The Frontiers of Technology in Warhead Verification

How might new technical verification capabilities enhance the prospects of success in future nuclear arms control negotiations? Both theory and evidence suggest that verification technologies can influence the dynamics of arms control negotiations by shaping and constraining the arguments and strategies that are available to the involved stakeholders. In the future, new technologies may help transcend the specific verification challenge of high-security warhead authentication, which is a verification capability needed in future disarmament scenarios that address fewer warheads, limit new categories of warheads, and involve nuclear weapons states other than the United States and Russia. Under these circumstances, the core challenge is maintaining the confidentiality of the classified information related to the warheads under inspection, while providing transparency in the verification process. This analysis focuses on a set of emerging warhead authentication approaches that rely on the cryptographic concept of zero-knowledge proofs and intend to solve the paradox between secrecy and transparency, making deeper reductions in warhead arsenals possible and thus facilitating future nuclear arms control negotiations

Complex negotiations in multi-agent systems

Los sistemas multi-agente (SMA) son sistemas distribuidos donde entidades autónomas llamadas agentes, ya sean humanos o software, persiguen sus propios objetivos. El paradigma de SMA ha sido propuesto como la aproximación de modelo apropiada para aplicaciones como el comercio electrónico, los sistemas multi-robot, aplicaciones de seguridad, etc. En la comunidad de SMA, la visión de sistemas multi-agente abiertos, donde agentes heterogéneos pueden entrar y salir del sistema dinámicamente, ha cobrado fuerza como paradigma de modelado debido a su relación conceptual con tecnologías como la Web, la computación grid, y las organizaciones virtuales. Debido a la heterogeneidad de los agentes, y al hecho de dirigirse por sus propios objetivos, el conflicto es un fenómeno candidato a aparecer en los sistemas multi-agente. En los últimos años, el término tecnologías del acuerdo ha sido usado para referirse a todos aquellos mecanismos que, directa o indirectamente, promueven la resolución de conflictos en sistemas computacionales como los sistemas multi-agente. Entre las tecnologías del acuerdo, la negociación automática ha sido propuesta como uno de los mecanismos clave en la resolución de conflictos debido a su uso análogo en la resolución de conflictos entre humanos. La negociación automática consiste en el intercambio automático de propuestas llevado a cabo por agentes software en nombre de sus usuarios. El objetivo final es conseguir un acuerdo con todas las partes involucradas. Pese a haber sido estudiada por la Inteligencia Artificial durante años, distintos problemas todavía no han sido resueltos por la comunidad científica todavía. El principal objetivo de esta tesis es proponer modelos de negociación para escenarios complejos donde la complejidad deriva de (1) las limitaciones computacionales o (ii) la necesidad de representar las preferencias de múltiples individuos. En la primera parte de esta tesis proponemos un modelo de negociación bilateral para el problema deSánchez Anguix, V. (2013). Complex negotiations in multi-agent systems [Tesis doctoral no publicada]. Universitat Politècnica de València. https://doi.org/10.4995/Thesis/10251/21570Palanci

Was Machiavelli Right? Lying in Negotiation and the Art of Defensive Self-Help

The majority of law review articles addressing lying and deception in negotiation have argued, in one form or another, that liars and deceivers could be successfully reined in and controlled if only the applicable ethics rules were strengthened, and if corresponding enforcement powers were sufficiently beefed up and effectively executed. This article takes a different approach, arguing that the applicable ethics rules will likely never be strengthened, and, furthermore, that even if they were, they would be difficult to enforce in any meaningful way, at least in the context of negotiation. The article concludes that lawyers, businesspeople, and everyone else who engages in negotiation should learn how to carefully and purposefully implement mindsets, strategies, and tactics to defend themselves against others who lie and deceive. The article sets forth those defensive devices and offers prescriptive advice for minimizing one\u27s risk of being exploited in a negotiation should other parties lie

Human-Machine Cooperative Decision Making

Diese Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit der gemeinsamen Entscheidungsfindung in der Mensch-Maschine-Kooperation und liefert neue Erkenntnisse, welche von der theoretischen Modellierung bis zu experimentellen Untersuchungen reichen. Zunächst wird eine methodische Klassifikation bestehender Forschung zur Mensch-Maschine-Kooperation vorgenommen und der Forschungsfokus dieser Dissertation mithilfe eines vorgestellten Taxonomiemodells der Mensch-Maschine-Kooperation, dem Butterfly-Modell, abgegrenzt. Darauffolgend stellt die Dissertation zwei mathematische Verhaltensmodelle der gemeinsamen Entscheidungsfindung von Mensch und Maschine vor: das Adaptive Verhandlungsmodell und den n-stufigen War of Attrition. Beide modellieren den Einigungsprozess zweier emanzipierter Kooperationspartner und unterscheiden sich hinsichtlich ihrer Ursprünge, welche in der Verhandlungs- beziehungsweise Spieltheorie liegen. Zusätzlich wird eine Studie vorgestellt, die die Eignung der vorgeschlagenen mathematischen Modelle zur Beschreibung des menschlichen Nachgebeverhaltens in kooperativen Entscheidungsfindungs-Prozessen nachweist. Darauf aufbauend werden zwei modellbasierte Automationsdesigns bereitgestellt, welche die Entwicklung von Maschinen ermöglichen, die an einem Einigungsprozess mit einem Menschen teilnehmen können. Zuletzt werden zwei experimentelle Untersuchungen der vorgeschlagenen Automationsdesigns im Kontext von teleoperierten mobilen Robotern in Such- und Rettungsszenarien und anhand einer Anwendung in einem hochautomatisierten Fahrzeug präsentiert. Die experimentellen Ergebnisse liefern empirische Evidenz für die Überlegenheit der vorgestellten modellbasierten Automationsdesigns gegenüber den bisherigen Ansätzen in den Aspekten der objektiven kooperativen Performanz, des menschlichen Vertrauens in die Interaktion mit der Maschine und der Nutzerzufriedenheit. So zeigt diese Dissertation, dass Menschen eine emanzipierte Interaktion mit Bezug auf die Entscheidungsfindung bevorzugen, und leistet einen wertvollen Beitrag zur vollumfänglichen Betrachtung und Verwirklichung von Mensch-Maschine-Kooperationen

