Dynamics of banking technology adoption: an application to internet banking

This paper is concerned with examining behaviour of firms (banks) and consumers (banks’ customers) in the event of a new technology (internet banking) introduction. The determinants of consumer adoption of internet banking are characterised using survey data from Korea in both static and dynamic framework. I find evidence that adoption of internet banking is influenced by sex, age, marital status, degree of exposure to internet banking, and the characteristics of the banks. A duration analysis shows no evidence of first mover advantage (order effects) in internet banking whilst the largest bank (rank effects) in commercial banking remains dominant in internet banking. The results imply that the internet banking adoption is dominated by social norm effects

Social Interactions in the Labor Market

We examine theoretically and empirically social interactions in labor markets and how policy prescriptions can change dramatically when there are social interactions present. Spillover effects increase labor supply and conformity effects make labor supply perfectly inelastic at a reference group average. The demand for a good may also be influenced by either a spillover effect or a conformity effect. Positive spillover increases the demand for the good with interactions, and a conformity effect makes the demand curve pivot to become less price sensitive. Similar social interactions effects appear in the associated derived demands for labor. Individual and community factors may influence the average length of poverty spells. We measure local economic conditions by the county unemployment rate and neighborhood spillover effects by the racial makeup and poverty rate of the county. We find that moving an individual from one standard deviation above the mean poverty rate to one standard deviation below the mean poverty rate (from the inner city to the suburbs) lowers the average poverty spell by 20–25 percent. We further consider overall labor market outcomes by examining theoretically the socially optimal wealth distribution. Interdependence in utility can mitigate the need to transfer wealth to low-wage individuals and may require them to be poorer by all objective measures. Finally, we quantify how labor market policy changes when there are household social interactions. Labor supply estimates indicate positive economically important spillovers for adult U.S. men. Ignoring or incorrectly considering social interactions can mis-estimate the labor supply response of tax reform in the United States by as much as 60 percent.social interactions, spillover, conformity, inequality, poverty, labor supply, reference group, social multiplier, income tax, PSID

Dynamics of Banking Technology Adoption: An Application to Internet Banking

This paper is concerned with examining behaviour of firms (banks) and consumers (banks' customers) in the event of a new technology (internet banking) introduction. The determinants of consumer adoption of internet banking are characterised using survey data from Korea in both static and dynamic framework. I find evidence that adoption of internet banking is influenced by sex, age, marital status, degree of exposure to internet banking, and the characteristics of the banks. A duration analysis shows no evidence of first mover advantage (order effects) in internet banking whilst the largest bank (rank effects) in commercial banking remains dominant in internet banking. The results imply that the internet banking adoption is dominated by social norm effects.internet banking, technology adoption, first-mover advantage, pre-emption, social norm

DYNAMICS OF BANKING TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION : AN APPLICATION TO INTERNET BANKING

This paper is concerned with examining behaviour of firms (banks) and consumers (banks’ customers) in the event of a new technology (internet banking) introduction. The determinants of consumer adoption of internet banking are characterised using survey data from Korea in both static and dynamic framework. I find evidence that adoption of internet banking is influenced by sex, age, marital status, degree of exposure to internet banking, and the characteristics of the banks. A duration analysis shows no evidence of first mover advantage (order effects) in internet banking whilst the largest bank (rank effects) in commercial banking remains dominant in internet banking. The results imply that the internet bankin g adoption is dominated by social norm effects.internet banking ; technology adoption ; first-mover advantage ; pre-emption ; social norm

Migration Enclaves, Schooling Choices and Social Mobility

This paper investigates the presence of a network externality which might explain the persistence of low schooling achievements among internal migrants. We test empirically whether young migrants schooling decisions are affected by the presence of covillagers at destination, using data on life-time histories of migration and education choices from a rural region of Thailand. Different modelling approaches are used to account for the self-selection of young migrants, for potential endogeneity of the network size, and for unobserved heterogeneity in individual preferences. The size of the migrant network is found to negatively affect the propensity of young migrants to pursue schooling while in the city. This finding suggests that policies seeking to minimise stratification in enclaves might have a socially multiplied impact on schooling participation, and, ultimately, affect the socio-economic mobility of the rural born.education, networks, migration

Reference values: a review

Reference values are used to describe the dispersion of variables in healthy individuals. They are usually reported as population-based reference intervals (RIs) comprising 95% of the healthy population. International recommendations state the preferred method as a priori nonparametric determination from at least 120 reference individuals, but acceptable alternative methods include transference or validation from previously established RIs. The most critical steps in the determination of reference values are the selection of reference individuals based on extensively documented inclusion and exclusion criteria and the use of quality-controlled analytical procedures. When only small numbers of values are available, RIs can be estimated by new methods, but reference limits thus obtained may be highly imprecise. These recommendations are a challenge in veterinary clinical pathology, especially when only small numbers of reference individuals are available

Testing Guilt Aversion

Guilt averse individuals experience a utility loss if they believe they let someone down. In particular, generosity depends on what the donor believes that the recipient expects to receive. In experimental work, several authors have identified a positive correlation between such second-order donor beliefs and generous behavior, as predicted by the guilt aversion hypothesis. However, the correlation could alternatively be due to a “false consensus effect,” i.e., the tendency of people to believe others to think like themselves. In order to test the guilt aversion hypothesis more rigorously, we conduct three separate experiments: a dictator game experiment, a complete information trust game experiment, and a hidden action trust game experiment. In the experiments we inform donors about the beliefs of their respective recipients, while eliciting these beliefs so as to maximize recipient honesty. The correlation between generous behavior and donors’ second-order beliefs is close to zero in all three experiments.guilt aversion; beliefs; generosity; experiments.

The effect of anchors and social information on behaviour

We use a ‘multi-player dictator game’ (MDG), with ‘social information’ about the monetary transfer made by a previous dictator to a recipient, to examine whether average contributions as well as the behavioural strategy adopted are affected by the first amount presented (the ‘anchor’) using a sequential strategy elicitation method. We find that average contributions are positively affected by the anchor. The anchor is also found to influence the behavioural strategy that individuals adopt, such that low anchors significantly increase the likelihood that players will adopt unconditional self-interested strategies, whereas high anchors increase the likelihood of adopting giving strategies. The distribution of strategies – and hence, the distribution of behavioural ‘types’ - is therefore affected by the initial conditions of play, lending support to the notion that behavioural strategies are context dependent

The effect of anchors and social information on behaviour

We use a ‘multi-player dictator game’ (MDG), with ‘social information’ about the monetary transfer made by a previous dictator to a recipient, to examine whether average contributions as well as the behavioural strategy adopted are affected by the first amount presented (the ‘anchor’) using a sequential strategy elicitation method. We find that average contributions are positively affected by the anchor. The anchor is also found to influence the behavioural strategy that individuals adopt, such that low anchors significantly increase the likelihood that players will adopt unconditional self-interested strategies, whereas high anchors increase the likelihood of adopting giving strategies. The distribution of strategies – and hence, the distribution of behavioural ‘types’ - is therefore affected by the initial conditions of play, lending support to the notion that behavioural strategies are context dependent