The Optimal Taxation of UnskilIed Labor with Job Search and Social Assistance

In order to explore the optimal taxation of low-skilled labor, we extend the standard model of optimal non-linear income taxation in the presence of quasi-linear preferences in leisure by allowing for involuntary unemployment, job search, an exogenous welfare benefit, and a non-utilitarian social welfare function.In trading off more low-skilled employment against more work effort of higher skilled workers, the government balances distortions on the search margin with those on work effort.Positive marginal tax rates at the bottom may help to encourage job search if this search is taxed on a net basis.Lower welfare benefits and search costs tend to reduce marginal tax rates throughout the skill distribution.social welfare;job search;unemployment;income tax;unskilled workers

08361 Abstracts Collection -- Programming Multi-Agent Systems

From 31th August to 5th September, the Dagstuhl Seminar 08361 ``Programming Multi-Agent Systems\u27\u27 was held in the International Conference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the seminar, several participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section describes the seminar topics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available