Human-Machine Cooperative Decision Making

The research reported in this thesis focuses on the decision making aspect of human-machine cooperation and reveals new insights from theoretical modeling to experimental evaluations: Two mathematical behavior models of two emancipated cooperation partners in a cooperative decision making process are introduced. The model-based automation designs are experimentally evaluated and thereby demonstrate their benefits compared to state-of-the-art approaches

The Return of the Rogue

The “rogue trader”—a famed figure of the 1990s—recently has returned to prominence due largely to two phenomena. First, recent U.S. mortgage market volatility spilled over into stock, commodity, and derivative markets worldwide, causing large financial institution losses and revealing previously hidden unauthorized positions. Second, the rogue trader has gained importance as banks around the world have focused more attention on operational risk in response to regulatory changes prompted by the Basel II Capital Accord. This Article contends that of the many regulatory options available to the Basel Committee for addressing operational risk it arguably chose the worst: an enforced selfregulatory regime unlikely to substantially alter financial institutions’ ability to successfully manage operational risk. That regime also poses the danger of high costs, a false sense of security, and perverse incentives. Particularly with respect to the low-frequency, high-impact events—including rogue trading—that may be the greatest threat to bank stability and soundness, attempts at enforced self-regulation are unlikely to significantly reduce operational risk, because those financial institutions with the highest operational risk are the least likely to credibly assess that risk and set aside adequate capital under a regime of enforced self-regulation

Mediator Impartiality and Mediator Interest

Scholars have debated whether mediator impartiality or mediator interest plays a more vital role in bringing about a successful outcome. This research develops a comprehensive model that accounts for mediation occurrence and medication outcome in terms of an additive model of both mediator impartiality and mediator interest. The two channels through which mediators influence the changes of mediation and occurrence and outcome are hypothesized to be two dimensions of trust, mediator fairness and mediator capacity. This research argues 1) that mediator impartiality contributes to successful mediation outcomes by improving disputants’ trust in mediators’ fairness and 2) that mediator interest increases the likelihood of successful mediation outcomes by improving disputants’ trust in mediators’ capacity. Therefore, this research hypothesizes that the levels of mediators’ impartiality and mediators’ interest do not have individual effects on mediation occurrence and outcome. It argues, rather, that the additive level of the two variables determines the likelihood of mediation occurrence and successful outcome. The hypotheses of this research are tested using quantitative analysis of 294 interstate mediation cases carried out by states between 1945 and 1999 and qualitative analyses of the Philippines’ mediation of the Borneo dispute between Malaya and Indonesia in 1964 and Syria’s mediation of the border dispute between North Yemen and South Yemen in 1979. Both sets of analyses support the researcher’s claim that it is the additive level of impartiality and interest, rather than the individual level of both variables, that affects the chance of mediation success being achieved

Enemies in Agreement: Domestic Politics, Uncertainty, and Cooperation between Adversaries

Adversarial agreements, such as the nuclear weapons treaties, disarmament zones, or conventional weapons limitations, vary considerably in the information sharing provisions they include. This dissertation investigates why adversarial states sometimes choose to cooperate by creating restraining institutions, and how their choices for the form of that cooperation are constrained and motivated. I argue that uncertainties arising out of domestic political volatility, which includes leadership changes or public unrest, make arms control agreements more likely because these moments create the possibility of foreign policy change. When states consider one another as relatively cooperative, increasing uncertainty about the adversary's security incentives leads them to hedge and pursue low monitoring agreements instead of relying on informal cooperation. Conversely, under highly competitive conditions, increased uncertainty makes states more willing risk cooperation and form agreements with intrusive information provisions where no agreements were previously possible. I show support for the theory through tests using an original data set of all adversarial cooperation agreements (1816-2007) and their provisions. Controlling for other determinants of arms control, I show that both types of domestic political volatility contribute to a higher likelihood of an agreement. As expected, the effect of volatility on types of information provisions is conditional on the prior relationship between the states. A detailed study of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (US-Soviet Union, 1987) traces how shifts created by Gorbachev's new leadership contributed to greater uncertainty among US policymakers about Soviet intentions, giving both sides the negotiating space to design an intrusively monitored treaty. I then demonstrate the generalizability of the theory across a wider range of cases by looking at the effects of domestic volatility on agreement outcomes for adversaries experiencing détente; for those engaged in post-conflict competition, and for asymmetric powers negotiating new weapons limitation.Governmen