In Search of an Integrated Logic of Conviction and Intention

According to a two-level criterion for combination tests in the field of ordinary language (C-CT), moral 'ought'-sentences may be taken to imply 'I intend'-sentences partly semantically and partly pragmatically. If so, a trenchant linguistic analysis of the concept of moral obligation cannot do without a non-classical logic which allows to model these important kinds of ordinary-language implications by means of purely syntactical derivations. For this purpose, an integrated logic of conviction and intention has been tentatively devised by way of a doxastically, buletically, and pragmatically extended calculus of natural deduction. This system of buletic logic cannot even be launched without one or two derivation rules of deductive closedness. However, these very closedness rules appear to be responsible for buletic paradoxes which are analogous to paradoxes long since known from other, less exotic branches of logic but at first sight look much more virulent. After having scrutinized two potential strategies for coping with the paradoxes of buletic logic, finally we can convince ourselves that these paradoxes, as well as their familiar non-buletic counterparts, are but apparent paradoxes, provided we consistently lean on C-CT and do not let pragmatical considerations intrude into purely logical ones

Designing Normative Theories for Ethical and Legal Reasoning: LogiKEy Framework, Methodology, and Tool Support

A framework and methodology---termed LogiKEy---for the design and engineering of ethical reasoners, normative theories and deontic logics is presented. The overall motivation is the development of suitable means for the control and governance of intelligent autonomous systems. LogiKEy's unifying formal framework is based on semantical embeddings of deontic logics, logic combinations and ethico-legal domain theories in expressive classic higher-order logic (HOL). This meta-logical approach enables the provision of powerful tool support in LogiKEy: off-the-shelf theorem provers and model finders for HOL are assisting the LogiKEy designer of ethical intelligent agents to flexibly experiment with underlying logics and their combinations, with ethico-legal domain theories, and with concrete examples---all at the same time. Continuous improvements of these off-the-shelf provers, without further ado, leverage the reasoning performance in LogiKEy. Case studies, in which the LogiKEy framework and methodology has been applied and tested, give evidence that HOL's undecidability often does not hinder efficient experimentation.Comment: 50 pages; 10 figure

Managing in Uncertainty : Complexity and the paradoxes of everyday organizational life

© 2015 Chris Mowles. All rights reserved.The reality of everyday organizational life is that it is filled with uncertainty, contradictions and paradoxes. Yet leaders and managers are expected to act as though they can predict the future and bring about the impossible: that they can transform themselves and their colleagues, design different cultures, choose the values for their organization, be innovative, control conflict and have inspiring visions. Whilst managers will have had lots of experiences of being in charge, they probably realise that they are not always in control. So how might we frame a much more realistic account of what’s possible for managers to achieve? Many managers are implicitly aware of their messy reality, but they rarely spend much time reflecting on what it is that they are actually doing. Drawing on insights from the complexity sciences, process sociology and pragmatic philosophy, Chris Mowles engages directly with some principal contradictions of organizational life concerning innovation, culture change, conflict and leadership. Mowles argues that if managers proceed from the expectation that organizational life as inherently uncertain, and interactions between people are complex and often paradoxical, they start noticing different things and create possibilities for acting in different ways. Managing in Uncertainty will be of interest to practitioners, advanced students and researchers looking at management and organizational studies from a critical perspective

Learner autonomy : the first language/ second language : some reflections on the nature and role of metalinguistic knowledge

Learner autonomy is classically defined as "the ability to take charge of one's learning" (Holec 1981:3). Such an ability presupposes a positive attitude towards the process, content and goals of learning, and is sustained and strengthened by a developing capacity for "detachment, critical reflection, decision-making, and independent action" (little 1991:4). The freedom that characterizes the autonomous learner is not absolute, but conditional and constrained. Learning, whether developmental/ experiential or formal, is always embedded in an interactive, social process (self- instruction entails an internalization of this process, so that our capacity for learning on our own develops out of our experience of learning in interaction with others; cf. Uttle 1991:5). This explains the paradox that learner autonomy can be fully understood as a theoretical construct and effectively pursued as a pedagogical goal only when we take full account of the social context in which learning takes place. The argument in favour of fostering learner autonomy has been conducted in both social and psychological terms. In adult education, for example, there has been a tendency to stress "the need to develop the individual's freedom by developing those abilities which will enable him to act more responsibly in running the affairs of the society in which he lives" (Holec 1981:1.). The link between educational purpose and political ideal could scarcely be plainer. Other explorations of the theory and practice of learner autonomy, by contrast, have focussed on the psychological dimension of learning, emphasizing that we can only ever learn on the basis of what we already know, and that no two individuals have exactly the same store of knowledge.peer-reviewe

Practicing Hope

In this essay, I consider how the theological virtue of hope might be practiced. I will first explain Thomas Aquinas’s account of this virtue, including its structural relation to the passion of hope, its opposing vices, and its relationship to the friendship of charity. Then, using narrative and character analysis from the film The Shawshank Redemption, I examine a range of hopeful and proto-hopeful practices concerning both the goods one hopes for and the power one relies on to attain those goods. In particular, I show how the film’s picture of the role friends and friendship play in catalyzing hope is a compelling metaphor for Christian hope’s reliance on Go

Identity and Commitment: Sen\u27s Conception of the Individual

This paper develops a conception of personal identity for Amartya Sen’s capability framework that emphasizes his self-scrutinizing aspect of the self and related concept of commitment, and compares this conception to the collective intentionality-based one advanced in Davis (2003c). The paper also distinguishes personal identity and social identity, and contrasts Sen’s framework with recent standard economics’ explanation of social identity in terms of conformity. Sen’s concept of commitment is examined in two formulations, and the later version is related to Bernard Williams’ thinking about identity-conferring commitments. The paper’s concludes by arguing that explaining personal identity as a special capability and possible object of social-economic policy provides one way of resolving the debate over whether the capability framework ought to have a short-list of essential capabilities

What If? The Exploration of an Idea

A crucial question here is what, exactly, the conditional in the naive truth/set comprehension principles is. In 'Logic of Paradox', I outlined two options. One is to take it to be the material conditional of the extensional paraconsistent logic LP. Call this "Strategy 1". LP is a relatively weak logic, however. In particular, the material conditional does not detach. The other strategy is to take it to be some detachable conditional. Call this "Strategy 2". The aim of the present essay is to investigate Stragey 1. It is not to advocate it. The work is simply an extended exploration of the strategy, its strengths, its weaknesses, and the various dierent ways in which it may be implemented. In the first part of the paper I will set up the appropriate background details. In the second, I will look at the strategy as it applies to the semantic paradoxes. In the third I will look at how it applies to the set-theoretic paradoxes