Almost structural completeness; an algebraic approach

A deductive system is structurally complete if its admissible inference rules are derivable. For several important systems, like modal logic S5, failure of structural completeness is caused only by the underivability of passive rules, i.e. rules that can not be applied to theorems of the system. Neglecting passive rules leads to the notion of almost structural completeness, that means, derivablity of admissible non-passive rules. Almost structural completeness for quasivarieties and varieties of general algebras is investigated here by purely algebraic means. The results apply to all algebraizable deductive systems. Firstly, various characterizations of almost structurally complete quasivarieties are presented. Two of them are general: expressed with finitely presented algebras, and with subdirectly irreducible algebras. One is restricted to quasivarieties with finite model property and equationally definable principal relative congruences, where the condition is verifiable on finite subdirectly irreducible algebras. Secondly, examples of almost structurally complete varieties are provided Particular emphasis is put on varieties of closure algebras, that are known to constitute adequate semantics for normal extensions of S4 modal logic. A certain infinite family of such almost structurally complete, but not structurally complete, varieties is constructed. Every variety from this family has a finitely presented unifiable algebra which does not embed into any free algebra for this variety. Hence unification in it is not unitary. This shows that almost structural completeness is strictly weaker than projective unification for varieties of closure algebras

Zero-one laws with respect to models of provability logic and two Grzegorczyk logics

It has been shown in the late 1960s that each formula of first-order logic without constants and function symbols obeys a zero-one law: As the number of elements of finite models increases, every formula holds either in almost all or in almost no models of that size. Therefore, many properties of models, such as having an even number of elements, cannot be expressed in the language of first-order logic. Halpern and Kapron proved zero-one laws for classes of models corresponding to the modal logics K, T, S4, and S5 and for frames corresponding to S4 and S5. In this paper, we prove zero-one laws for provability logic and its two siblings Grzegorczyk logic and weak Grzegorczyk logic, with respect to model validity. Moreover, we axiomatize validity in almost all relevant finite models, leading to three different axiom systems

Three-valued logics, uncertainty management and rough sets

This paper is a survey of the connections between three-valued logics and rough sets from the point of view of incomplete information management. Based on the fact that many three-valued logics can be put under a unique algebraic umbrella, we show how to translate three-valued conjunctions and implications into operations on ill-known sets such as rough sets. We then show that while such translations may provide mathematically elegant algebraic settings for rough sets, the interpretability of these connectives in terms of an original set approximated via an equivalence relation is very limited, thus casting doubts on the practical relevance of truth-functional logical renderings of rough sets

Extending possibilistic logic over Gödel logic

In this paper we present several fuzzy logics trying to capture different notions of necessity (in the sense of possibility theory) for Gödel logic formulas. Based on different characterizations of necessity measures on fuzzy sets, a group of logics with Kripke style semantics is built over a restricted language, namely, a two-level language composed of non-modal and modal formulas, the latter, moreover, not allowing for nested applications of the modal operator N. Completeness and some computational complexity results are shown

A UNIFYING FIELD IN LOGICS: NEUTROSOPHIC LOGIC. NEUTROSOPHY, NEUTROSOPHIC SET, NEUTROSOPHIC PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS

In 1960s Abraham Robinson has developed the non-standard analysis, a formalization of analysis and a branch of mathematical logic, which rigorously defines the infinitesimals

A Dempster-Shafer theory inspired logic.

Issues of formalising and interpreting epistemic uncertainty have always played a prominent role in Artificial Intelligence. The Dempster-Shafer (DS) theory of partial beliefs is one of the most-well known formalisms to address the partial knowledge. Similarly to the DS theory, which is a generalisation of the classical probability theory, fuzzy logic provides an alternative reasoning apparatus as compared to Boolean logic. Both theories are featured prominently within the Artificial Intelligence domain, but the unified framework accounting for all the aspects of imprecise knowledge is yet to be developed. Fuzzy logic apparatus is often used for reasoning based on vague information, and the beliefs are often processed with the aid of Boolean logic. The situation clearly calls for the development of a logic formalism targeted specifically for the needs of the theory of beliefs. Several frameworks exist based on interpreting epistemic uncertainty through an appropriately defined modal operator. There is an epistemic problem with this kind of frameworks: while addressing uncertain information, they also allow for non-constructive proofs, and in this sense the number of true statements within these frameworks is too large. In this work, it is argued that an inferential apparatus for the theory of beliefs should follow premises of Brouwer's intuitionism. A logic refuting tertium non daturìs constructed by defining a correspondence between the support functions representing beliefs in the DS theory and semantic models based on intuitionistic Kripke models with weighted nodes. Without addional constraints on the semantic models and without modal operators, the constructed logic is equivalent to the minimal intuitionistic logic. A number of possible constraints is considered resulting in additional axioms and making the proposed logic intermediate. Further analysis of the properties of the created framework shows that the approach preserves the Dempster-Shafer belief assignments and thus expresses modality through the belief assignments of the formulae within the developed logic