a restriction on the set function is that no result is implied for set functions deviating from the restriction, even slightly. A more flexible approach, studied by Feige and Izsak, is to design an approximation algorithm whose approximation ratio depends on the complexity of the instance, as measured by some complexity measure. Specifically, they introduced a complexity measure called supermodular degree, measuring deviation from submodularity, and designed an algorithm for the welfare maximization problem with an approximation ratio that depends on this measure. In this work, we give the first (to the best of our knowledge) algorithm for maximizing an arbitrary monotone set function, subject to a k-extendible system. This class of constraints captures, for example, the intersection of k-matroids (note that a single matroid constraint is sufficient to capture the welfare maximization problem). Our approximation ratio deteriorates gracefully with the complexity of the set function and k. Our work can be seen as generalizing both the classic result of Fisher, Nemhauser and Wolsey, for maximizing a submodular set function subject to a k-extendible system, and the result of Feige and Izsak for the welfare maximization problem. Moreover, when our algorithm is applied to each one of these simpler cases, it obtains the same approximation ratio as of the respective original work.Comment: 23 page

    Randomized Strategies for Robust Combinatorial Optimization

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    In this paper, we study the following robust optimization problem. Given an independence system and candidate objective functions, we choose an independent set, and then an adversary chooses one objective function, knowing our choice. Our goal is to find a randomized strategy (i.e., a probability distribution over the independent sets) that maximizes the expected objective value. To solve the problem, we propose two types of schemes for designing approximation algorithms. One scheme is for the case when objective functions are linear. It first finds an approximately optimal aggregated strategy and then retrieves a desired solution with little loss of the objective value. The approximation ratio depends on a relaxation of an independence system polytope. As applications, we provide approximation algorithms for a knapsack constraint or a matroid intersection by developing appropriate relaxations and retrievals. The other scheme is based on the multiplicative weights update method. A key technique is to introduce a new concept called (η,γ)(\eta,\gamma)-reductions for objective functions with parameters η,γ\eta, \gamma. We show that our scheme outputs a nearly α\alpha-approximate solution if there exists an α\alpha-approximation algorithm for a subproblem defined by (η,γ)(\eta,\gamma)-reductions. This improves approximation ratio in previous results. Using our result, we provide approximation algorithms when the objective functions are submodular or correspond to the cardinality robustness for the knapsack problem

    Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-Monotone Submodular Objectives: Offline and Online

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    The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design studies procurement auctions where the auctioneer (buyer) aims to maximize his valuation function subject to a hard budget constraint. We study the problem of designing truthful mechanisms that have good approximation guarantees and never pay the participating agents (sellers) more than the budget. We focus on the case of general (non-monotone) submodular valuation functions and derive the first truthful, budget-feasible and O(1)O(1)-approximate mechanisms that run in polynomial time in the value query model, for both offline and online auctions. Prior to our work, the only O(1)O(1)-approximation mechanism known for non-monotone submodular objectives required an exponential number of value queries. At the heart of our approach lies a novel greedy algorithm for non-monotone submodular maximization under a knapsack constraint. Our algorithm builds two candidate solutions simultaneously (to achieve a good approximation), yet ensures that agents cannot jump from one solution to the other (to implicitly enforce truthfulness). Ours is the first mechanism for the problem where---crucially---the agents are not ordered with respect to their marginal value per cost. This allows us to appropriately adapt these ideas to the online setting as well. To further illustrate the applicability of our approach, we also consider the case where additional feasibility constraints are present. We obtain O(p)O(p)-approximation mechanisms for both monotone and non-monotone submodular objectives, when the feasible solutions are independent sets of a pp-system. With the exception of additive valuation functions, no mechanisms were known for this setting prior to our work. Finally, we provide lower bounds suggesting that, when one cares about non-trivial approximation guarantees in polynomial time, our results are asymptotically best possible.Comment: Accepted to EC 201
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