On policy interactions among nations: when do cooperation and commitment matter?

This paper offers a framework to study commitment and cooperation issues in games with multiple policymakers. To reconcile some puzzles in the recent literature on the nature of policy interactions among nations, we prove that games characterized by different commitment and cooperation schemes can admit the same equilibrium outcome if certain spillover effects vanish at the common solution of these games. We provide a detailed discussion of these spillovers, showing that, in general, commitment and cooperation are nontrivial issues. Yet in linear-quadratic models with multiple policymakers, commitment and cooperation schemes are shown to become irrelevant under certain assumptions. The framework is sufficiently general to cover a broad range of results from the recent literature on policy interactions as special cases, both within monetary unions and among fully sovereign nations.International economic relations ; Game theory

On policy interactions among nations : when do cooperation and commitment matter ?

This paper offers a framework to study commitment and cooperation issues in games with multiple policymakers. To reconcile some puzzles in the recent literature on the nature of policy interactions among nations, we prove that games characterized by different commitment and cooperation schemes can admit the same equilibrium outcome if certain spillover effects vanish at the common solution of these games. We provide a detailed discussion of these spillovers, showing that, in general, commitment and cooperation are non-trivial issues. Yet, in linear-quadratic models with multiple policymakers commitment and cooperation schemes are shown to become irrelevant under certain assumptions. The framework is sufficiently general to cover a broad range of results from the recent literature on policy interactions as special cases, both within monetary unions and among fully sovereign nations.Credibility, commitment, monetary policy, fiscal policy, policy mix.

A generic framework for context-sensitive analysis of modular programs

Context-sensitive analysis provides information which is potentially more accurate than that provided by context-free analysis. Such information can then be applied in order to validate/debug the program and/or to specialize the program obtaining important improvements. Unfortunately, context-sensitive analysis of modular programs poses important theoretical and practical problems. One solution, used in several proposals, is to resort to context-free analysis. Other proposals do address context-sensitive analysis, but are only applicable when the description domain used satisfies rather restrictive properties. In this paper, we argüe that a general framework for context-sensitive analysis of modular programs, Le., one that allows using all the domains which have proved useful in practice in the non-modular setting, is indeed feasible and very useful. Driven by our experience in the design and implementation of analysis and specialization techniques in the context of CiaoPP, the Ciao system preprocessor, in this paper we discuss a number of design goals for context-sensitive analysis of modular programs as well as the problems which arise in trying to meet these goals. We also provide a high-level description of a framework for analysis of modular programs which does substantially meet these objectives. This framework is generic in that it can be instantiated in different ways in order to adapt to different contexts. Finally, the behavior of the different instantiations w.r.t. the design goals that motivate our work is also discussed

Pareto Efficiency in International Taxation

This paper addresses a key but neglected task in the theory of international taxation, lent increased urgency by growing awareness of the potential gains from tax coordination: the characterization of Pareto-efficient international tax regimes. It shows that the Diamond-Mirrlees theorem on the desirability of production efficiency, which underlies the key tenets of policy advice in international taxation ? the desirability of destination basis for commodity taxation, of the residence principle for capital income taxation, and of free trade ? is rendered inherently inapplicable to problems of international tax design by the distinctness of national budget constraints that is of the essence in thinking about international taxation. Conditions are established ? relating to the availability of explicit or implicit devices for reallocating tax revenues across countries ? under which production efficiency is nevertheless desirable, and a general characterization developed of the precise ways in which Pareto-efficient international taxation may require violation of established tenets.